

SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON BRITISH SECURITY POLICY: A READER

Susan L. Clark
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A Division of Hudson Institute

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
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1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a matter of possible interest.
2. This Research Memorandum, part of a CNA project on issues and developments in the Western Alliance, provides an introduction to Soviet perspectives on British security policy. This collection of original translations of authoritative essays from the Soviet press should serve as one step in the filling of the gap of knowledge about Soviet views about the defense policies, postures, and politics of key U.S. allies.


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
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SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON BRITISH SECURITY POLICY: A READER

Susan L. Clark
James L. Lacy

Naval Warfare Operations Division



ABSTRACT

How the Soviets perceive developments in U.S. security policy is a matter of understandable interest to U.S. security analysts and military planners. Less well known in American security circles, but also a matter of pertinent interest, are Soviet views about the defense policies, postures, and politics of key U.S. allies.

This reader, part of a series of CNA reports concerning the Western Alliance, is an initial step toward filling the gap in the case of one such ally: the United Kingdom. A collection of original translations of recent authoritative essays in Soviet journals and the Soviet press, the reader provides a rich introduction to Soviet perspectives on the multiple dimensions of British security policy.

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FOREWORD

British security policy has been the subject of several papers by the Center for Naval Analyses in recent years. Part of a larger study of future directions in the Western Alliance, these were concerned chiefly with those external and domestic factors most likely to influence Britain's defense priorities, choices, and capabilities in the decade ahead.¹

This reader supplements these other papers with the Soviet perspective on developments in Britain. On the theory that understandings of realities are often important realities themselves--especially in international security affairs--the reader provides a firsthand introduction to recent Soviet writings on the United Kingdom: its security aspirations, policies and debates; its roles in international affairs and arms control; its military forces; and its domestic politics.

The essays in these pages, selected and translated by Susan L. Clark, are taken from the more authoritative Soviet books, journals, newspapers, and monographs published in the USSR in the past 5 years. Together, they provide a rich overview of how the Soviets view U.K. defense policy in its multiple dimensions. Like a companion volume on French security policy,² the aim of the reader is to broaden consideration of developments in Britain by arraying how these play out in the thinking and writings of the principal adversary.

To this end, 17 book excerpts and articles by Soviet authors are included here. The 17 are representative of Soviet analyses of European security issues in general and British security policy in particular, and reflect the relatively high quality and factual informativeness of Soviet analyses.

The presentation of the selections is organized in six parts, beginning with excerpts from G. V. Kolosov's 1984 book, *England's Military-Political Course in Europe* (arguably the best Soviet work on Britain in the past 5 years), and proceeding through more particularized

1. Papers in the CNA Western Alliance Study dealing specifically with British security policy include: Robbin F. Laird, "The Future of the British Strategic Nuclear Forces" (CNA, Research Memorandum 86-121, May 1986); and James L. Lacy and Robbin F. Laird, "Perspectives on Defense Futures: National Development in Europe" (CNA, Research Memorandum 86-118, April 1986), 35-49.

2. Susan L. Clark, "Soviet Perspectives on French Security Policy: A Reader" (CNA, Research Memorandum 86-80, April 1986).

treatments of Britain's Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Emphases (Part II), British-Soviet Relations (Part III), British Military Policy and Doctrine (Part IV), the British Armed Forces (Part V), and a final cluster of articles on the British Military Network (Part VI). Ms. Clark's Introduction provides a summary guide to the contents of each part.

These selections, then, provide a good overview of contemporary Soviet thinking about issues and developments in Britain's foreign policy and defense posture. For those who might think such issues and developments go unnoticed in Soviet security circles, or who believe the Soviets anticipate an early "Findlandization" of Western Europe, these writings may provide a useful corrective. The selections here should be of interest not only to analysts concerned with NATO and West European affairs, but also to analysts and observers who follow Soviet thinking about Western defense.

James L. Lacy

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The aim of this reader is to provide a portfolio of current Soviet views about the state of affairs in British security policy. Selections have been drawn from authoritative Soviet books, journals, monographs and newspapers in recent years, with an eye toward covering all the key components of British foreign policy and defense, including domestic political considerations.

The selections are organized in six parts:

- Overview
- Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Emphases
- Anglo-Soviet Relations
- British Military Policy and Doctrine
- Britain's Armed Forces
- The British Military Network.

Part I, Overview, consists of excerpts from G. V. Kolosov's recent book, *England's Military-Political Course in Europe (Voenno-politicheskii kurs Anglii v Evrope)*, a tour d'horizon of British (and NATO) security policy--one of the best (at least, best informed) recent Soviet writings on the subject.

Liberally citing British and other Western sources throughout, Kolosov introduces the volume with a brief, favorable review of East-West detente in the 1970s, and a consideration of erosion in such cooperation since Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979.

Chapter one traces the shift in British security orientation from the still-global aspirations of the early post-World War II period to the increasing Europe-first focus of the last decade. While, in Kolosov's words, "it would be completely erroneous to assume that British leaders have renounced attempts to use military force in areas extremely remote from England's shores," concerns with internal "socialist transformations" within Western Europe and a "so-called external [threat], which many Western state figures call 'Soviet' in their political dictionary," preoccupy British defense priorities to the near exclusion of significant out-of-area military ventures in the future.

The second chapter looks at the U.K.'s nuclear forces, with emphasis on the history of U.S.-U.K. collaboration in nuclear weapons development and policies, on Britain's role in the Euromissile

deployments of the first half of the 1980s, and on the costs and benefits to Britain of such cooperation. In summary, such close collaboration has, on the one hand, "made it possible [for Britain] to influence to some extent the United States' course in elaborating NATO's nuclear strategy, to receive information first-hand about a broad range of problems and to participate in solving them." On the other hand, "this position has foreordained England's dependence on changes in American strategy and on Washington's interests in the...area."

Kolosov's third chapter deals with the British armed forces in the context of NATO: specifically, the politics of British participation in the NATO integrated military command structure. British participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises and maneuvers is considered at some length. The chapter closes with an appraisal of Western proposals for a "more rational" distribution of military roles among NATO national forces, prospects for "specialization" of Britain's armed forces within the Alliance, and familiar problems in modernizing NATO's infrastructure.

These themes are carried into chapters four and five which deal, variously and in considerable detail with British weapons production, the "development of military-industrial ties between England and the other leading West European states," programs to standardize weapons in NATO, and British attitudes and positions toward such forums as the West European Union, the Eurogroup, and the IEPG.

While "more intelligent" security policies for Britain depend "on who is in power," Kolosov does not foresee striking changes were a new government to take the reins after the next election. "The Labour leaders, with all their vacillations and inconsistency during the seventies, displayed a greater readiness to act in this direction than did the Conservative leaders," but Kolosov's expectations are guarded. Britain under any government will remain beholden to the United States. Nonetheless, "such changes are still more probable in the event the Labourites come to power, possibly in alliance with the other centrist parties."

Part II, Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Emphases, begins with another Kolosov piece, "Great Britain's Military-Political Course at the Start of the Eighties," published in 1983. Urging his readers that "very close attention must be paid to increasing the military might of the western nations," Kolosov reviews the U.S. cruise missile deployments in the U.K., the British government's plans to build up its strategic nuclear forces with the acquisition of Trident, and general plans for conventional force improvements. On the last note, the British Navy is singled out: it "occupies a special place among the nation's armed forces.... Its role and interventionist tendencies were clearly apparent during the Anglo-Argentinian conflict." The article is most illuminating, however, in its analysis of differences in the foreign policy and defense positions of the major political parties in

Britain. (The article appeared before the June 1983 general election in Britain, but this does not unduly date or detract from its perceptiveness.) Again, Britain's Labour Party is viewed cautiously: "The Labour leaders' pre-election promises about changes in British military and political policy often have not been fulfilled or have only been partially fulfilled once the Party has come to power." The recently-formed (1982) Social Democratic Party is a matter of some fascination, but "inasmuch as the Social Democrats are at a stage of both organizational and ideopolitical formation, it is still too early to talk about the existence of any clear-cut principles on military-political matters they might have."

A second article, "Great Britain in Today's World," by S. Madzoevskii and E. Khesin, aims "to elucidate the essence of...changes [in the 1970s] in England's international position." Citing a "far-reaching transformation of the structure of British imperialism towards 'Europeanization,'" the authors elaborate on their major thesis. That is, "in all the main spheres of England's mutual relations with the other imperialist powers--except in nuclear weapons--the tendency to increase the West European component prevails."

Part III, Anglo-Soviet Relations, consists of two essays published in 1984. Both concentrate on U.K.-Soviet relations since Thatcher came to power. In neither are there any surprises. Conservative rule under Thatcher is viewed as a serious break with the more congenial U.K.-Soviet relations of Thatcher's predecessors, and as a serious impediment to improved relations in the future.

The first article, "Soviet-British Relations at the Turn of the Eighties" by A. V. Golubev, is a detailed catalogue of British actions (and "anti-Soviet hysteria") viewed as erosive of good relations since the Conservatives have held Whitehall. In Golubev's conclusion, "The years 1979 to 1983 occupy a special place in the 60-year history of Soviet-British relations. They represent the start of a new complex and contradictory stage in these relations, when everything attained in previous years has been seriously tested."

The second piece, V. Kelin's "USSR-England: Experience in Cooperation in Combating a Common Danger," strikes a slightly more sanguine note, by treating the currently cool state of affairs as an anomaly, which will pass, presumably, when Thatcher departs the scene and the UK returns to its senses.

Part IV, British Military Policy and Doctrine, is introduced by a summary appraisal of Britain's political-military objectives, within and outside NATO, by A. Karemov and G. Semin, "Certain Provisions of the Military Doctrines of the Basic NATO European Countries," published in *Foreign Military Review (Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie)* in 1983. In essence, contemporary British "doctrine recognizes the unlimited use of nuclear weapons in a general war in the form of nuclear attack, and the

possibility of conducting limited wars not only outside the NATO zone, but also in Central Europe. At the same time, British specialists react with great restraint to the idea advanced by the White House of unleashing a 'limited' nuclear war in Europe, seeing in this an increased threat to the British Isles." The article briefly reviews British force structure and military training: a kind of "structure in the British command's estimation [that] makes it possible to employ [forces] flexibly and in various wars and conflicts."

The next selection, also published in *Foreign Military Review*, I. Vladimirov's "Great Britain's Military Policy," is a critical summary of Britain's plans for force modernization in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with noteworthy treatments of nuclear force modernization, chemical weapons, and Britain's expanding security relations with the People's Republic of China.

A lengthy piece by V. G. Trukhanovskii, "England's Nuclear Policy" (1985) follows. It probably is second only to Kolosov's works in terms of quality and informativeness. The article provides a detailed analysis of Britain's nuclear arsenal, the policies and politics surrounding it, and the U.S.-U.K. "special relationship" in this area. On a more general level, Trukhanovskii also examines U.S. bases in Britain, the British peace movements, and the defense priorities of the Thatcher government.

Part V, *Britain's Armed Forces*, consists of five short pieces on current and projected forces and force structure in the U.K. Part I of S. Anzherskii's two-part article in *Foreign Military Review* (1984), "Great Britain's Armed Forces," provides an overview of Britain's strategic nuclear and general purpose forces, including a mostly factual discussion of the U.K.'s ground forces and territorial troops. In part 2 he provides a similar assessment of the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy.

The next article, by V. Roshchupkin, "Ruled Out: The Nuclear Forces of England and France in NATO's Strategy" is (as excerpted here) devoted almost entirely to the British nuclear force and plans for its modernization. Echoing a familiar Moscow perspective, Roshchupkin cites Western media sources to the "supposed 'independent,' 'national' character of the British and French nuclear forces." "...[E]xpiation about the fact that one supposedly must not include British and French missiles in the overall European balance is demagoguery, pure and simple.... [These forces] exist, they are targeted against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and, as Americans themselves state, are intended to supplement the U.S.' forward-based nuclear means." Roshchupkin pays particular attention to both the tactical and the strategic nuclear capabilities of the Royal Navy. "...The British fleet is capable of accomplishing a considerable number of combat tasks both in a general nuclear-missile war and in limited wars--with and without weapons of mass destruction." "[T]he fact that during the

Anglo-Argentinian conflict in the South Atlantic there were nuclear weapons on board the destroyer Sheffield and on board other British combat ships can serve as confirmation of this."

In the next selection, "Great Britain's Naval Forces," Yu. Galkin and S. Grechin provide an insightful rundown of the Royal Navy: its composition, readiness, training, experiences in the Falklands, and lessons evidently learned and plans for its modernization into the 1990s. While senior members of the Royal Navy might today wish it were actually so, the authors are impressed by the "special place" in British security policy accorded to the Navy--"traditionally playing the leading role among the country's branches of the armed forces."

Finally, P. Shiryaev's 1985 article, "The British Air Force Command in the FRG," examines the organizational command and capabilities of the Royal Air Force in Germany, with particular attention to the introduction of the Tornado--an aircraft whose capabilities quite impress the author. "...With the completion of the transition of the main units and subunits of the British air group in the FRG to the Tornado aircraft, its combat potential will grow several times over, particularly in delivering strikes against the opponent's second echelons and reserves." "In terms of its characteristics, [Tornado] surpasses the analogous apparatus of the U.S. F-111 aircraft."

The final part of the reader, Part VI, The British Military Network begins with a piece by Colonel V. Leskov--"Great Britain: Geographical Conditions, State System, Economy, and Elements of its Infrastructure"--which, with its accompanying map, is a virtual targeting guide to the key elements of the U.K. infrastructure. The text itself is interesting as a general overview of the economy and for its listing of the main air and naval bases (including U.S. bases) in the British Isles.

Mr. Belyaev's *Red Star* article, "Who Benefits from the Arms Race?" (1985) is a critical discourse on the "ambitious plans of the Conservatives, dreaming about the former greatness of the British empire and aspiring to play a leading role in the Western world," and "the egotistical activities of the British military-industrial monopolies." A. Volkov's "The British Military Aid Program" (1984) assesses the extent and types of military assistance the UK provides to Third World countries, chiefly through the use of advisors, education, and training.

Lastly, N. Nikolaev's 1984 piece, "Great Britain: Following the Lead of the US' Aggressive Course," actually could fit in several different parts of this reader, assessing, as it does, U.K. military forces. It also examines Britain's role and position in the INF decision and in East-West arms negotiations.

G. V. Kolosov, *England's Military-Political Course in Europe* [Voenno-politicheskii kurs Anglii v Evrope] (Moscow: Nauka, 1984). Excerpts.

INTRODUCTION

The development of international relations in Europe at the present stage represents a highly complex and ambiguous process generating a multitude of varied problems. Among them, military-political issues occupy one of the main positions.

In the past decade and now, at the start of the eighties, one could observe many examples of how the policies of the leading imperialist powers in the military-political sphere have had a negative effect on the situation in the world and in Europe and have undermined that which was positive in relations between the socialist and capitalist states, who had managed to achieve negotiations on security and disarmament in various fora.

The Soviet Union and the other nations of the Warsaw Pact have made great efforts to obtain mutually acceptable agreements with NATO members that would contribute to a lessening of tensions, to a strengthening of security, and to a reduction of armaments and armed forces. This policy was echoed, to one extent or another, in the seventies by ruling circles in the U.S. and the West European nations. A recognition of the need for peaceful coexistence, for restraining this arms race--primarily the nuclear one--made it possible in the past decade to conclude a number of important agreements.

The Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks were of vital importance. In Europe, at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the participating nations examined, and subsequently approved, fundamental principles of interstate relations that meet the interests of peaceful coexistence. Since 1973 the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks have been going on in Vienna, their main objective being to lower the level of opposition in this region of vital military-political importance. All this, along with the expansion of bilateral relations between European socialist and capitalist states in the past decade, has established the basis for a mutually acceptable resolution to the problems of military security and disarmament in Europe.

However, this did not happen. At the end of the seventies and beginning of the eighties, as the CPSU's Central Committee's Report to the XXVI Party Congress noted, "the opponents of detente, of arms limitations, and of improving relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have become noticeably more active."¹

U.S. leaders have taken a course to accelerate the build-up of U.S. military might, to unfold new spirals in the arms race, and to intensify opposition to the Soviet Union. They are striving to lead their West European NATO allies down this dangerous path behind them.

In the context of the deteriorating international situation caused by the policy of imperialism's more aggressive circles, who are attempting to impede the strengthening of the socialist states' position and the development of the national-liberation movement, the Soviet Union is--as was noted at the Plenary of the CPSU Central Committee in June 1983--doing everything necessary to oppose these attempts in order to lessen the threat of a thermonuclear war, to weaken international tension and to preserve peace, and it is striving to make international relations fundamentally healthier and to strengthen and develop all the good principles in these relations.

The implementation of these important tasks of Soviet foreign policy is taking place in conflict and in cooperation with the policy of the United States and the other North Atlantic bloc participants. The nature of this development of international relations as a whole and especially in Europe, where the nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact directly oppose each other, depends on how cooperation progresses and on whether the predominant elements in this cooperation will be elements of confrontation or an attempt to reach a definite mutual understanding and agreement. Much here is tied into the position leading West European powers, including England, will take on the issue of the state relations between the two systems in the military-political sphere.

If one examines England's military-political course and the British leaders' approach to the problems of ensuring security and disarmament from this viewpoint, then, in our view, a study of them provides the potential to concretely examine the complex interaction of the two tendencies in the policy of the North Atlantic allies: a focus on intensifying armed opposition to the socialist community and a policy to reach agreements touching on the military-political aspects of security and the problems of disarmament.

It must be certified that at the start of the eighties, the former tendency was more noticeable in British policy. The Conservative government headed by Margaret Thatcher is doing everything it can to retain for England the role of the leading West European NATO power and is actually assisting in the realization of plans to station new U.S. nuclear weapons systems in Europe.

The increase in elements of opposition observed in recent years in British policy toward the Soviet Union is most directly reflected in the British military-political course and has contributed to the adoption of a whole series of resolutions aimed at building up the military might of England and its NATO allies. For example, in 1977 the British government agreed to annually raise the real expenditures on military needs by

3 percent; in 1979 it approved the plan to station U.S. missiles in Western Europe--including on British territory; and in 1980 it declared its intention to acquire the latest strategic weapon system, the Trident, from the United States. All these decisions were caused primarily by an interest in opposing the socialist community in Europe.

CHAPTER 1. England's Participation in Armed Opposition in Europe: The Main Tasks and Problems in Implementing These Tasks

By the middle of the last decade, the long process of concentrating England's military efforts in Europe had, on the whole, been completed. While even some 15 years ago England was attempting to take part in armed opposition to socialism and the national liberation movement on a global scale, today its military-political course has acquired a sufficiently clearly expressed European orientation, corresponding to the overall evolution of British foreign policy strategy. It is sufficient to note here that, whereas in the fifties and first half of the sixties England's armed forces outside Europe carried out more than 20 major operations, including participation in the war in Korea, in recent years they have not been used on such a scale.²

Naturally, it would be completely erroneous to assume that British leaders have renounced attempts to use military force in areas extremely remote from England's shores. Recurrences of imperial ambitions and new splashes of militant moods are fully possible. A graphic confirmation of this has been the dispatch of the British fleet to the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands during the Anglo-Argentinian conflict in April-May 1982. Also, a still predominant and long-term tendency, in our view, is the orientation of the British armed forces toward executing common NATO tasks in Europe. It is namely active participation in the armed confrontation in this region that is the paramount task facing the British armed forces. As the Secretary of Defence of the Labour government, Denis Healy, stated at the end of the sixties, in the future British military planning "will be based on the conviction that the only conflict in which we would introduce our main armed forces would be a conflict in Europe. Compared to this, our commitments outside Europe will be extremely limited." There are quite definite reasons for this reorganization.

First, it is natural that London would view the concentration of its attention on "defense" of its national territory and its surrounding seas to be the most important priority. So, in fact, it always has been except for the fact that in the relatively recent past, England had to "protect" its vast colonial possessions thousands of miles away. But now, after the forced renunciation of fulfilling most of its military commitments outside Europe, this main task has merely become more visible, as the old fortress tower around which different extensions from different times have been removed.

Second, the increased West European orientation in British foreign policy strategy and its active participation in the all-around development of the West European imperialist "power center" have foreordained the further increase in ensuring their position in Western Europe. Striving in every way possible to increase England's influence with respect to its European Community partners, British leaders have frequently counted on the fact that further fulfilling Britain's role as a leading West European military power in NATO will allow it to have the necessary influence in other areas too. And although these calculations usually do not prove correct, they nevertheless occupy no small place in British policy.

And finally, third, socialism's increased influence and fortified position in Europe troubles the West European--including British--bourgeoisie most of all. British ruling circles seriously fear the possible long-term consequences of this process. The real fear for capitalism's fate in Western Europe is a very important basis of England's military-political course. Neither the outbreak of armed conflicts in the developing world nor the exacerbation of inter-imperialist contradictions currently evokes such a keen reaction from British leaders. Here it is a question of two "threats" virtually at the same time: an internal one connected with the possibility of revolutionary, socialist transformation in a given West European nation and a so-called external one, which many Western state figures call "Soviet" in their political dictionary.

* * *

In defining the appropriate roles for U.S. nuclear armaments in Europe and for England's nuclear force, the majority of British politicians and specialists note the priority of the U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on the European continent that provide the "efficacy" of the military might of the NATO allies, whereas the British nuclear force is usually accorded an auxiliary role in the military confrontation. Such an approach is substantiated by the conviction that it is only thanks to the American nuclear arsenal in Europe, supported by all the U.S. strategic forces, that it is possible for the NATO allies to acquire definite advantages. This, in turn, results in their following the United States in the development of NATO nuclear plans, their support for increasing the American nuclear arsenal in Europe, and their determination to preserve and continue Anglo-American nuclear cooperation and to strengthen military-political ties as a whole.

Counting on nuclear weapons in a confrontation with the Soviet Union is not, of course, anything new. This hope appeared among British leaders and specialists when England's nuclear arsenal had just been established and the first U.S. bombers with atomic bombs were stationed on her territory. Back then Washington and London proceeded from the fact that, in the event of an outbreak of a military conflict in Europe between the NATO members and the nations of the socialist community, the

United States and England would use nuclear weapons right at the first stage of such a conflict. This adventuristic approach by the leaders of the two powers found its practical manifestation at the end of the forties and beginning of the fifties in the formation of plans to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union....

In the 1975 annual survey put out by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, it was asserted that "improved conventional armaments could in many cases replace tactical nuclear weapons systems." This, in the opinion of the compilers of the survey, would lead to a decreased dependency of England, the FRG, and other West European allies on the U.S., as it is namely in the area of the development of nonnuclear arms that the West European nations are capable of attaining the greatest results.⁴ ...British leaders and military commanders, while fully recognizing the advantages that come with placing the latest conventional armaments systems into service, and while continuously carrying out such a modernization, do not consider possible any kind of reduction in the role of nuclear weapons.

* * *

In taking active part in the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance at the end of the forties and beginning of the fifties, British ruling circles presumed that England's objectives in a military confrontation and the protection of its interests in Western Europe required the establishment of close military-political cooperation with the U.S. and West European states, complemented within the NATO framework. In addition, England sought to preserve its "special relationship" with the United States, making it possible for her to retain a privileged position within the alliance compared to the other participating nations.

Have these foundations of the British military-political course undergone any kind of changes?

There is no doubt that the strengthening of NATO and its alliance with the U.S. have been and remain most important objectives of British foreign and military policy. It is difficult to find any significant government statement where this thesis is not expressed in a more or less definite form....

CHAPTER 2. England and Nuclear Weapons

The basic trends in England's bilateral nuclear collaboration with the United States are England's acquisition from the U.S. of materials, information, equipment, and the actual armaments systems to support the effectiveness and augmentation of the British nuclear force, the coordination of this force with the American one, and the stationing in England of various U.S. nuclear weapons systems.

Until now the first trend has been determined by an agreement concluded in 1958 providing for the exchange of information, fissionable materials, and equipment necessary for the production of nuclear weapons. In accordance with it, back at the end of the fifties and beginning of the sixties, the U.S. rendered great assistance in the creation of the first British nuclear submarines and it supplied England with the enriched uranium necessary for the reactors of these submarines and for nuclear weapons. The agreement, designed for 10 years, was extended by the governments of the two countries in 1968 and subsequently in 1973 and 1978. It is of a bilateral, closed character. In accordance with it, England pledged not to transmit any information, materials or equipment as a result of the collaboration to a third country or to an international organization without the consent of the United States. Although the American government took upon itself an analogous commitment with respect to British information and materials, the unequal nature of the exchange makes it a formality for Washington, whereas London must always take the U.S. position into consideration. In an important amendment to this agreement, adopted in May 1959, it was also stated that England had the right to acquire from the U.S. certain special materials for nuclear weapons and even the actual delivery means for the nuclear weapons.

A paramount role in the development of the present British nuclear force was played by the understanding reached in December 1962 in Nassau about deliveries to England of American Polaris ballistic missiles, special materials for warheads, and equipment for launching these missiles and for homing-in on a target. In addition, the U.S., within the framework of this understanding, delivered to England a portion of its navigation equipment and communication systems. And it was namely thanks to U.S. assistance in the creation of its four nuclear missile submarines that England was able, with relatively small expenditures, to increase sharply the effectiveness of its nuclear forces. Based on official data, the purchase of Polaris cost only 58 million pounds sterling and the entire program, including construction of the nuclear submarines, 215 million pounds sterling.

For England, the role of this collaboration was great in the seventies, too. The above-mentioned agreements, supplemented by a series of subsequent individual understandings, remain a sufficiently durable and unique foundation for the further development of relations between the two powers in this area. British leaders have repeatedly underscored the importance of continuing these Anglo-American ties.

It has been noted that after the completion of the Polaris program, England's dependence on the U.S. was retained by deliveries of "certain special materials and equipment." Moreover, the system of agreements made it possible for British specialists to be up on the development of nuclear armaments in the U.S. and to be more informed in this area than the other NATO West European allies. A breach of this system would deprive England of quite definite benefits and advantages. Thus, for

example, while not possessing its own underground range for testing nuclear weapons, since 1963 England has been able, on the basis of its understanding of collaboration with the U.S., to use the U.S. underground range in Nevada and, no less importantly, has been able to receive information about U.S. tests, which have been carried out much more often and on an incomparably larger scale.

Such dependence on the United States remains very substantial. By acquiring Polaris in the sixties and having renounced a program of its own for creating a nuclear-missile weapons system, the British government thereby tied the further development of England's nuclear forces to American programs.

The planned removal of Polaris from the U.S. inventory in the eighties after a transition to new systems has caused uneasiness during the past decade among those British politicians and specialists who have most of all feared that England would be left with an "obsolete" nuclear weapons system in the future.

Back at the beginning of the seventies they were arguing that in order to modernize the nuclear force, England's government should have already then exploited the extant system of Anglo-American relations and convinced Washington, as in 1962 in Nassau, to at least give [England] the latest nuclear weapons delivery missiles. But at that time this point of view did not receive clearly expressed support either from the Conservative leadership or the Labourites. The Heath government did not, in principle, reject the possibility of reaching such an understanding with the U.S., but particularly considering the need to strengthen cooperation with France, it did not aspire to concentrate attention on it. According to press statements, during his visit to the U.S. at the beginning of 1973, Heath ascertained the U.S. President's attitude toward the question of rendering further assistance in the development of British nuclear forces. After the talks were concluded, in response to the question of whether the talks had not been about acquiring U.S. Poseidon missiles, he declared that he "would not, at this stage, want to discuss specific types of arms inasmuch as the government still had not come near to making a decision." The then Secretary of Defence, Lord Carrington, responding to an analogous question, confirmed that England had not made such a request of the U.S. In the event a decision were to be made with respect to the Poseidons and it were to meet with a favorable reaction in Washington, then the British government would, the Secretary continued, make an appropriate official statement.

But in the second half of the seventies, spokesmen from the Conservative Party's leadership, from time to time raising the question about the "need" to modernize the British nuclear forces, pointed out the advantages in receiving American assistance or in acquiring weapons systems from the U.S. In particular, at the start of 1977 there appeared in the conservative press a proposal to buy from the United

States the Polaris missiles being withdrawn from the U.S. arsenal and to additionally equip another four or five [British] nuclear submarines with these missiles. However, the Labour government selected another path for enlarging the might of the British nuclear forces, having placed its basic reliance in the seventies on implementing the Chevaline program.

The execution of this program would scarcely be possible without considerable support on the part of the United States. First and foremost, Washington agreed to continue deliveries of all necessary materials for raising the effectiveness of England's nuclear forces in the eighties. In accordance with the understanding reached, it was planned to ensure deliveries of Polaris missiles and their various components and the granting of necessary information. Moreover, a highly important part of the Chevaline program--the testing of new nuclear warheads and the launching of the missiles themselves--was carried out in the United States.

At the same time under the Labour government, England's operational-tactical nuclear forces were modernized. The obsolete Honest John missiles, in the arsenal of the British Rhine army, were replaced by the new American Lance system, which began to appear in the inventory of the British troops in the FRG in 1976. But, as before, England does not possess the warheads for these missiles; they are kept in special U.S. Army warehouses.

All the same, the most substantial evidence of the continuation of Anglo-American collaboration in the nuclear weapons sphere was the reaching of an understanding about the sale of Trident missiles to England and the granting of aid in the transition to the new strategic arms system. Lawrence Freedman believes that the preparations for such an understanding had been initiated by the Labour government. In his opinion, James Callaghan discussed the question of replacing the Polaris with President Carter in January 1979. The British government's request for the rendering of assistance to build up its nuclear force met with a favorable response from the U.S. administration. The then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, came out in favor of selling Trident missiles to England, noting the desirability of such a modernization.

Subsequently various questions concerning the elaboration of corresponding agreements were also examined by the U.S. conservative government leadership that had come into power. As is clear from materials published by England's Ministry of Defence, a final understanding was confirmed by letters between Carter and Thatcher in July 1980. At the end of September of the same year, the agreement to sell Polaris was reworked in order to extend it to the sale of Trident missiles. It was reported that, as before, England would rely on U.S. assistance in acquiring the missiles themselves, the necessary equipment, and technical information and in using the communications systems and command training centers. It is planned to build the nuclear

submarines in British shipyards. This program is designed for 15 years, and its cost has been determined by England's Ministry of Defence to be 5 billion pounds sterling in 1980 prices. In the event it is implemented, England will receive a qualitatively new strategic arms system. The British nuclear force will then consist of four nuclear submarines with Trident-2 missiles, equipped with 14 individually targetable warheads, and they will be much more powerful and effective than England's present nuclear forces.

But the British leaders are paying for this aid through the subordination of the country's nuclear forces to American strategy and through their de facto connection to U.S. nuclear forces. Still speaking about the sale of Polaris missiles, the well-known American political analyst Richard Rosecrance noted in his monograph, not without foundation, that "in making such concessions, the U.S. had in mind the absence of any kind of divergence of interests over the most important nuclear problems." Lawrence Freedman, who was mentioned earlier, in appraising the Trident agreement, believes that when it was concluded, the U.S. was also being guided by its own political and strategic objectives and did not at all intend to "do much good" for England.

The second trend in the Anglo-American nuclear partnership is the coordination of British nuclear forces with U.S. forces both bilaterally and within NATO. This coordination encompasses military planning, operational interaction and communications. Its effectiveness on the political level is ensured through the functioning of a system of bilateral consultations on the basic questions not only of coordinating nuclear forces, but also on the overall problems of nuclear strategy. This collaboration is based more, not on precisely formulated agreements between the two powers, but on the unity of their courses, the mutual understanding of British and American leaders, and their readiness to coordinate their actions. There also exist special understandings concerning the direct military aspect of coordinating the British nuclear forces with the American ones.

Already by the end of the fifties, when the British V-class strategic bombers with nuclear warheads on board were placed into service, the government "hooked them up" to U.S. nuclear forces in Europe. General plans for interaction were worked out, targets allocated, and command communications established. After the four nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles became the foundation of England's nuclear forces, this coordination expanded correspondingly. It includes elaborating common plans for interaction and targeting, maintaining permanent communications, exchanging information, collaborating in command training, and operating nuclear submarines. During patrol these British subs mainly use data from special American satellites.

But the effectiveness of such coordination still depends, in the final analysis, on political factors and on England's readiness to follow plans outlined jointly with the U.S. In order to retain control

over the British nuclear force, the British government stipulated in its agreement with the U.S. the right to withdraw them from NATO and to use them independently if the "higher national interests of England" were threatened.

Nevertheless, the Labour government, back when it was putting the nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles into service, especially underscored the vital importance of including them in "NATO's nuclear forces."

It was even maintained that it was generally illegal to view the British Polaris as an independent "deterrent." According to the opinion expressed in 1970 by the leader of the Labourites, Harold Wilson, "these forces never were independent. We have rejected such claims and have joined our forces with the Americans'. The decision (to use them) can only be by a collective decision within NATO. There will be no independent use of a so-called independent British deterrent. The only situation where the government will take its nuclear forces out of NATO will be when NATO ceases to exist." Clarifying the essence of the coordination, Secretary of Defence Denis Healy then declared that his government "has made Polaris a part of the alliance's forces, has placed them theoretically under the command of the U.S. Commander-in-Chief of NATO forces in Europe, and has accepted the proposed targets and operational plans."

The leaders of the Conservative Party basically adhered to similar views on the issue of such coordination. At the same time they usually avoided publicly acknowledging and, especially, underscoring the "unconditional" subordination of British nuclear forces to NATO.

But regardless of insignificant differences in interpretation, retaining coordination of the British nuclear force with the American one and the overall bilateral system of consultations on nuclear problems has responded to the most important interests of the leaders of both the Labourites and the Conservatives. It has made it possible to influence to some extent the United States' course in elaborating NATO's nuclear strategy, to receive information firsthand about a broad range of problems, and to participate in solving them. At the same time, this position has foreordained England's dependence on changes in American strategy and on Washington's interests in the given area. In the development of its nuclear planning, England has largely followed the path blazed by the U.S. It is true, as representatives of the British government have maintained, that England took a most active part in the implementation of appropriate changes in NATO's nuclear planning. Here London sought greater influence in carrying out these changes within the framework of bilateral Anglo-American consultations and within NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, established not the least on British initiative.

In supporting close relations with the U.S. in the nuclear weapons sphere, British leaders have attempted to consolidate the "efficacy" of

American "nuclear guarantees" to England and the other West European NATO allies. Spokesmen from the British government have repeatedly asserted that it is namely thanks to the constant ability and readiness of the U.S. to threaten the use of its nuclear weapons that the "security" of the West European allies and NATO's cohesion are ensured. Here they have in mind both U.S. strategic forces and U.S. nuclear weapons systems: missiles, bombers with nuclear weapons, "atomic" artillery, and various nuclear warheads located in Western Europe. These U.S. forces have been viewed and continue to be viewed by British leaders as the main "deterrent," which cannot, for all practical purposes, be replaced by the British Polaris system.

In practice, a highly important result of this policy of the British ruling circles was the basing of various American nuclear weapons systems in England.

It was begun with the deployment of American bombers with nuclear weapons aimed against the Soviet Union in the country back in the first post-war years. In consenting to grant bases on its territory, England's leaders attempted to extract promises from Washington to consult with them ahead of time in a crisis situation when the possibility of using these bombers becomes real. Subsequently, at the juncture of the fifties and sixties, there followed the deployment of the next U.S. nuclear weapons system--medium-range Thor ballistic missiles and in 1960, the granting of bases in Holy Loch for U.S. nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles. During the seventies, the United States retained both the bases for the bombers and the base in Holy Loch, where at the time nuclear submarines with Poseidon missiles made port calls. In 1976 an agreement was reached between England and the U.S. on the construction of a base on the island of Diego Garcia, under British control, in the Indian Ocean for U.S. submarines and bombers having nuclear-missile weapons onboard.

The stationing of American nuclear weapons on British territory and their accumulation long ago turned the country into one of the United States' key outposts in Europe with all the ensuing consequences, and in the military-policy sphere they have made England largely dependent on Washington's will. In the final analysis, the American leaders have decided whether they should consult with the British government regarding given measures concerning these nuclear weapons systems. Experience has shown that in crisis situations Washington has preferred to act independently, not asking the opinion of its junior partner beforehand. For example, in 1973 during the Middle East conflict, the bringing of U.S. air bases in England to a higher level of combat readiness was carried out without coordinating with the Conservative government. Similar cases are to be seen throughout the system of Anglo-American bilateral consultations; they demonstrate the unequal status of the partners. Spokesmen from the country's leftist forces, realistically thinking political figures, and specialists have repeat-

edly pointed out the danger of retaining U.S. nuclear weapons in England under such circumstances.

Nevertheless, there continue to be American bombers located on British territory, equipped with not only conventional, but also nuclear weapons. In addition, in accordance with NATO's plans, the deployment of cruise missiles on U.S. bases in England was begun at the end of 1983. The implementation of this dangerous plan of action is aimed, for all intents and purposes, at disrupting the existing balance of nuclear forces between the Soviet Union and the United States and is capable of leading to a serious exacerbation of the international situation and to the untwisting of new spirals in the nuclear arms race.

The Conservative government, when NATO's decision regarding these missiles was still just being prepared, was the first of the West European state governments to approve the nuclear plans made by the U.S. leaders for Western Europe and did no small amount to convince the other allies of the "need" to implement them very quickly. Such a rigid position was brought about by the course taken by the Conservatives to intensify military opposition to the Soviet Union and by their determination to consolidate the bilateral nuclear partnership with the U.S., not lastly owing to the unimpeded acquisition of Trident. As a result, back in December 1979 the Conservatives announced, without any stipulations whatsoever, their readiness to grant two bases for U.S. cruise missiles, where it is scheduled to station no fewer than 160 of these missiles, or more than one-third of the entire quantity planned for Western Europe.

CHAPTER 3. British Armed Forces and Their Participation in NATO

It has now already been 30 years that London has viewed the focus of the British armed forces on executing NATO tasks as a very important condition for the conduct of England's military-political course. And although during this time a suitable structure for the bloc has been established and various methods of military-political and military collaboration have been worked out and tested, the NATO allies have undertaken new efforts aimed at improving this structure and these methods and at adjusting them to the changes taking place. In this matter, British leaders, the staffs of the branches of the armed forces, and the Ministry of Defence, striving to preserve and, as much as possible, to strengthen England's position in NATO, have played a role of no small importance. They attach principal importance to raising command effectiveness: cooperating and supporting British armed forces and the armed forces of England's allies; and coordinating the development, modernization, and military training of these forces in accordance with NATO's general plans and programs, the initiative for which, in both its formation and implementation, usually belongs to the United States. Here it is by no means always possible to follow a precise line between national and NATO prerogatives and objectives. We will try, however, to outline a definite demarcated boundary so as to clarify, in particular, the

potential for deepened military-political and military collaboration between England and the other West European allies.

Statements by the British government and the Ministry of Defence constantly underscore the subordination of England's armed forces in Europe to the NATO command and their focus on executing the "common tasks" of the bloc. At the same time, these forces are, as is known, at the disposal of the government and are developed in accordance with the plans and decisions of the Ministry of Defence and the British military-political course. Just what is the real "distribution of authority"?

In an article commemorating the 25th anniversary of the North Atlantic Alliance, a *Times*' defense columnist unequivocally noted that an integrated command structure "remains the pride of generals without troops until such time as events force the NATO member states to put their national armed forces at its disposal."⁵ England's former permanent representative to the NATO Council, B. Burrows, gave a generally analogous, though somewhat more developed, appraisal of the situation in his work.⁶

Although the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the NATO nations in Europe and the regional commanders have integrated "multi-national" staffs ensuring the coordination of military planning, military training, and security of the allied armed forces in NATO, these forces remain at the disposal of the national commands. Transferring them to be subordinate to the NATO command can be carried out only in accordance with a fairly complicated procedure developed and approved by all the allies in the event the governments make the necessary decisions. But under normal circumstances, the NATO commander has at his disposal certain contingents of national armed forces (as a rule, during maneuvers), which are regulated in accordance with intergovernmental agreements.

The Military Planning Committee, whose representatives at the sessions are the Ministers of Defence of the participating nations, and the Military Committee of the Chief of the General Staffs, whose functions in between sessions are fulfilled by the corresponding permanent committees, carry out the entire leadership of the activities of the military organization, including the activities of the integrated command. They all, in the final analysis, follow the decisions of the North Atlantic Council. This intergovernmental system obviously dominates over the integrated command system. However, the role of the commanders in actuality is not so limited. This is brought about to a great extent by the fact that they are usually commanders of groupings of national armed forces at the same time, focused on executing NATO tasks. For example, as is known, the post of Supreme Allied Commander is occupied by the Commander of U.S. Forces, Europe.

In comparison to the Americans' role in the military organization of the North Atlantic Alliance, the position of the British generals and admirals can appear relatively modest. But actually their influence in NATO, while of course lagging behind the Americans', noticeably surpasses the influence of the other allies. It is manifested primarily in the allocation of the higher posts in NATO's integrated command--26 of which, according to a statement by the FRG's Minister of Defense Georg Leber, were occupied by Englishmen in 1977 and only 10 by West Germans.⁷

In the seventies the higher British officers occupied the posts of Commander of the Northern Army Group of the NATO countries in Central Europe and the Commander of the Second Allied Tactical Air Command for this group, the Commander of Naval Forces in the Channel, and the Command of NATO forces in Northern Europe.

The traditional granting of these posts to British military officers is by no means accidental--it reflects England's contribution to the confrontation in these regions. Let us recall that the Northern Group of Forces of the NATO countries, located as are the Second and Central Groups under the authority of the bloc's Central European command, consists primarily of the British Army on the Rhine, a corps from the Bundeswehr, and Dutch and Belgian troops. Having considerable armed forces in the northern portion of the FRG, the British government, even back when NATO was being formed, obtained the assignment of Commander of the British Army on the Rhine to be commander of the entire grouping. In the seventies, General Harry Tuzo occupied this post.

At the same time, the commander of the British Air Force in the FRG led the Second Allied Tactical Air command, which was primarily called upon to provide air support to the Northern group of troops. British aircraft makes up roughly one-third of the NATO countries' aircraft assigned to this command; as a whole in Central Europe, according to estimates by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, England has given the NATO command about 8 percent of the ground troops, 9 percent of the tanks, and 11 percent of the aircraft.⁸

A British admiral also traditionally occupies the post of Command of NATO Allied Naval Forces in the English Channel, which is brought about by its mutual importance to England and the preponderance of British naval forces there. As was asserted, not without foundation, in the work of authoritative British specialists, this command--a status equated with the Atlantic command--encompasses a fairly small region and was formed in great part to satisfy London's thoughts of prestige.⁹

The Command of Naval Forces and Allied Troops in Northern Europe is of far greater importance; its sphere is considered to be the northern coast of the FRG (Schleswig-Holstein), Denmark, Norway, and the Northeast Atlantic. Relying on the predominance of the British Navy in this area, England's government has been able to retain the commander post for a British admiral. In the seventies it was occupied by the

Commander of the British Navy who was additionally performing the duties of Commander of Allied Forces in the English Channel. Not satisfied with this, London sought to give British admirals and generals new posts in the hierarchy of NATO's integrated command, above all in those commands whose sphere of operation abutted or was close to England.

At the same time, great attention is paid to the active participation of England's representatives in the activities of the NATO Military Planning Committee and the Military Committee. At meetings of the Military Planning Committee, the British Secretary of Defence has repeatedly come out with important initiatives and proposals. From 1975 to 1977 the representative to the Military Committee, which prepares the documents and recommendations for the meetings of the Ministers of Defence, was British Admiral Peter Hill-Norton.

All this, let alone the significant "presence" of lower rank British officers and specialists in the headquarters, command, and various NATO committees, is called upon to protect the specific interests of England's government and military leadership and to not permit a diminution of its influence within the bloc's military organization. On the whole, the existing distribution of roles in the NATO command has suited British leaders. The increased role of other West European allies in it, particularly the FRG, has evoked contradictory feelings in London. In any event, it is not considered desirable owing to the decreased predominance of American (and British) influence.

While taking an active part in the activities of the NATO integrated command, British military figures, leaders, and the Ministry of Defence have nevertheless hardly been unambiguous about plans to expand the command's authority during normal circumstances and about putting considerable contingents of England's armed forces at its direct disposal. As a whole, they supported U.S. proposals advanced at the end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies to establish four permanent international organizations subordinate to the NATO command: NATO "mobile forces" and naval forces in the Atlantic, the English Channel, and the Mediterranean.¹⁰

The "mobile forces," consisting of specially trained units of allied ground troops and tactical and transport air squadrons, have been designed first and foremost by the NATO command for rapid transfers to various areas of Western Europe. England's contribution to them was not so great--a battalion group (about 1,500 men), one Harrier squadron, and several helicopters. While repeatedly making note of this participation in the annual White Papers and underscoring the political and military importance of NATO's "mobile forces," nevertheless the British government did not increase its contribution during the seventies.

The allied naval organizations directly subordinate to the NATO command played a relatively modest role in the past decade. For example, the Standing Naval Force Atlantic usually consisted of six or

seven ships from NATO nations, of which England allocated one. Even smaller was the size of the joint naval forces in the Channel, consisting of several mine sweepers. The permanent NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean were more significant in their standards and their size. However, having resolved to reduce the presence of British naval forces in the Mediterranean, the Labour government withdrew British ships and submarines from this force.

British specialists have more than once noted the insignificance of allied integrated forces compared to the national forces focused on executing NATO missions, but not directly subordinate to the bloc's command. Given the experience of their creation and functioning, London has recognized in words the usefulness of this form of cooperation, but has not in practice demonstrated great interest in transferring the more essential contingents of England's armed forces to the subordination of the NATO command. Such an approach is usually rooted in the fact that from a military point of view, the more effective [approach] is not a "multinational" formation consisting of small contingents, but the cooperation of national armed forces at the divisional level and not the unification of several ships from different countries, but the close coordination of national navies. On this basis, it is maintained that the established "multinational" formations and flotillas can more likely be of symbolic significance.¹¹

However, this kind of explanation is incomplete. Apparently, in order to make a transition from the present level of cooperation between the armed forces of England and its allies to a qualitatively new one (an important feature of which would be the increased role of the NATO command's integrated system and the transfer of a large portion of these forces to be at the direct disposal of the command), it is necessary to achieve considerable political unity. Such a fundamental change would be, to a great extent, equivalent to renouncing national prerogatives over the armed forces and subordinating them to a far greater extent to the objectives of U.S. military-political policy.

The basic and most acceptable forms--according to the appraisals of British specialists--of military cooperation among the NATO allies remains the coordination of armed forces focused on executing the bloc's missions in accordance with the integrated command's plans. Owing to its development and improvement, the British government and Ministry of Defence have expected--through the unification of common efforts--to obtain closer armed forces cooperation. In this connection, the functions of the integrated command with respect to England's armed forces assigned to it were quite broad and significant. In particular, according to the Ministry of Defence's explanation, England "cannot arbitrarily withdraw the armed forces from the command of the Commander-in-Chief of NATO forces in Europe that are subordinate to it. Mandatory consultations are required in order to reduce or reorganize them."¹² Such consultations were conducted by the Labour government with NATO headquarters and regional commands at the end of 1974 and beginning of

1975 when it was intending to carry out a reorganization of the British Army on the Rhine and to cut back the British military presence in the Mediterranean.

London considers the most effective form for developing cooperation of the NATO allies' armed forces to be the conduct of military maneuvers and exercises, which make it possible to test elaborated plans, the efficacy of the command system, and the potential for joint operations. Substantial importance is accorded to the active participation of major contingents of British armed forces in NATO-organized maneuvers, although this requires no small amount of expenditures.

Here, particular attention is paid to working out cooperation between the British fleet, Air Force, and special Army subunits and the allied forces in the North Eastern Atlantic. In September 1972, British naval forces played a key role in the NATO maneuvers "Strong Express," conducted in this area, and that had the objective of providing the rapid transfer of troops to the northern part of Norway and providing the corresponding cover for them.¹³ Maneuvers with similar objectives were conducted in September 1974 with the participation of England's armed forces. For several days, allied naval and air forces worked on operations in the North East Atlantic, including an assault landing. Two years later, the large-scale maneuvers of "Team Work" took place in the same region, in which up to 200 different combat ships, 30 submarines, 900 aircraft, and 80,000 NATO troops took part. No small portion of them was allocated by England.¹⁴

In recent years, maneuvers similar in objectives and scenario have periodically been repeated in the North East Atlantic. According to the Ministry of Defence's explanation, the NATO command has usually guaranteed the British Navy a principal role in them in providing assault landings. It has been reported that, in accordance with elaborated plans, "British reinforcements should take up their positions in Norway and Denmark no later than 5 days after an emergency arises." It is intended to use these British troops as the vanguard for larger numbers of allied forces.¹⁵

British armed forces have not let slip by chances to make their contribution to the execution of maneuvers by the North Atlantic Alliance in the Mediterranean too. For example, in May 1974 they took an active part in the maneuvers organized there, called "Dawn Patrol," aimed at working on naval cooperation, improving combat against submarines, and which included an assault landing. In the future, too, despite the gradual withdrawal of British armed forces from the Mediterranean, their size in this region has grown considerably during maneuvers.

England's Ministry of Defence and the higher military command pays a great deal of attention to the development of cooperation among the British Army on the Rhine, the British Air Force in the FRG, and the

allied armed forces that belong to the northern group of the NATO Central European command. This development and expansion of cooperation is achieved through the regular conduct of large-scale maneuvers. Here particular importance is attached to perfecting the transfer of reinforcements from England to the FRG.

Along with the active participation of British armed forces in multilateral NATO maneuvers, their cooperation with the armed forces of individual West European allies also has developed. Such collaboration is usually carried out on the basis of bilateral agreements that provide for the conduct of a whole series of joint maneuvers. Through an understanding with the FRG, cooperation of the British Army on the Rhine and the Air Force with subunits from the Bundeswehr have been worked out, and through an agreement with the Danish government, exercises are periodically organized that include transporting British troops to Denmark and coordinating their actions with the Danish army.¹⁶

In the past decade agreements have been concluded and implemented dealing with the expanded cooperation of certain branches and contingents of armed forces. One of them is the Anglo-Dutch agreement of 1972 providing for the conduct of joint exercises by the two nations' naval forces and the granting to Holland of the right to keep some of its submarines at the British naval base in Faslane. One should particularly note the conduct of joint maneuvers by contingents of British and French naval forces. Although France has not participated in the activities of the bloc's military organization, this has not impeded the establishment of certain ties and coordination between its naval forces and the British fleet.

The many other bilateral agreements and understandings of this type mentioned above are an important link in England's military partnership with the West European allies. Usually such bilateral collaboration is viewed as one form of NATO activity inasmuch as it fully conforms to the general plan for developing cooperation among the armed forces of all the alliance nations, including the United States. At the same time, it is implemented with consideration given above all to their own programs and can even be carried out, in principle, without the prior adoption of a resolution by all the NATO members in the Council or the Military Planning Committee. To this one should also add that in the conduct of a whole series of multilateral maneuvers by the NATO countries' armed forces, U.S. troops did not by any means always play the main role everywhere. Nor infrequently, England, the FRG, and other West European allies gave a large portion of the forces for these maneuvers, and they were led not only by American, but also British, West German, and Italian generals and admirals.

In working out cooperation between British armed forces and allied forces in maneuvers and exercises, London has paid considerable attention to the problems of coordinating and drawing together national doctrines for employing armed forces on the battlefield. As was noted

in the *NATO Review*, it is namely the gradual attainment of unity in this sphere that would make it possible to raise coordination to a higher level, to come near to coordinating rearmament programs, and to establish better conditions in order to raise the effectiveness of, and to build up, its military might.¹⁷

The British Ministry of Defence advanced this thesis back at the very start of the seventies and did much to develop this form of collaboration. The Labour government's White Paper for 1970 pointed out that "collaboration between the armed forces' staffs in harmony with tactics and in conformity with national rearmament programs opens the way for the expansion of military cooperation." It will help, it is further stated, to strengthen the military might of the NATO allies with "minimal costs."¹⁸

Following this viewpoint, the leaders of the Ministry of Defence and the staffs of the three branches of England's armed forces took an active part in discussing and resolving the problems of drawing the military doctrines together and of improving cooperation. As the commander of the British Army on the Rhine, General Tuzo noted, appearing before members of a Parliamentary committee at the beginning of 1975, these efforts aimed at coordinating national concepts and elaborating common ones for using armed forces must precede the coordination of rearmament programs; and they are an essential condition for making the transition to standardize armaments and military equipment.¹⁹

For the most part, this activity has been carried out in accordance with NATO military plans and U.S. guidelines. At the same time, it also contains a West European aspect and has been carried out on a bilateral and multilateral basis directly between England and its West European allies. Thus, for example, beginning in 1972, representatives from the British army staff have participated in the work of the committee of the chiefs of staff of the ground troops of seven West European states with the aim of "elaborating unified operational-tactical views, coordinating combat training, and drawing together methods of material-technical support."²⁰

But despite efforts taken in this direction, such an objective, as acknowledged by British specialists, could scarcely be attained soon. Given the undoubted development of this form of collaboration, attempts to go beyond the framework of the agreement and to reduce national doctrines for using, forming, and training the armed forces to a given common denominator have, essentially, proven unsuccessful. Leaders of England's Ministry of Defence and higher military command have by no means always striven to make use, in practice, of allied experience and methods, usually giving preference to its own [experience and methods], making it possible--if one can judge from the not-so-modest statement by the commander of the British Army on the Rhine, Tuzo--to establish "a better army in Europe."²¹

Obstacles similar in character, but more noticeable, have emerged during the implementation of plans by England and other West European NATO allies for the so-called specialization of the armed forces. As is known, the NATO command headquarters has not infrequently--on the initiative of U.S. military men--advanced from time to time proposals for "a more rational" distribution of the roles among the contingents of armed forces subordinate to it and even for the elaboration of a certain all-embracing agreement, according to which the objective for some would be improving and augmenting chiefly naval forces, and for others, the armies or their individual components, etc. In this connection, they would not attempt to develop simultaneously all the components of the national armed forces. Such a decision, so its proponents have claimed, would make it possible for the NATO West European allies to sharply increase the effectiveness of the combined military might, to avoid expenses in carrying out analogous programs, and to obtain considerably greater unity in implementing the military-political courses. In fact, within the overall framework of the existing distribution of responsibility between the U.S.--ensuring primarily the "nuclear deterrent"--and the West European members of NATO--being basically responsible for maintaining the effectiveness and development of nonnuclear forces--it is proposed to carry out a subsequent, more detailed distribution of functions, primarily among the nations capable of developing in the future all three branches of the armed forces and those who were to concentrate their efforts on executing the more modest missions.

In speaking concretely about a more rational--in its opinion--specialization of British armed forces in the foreseeable future, London usually has particularly underscored the role of the British Navy, but it has by no means advocated a diminished role for the Air Force and Army or for cutting back their size.²² The impression has been created that the proposed specialization of the armed forces should basically concern the "smaller" West European allies. In any event, working out an agreement of this kind has proven an extremely complicated affair. A majority of British specialists have considered it unrealistic and even undesirable to reach any kind of formal understandings about the "distribution of labor" in developing a given component of the armed forces, assuming a change in the existing structure of these forces. Rather, they have supported the realization of not so far-reaching proposals concerning the concrete problems of a "more rational" distribution of armed forces' missions and the coordination of military programs, primarily within NATO. The attitude of British leaders and the Ministry of Defence toward prospects for some decrease in the role of the British Army on the Rhine, given the simultaneous corresponding increase in the role of the Bundeswehr, characterizes quite graphically the special features of their position on this range of problems. While advocating additional contributions being made by the FRG to the confrontation in Central Europe and demanding from Bonn at least partial reimbursement for the constantly increasing expenses of maintaining the British Army on the Rhine, London has at the same time repeatedly made it understood, with greater or lesser candor, that its presence in the FRG at the

current level is, for England, highly important and, furthermore, makes it possible for England to protect its rights as one of the victorious powers.

In expanding and improving cooperation between the British armed forces and allied armed forces, the British government and its higher military command have seen one of the basic ways of attaining the established objective in the development, in every way possible, of NATO's infrastructure. Probably, it is here that the North Atlantic military integration received its most complete and palpable expression. Most of the programs to modernize the bloc's infrastructure were of a collective character; all the allies could use their results. These programs were worked out in NATO bodies, as a rule, on the initiative of the U.S. government and military men, who insisted on considerable improvements in the communications systems and airfields and on an increase in the effectiveness of the air defense and early warning systems. At the same time, they usually responded in full to the interest of the higher military commands of England, the FRG, and other West European allies. Disagreements arose basically when discussing the issue of weapons allocations and the specific parameters of the programs.

According to estimates by British specialists, at the beginning of the seventies the U.S. was paying for about 30 percent of the costs to develop the NATO infrastructure in Western Europe, the FRG, 25 percent, and England, a little more than 10 percent.²³ Washington demanded an increase in the corresponding contributions of its West European partners. The activities of the NATO Eurogroup, established under the active participation of England and the FRG, were aimed at first to a great extent at satisfying the American demands.

Among the larger programs to modernize the bloc's infrastructure implemented by the NATO allies in the past decade, the air defense control system's (NADGE) creation should be identified above all; it was begun back in the mid-sixties and was generally completed by 1973.²⁴ In accordance with this program, across the entire distance from Turkey to the Arctic, about 100 radar installations were built and special equipment distributed, which made it possible to quickly process incoming information and to inform the NATO command and the Air Defense forces, which were significantly reinforced thanks to the fact that new aircraft and guided missiles had been put into service. Subsequently, a joint study of the system's "multinational" personnel was carried out, cooperation among its components improved, and plans for a subsequent modernization worked out, which were discussed, in particular, at the NATO Council session in May 1977 among the other measures stipulated in the 10-year program to strengthen the bloc's military might. It should be noted that, although NADGE was a NATO program, its fruits were enjoyed not only by the members of the bloc's military organization, but also by France, who received specific information for the needs of its own Air Defense.

A second major infrastructure project of joint development was the creation, beginning in 1976, of the joint NATO Integrated Communications System, through which it was intended to ensure communications between the governments and the commands of the Alliance nations via satellite.²⁵ The U.S. agreed to pay only one quarter of the cost of this project, while the rest of the money was allocated by England, the FRG, and the other NATO allies.²⁶ Within the framework of this program, an agreement was concluded in December 1979 between the Ministries of Defense of the U.S. and England for the joint development, use, and servicing of long-range communication devices, operating via satellite. At the same time, the existing automatized communications system for the NATO command among all the capitals of the bloc's states was improved, and the information processing center was modernized.²⁷

In the second half of the seventies, the U.S. obtained an agreement from its West European allies to participate in the creation of an early warning and detection system--AWACS. However, England did not participate directly in this.

The implementation of these and a whole series of less significant programs to develop the infrastructure has allowed the allies to increase noticeably the harmony of connecting links and the "nervous system" of the bloc's military organization, without whose permanent functioning leaders of England's Ministry of Defence would consider it impossible to ensure effective cooperation between the armed forces and the commands. These forms of participation by England and its armed forces in the activities of the North Atlantic Alliance's military organization testify to the fact that it was foreordained not only by the unconditional execution of American plans. In practice, one has been able to observe a fairly complex combination of interests between the British military-political course and the objectives of the unified command led by the U.S.; a certain isolation of British armed forces subordinate to this command; and the retention of the existing national system for formation, training, and material-technical support. Even in the context of the further development of the North Atlantic, military integration now taking place and the expansion of cooperation among allied armed forces in which England has participated in detail, London has not--as far as can be judged--striven for any kind of "dissolution" of the British contribution or for its "internationalization."

Furthermore, in the modernization of these armed forces included in NATO and in the development of their cooperation, the role for England, the FRG, and other West European allies was much greater than their role in the area of nuclear weapons where, essentially, the United States has completely dominated. This is not surprising since, according to estimates by British specialists, these nations gave NATO up to 90 percent of the bloc's armed forces in Western Europe, 75 percent of the tanks, 80 percent of the naval forces, and 75 percent of the air forces.²⁸ Already by virtue of this, the development of collaboration among the armed forces of the West European allies in NATO, aimed as a whole at

achieving common objectives in the military confrontation with the socialist community, could not help but acquire certain traits peculiar to it. As a result, as we will see later, in the past decade there has begun to take shape an appropriate system for regulating such West European collaboration, a system closely connected with NATO, but also possessing a definite autonomy.

The attitude of British leaders and the armed forces' command toward prospects for working out an understanding to reduce the level of confrontation in Central Europe is indicative on a more general plane of the same tendencies [prevalent] in their attitude toward nuclear arms limitations.

The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks are examining the situation in the area to which the British command pays primary attention in its plans, the region where, in order to reinforce NATO armed forces in a "crisis situation," it is proposed (as already stated above) to assign almost half of England's ground troops. The potential for the British government to contribute to or counteract the success of the Vienna talks is quite considerable.

Along with the FRG, England plays the leading role in these talks among the West European NATO allies. At the same time, the British delegation at the Vienna talks does not occupy any kind of special position and it acts in accordance with the jointly elaborated line of the NATO countries. As a result, practically all the "bends" in this line, determined primarily by the United States, have an effect on the British representatives' approach to the issues being discussed.

In official statements, leaders of the Conservatives and Labourites have repeatedly noted their interest in working out an agreement at the Vienna talks to reduce the level of confrontation. But although there was no scarcity of expressions of readiness to make a positive contribution to solving the problems of mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe, the impression developed that London, like, incidentally, the other capitals of the NATO countries, was by no means interested in successfully concluding the Vienna talks or in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement that would meet the security interests of both sides.

An examination of the general reasons for this and a critical analysis of the West's proposals at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks are contained in a whole series of works by Soviet specialists. Here, we are interested in only one aspect--the British leaders' approach to these talks and their objectives, brought about mainly by England's active participation in confrontation in this area, by maintaining and raising the effectiveness of the British Army on the Rhine, and by its relations with the U.S. and its West European allies in the military-political sphere.

England is, as has already been stated, making no small contribution to the armed confrontation on the European continent and is, jointly with its allies, strengthening the bloc's military might in Central Europe. British leaders and the armed forces' command are doing everything possible to equip the troops stationed in this region with the latest armaments and to improve their training and the development of cooperation with other allied forces. In operating in this direction, London has cited a certain "disruption" of the correlation of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe and has talked endlessly about the superiority of Soviet armed forces. It is therefore not surprising that the proposals providing for a reduction in the level of confrontation in this region have not met with the support of the British government, armed forces' command or military specialists. Nevertheless, over the past decade they have been forced to repeatedly discuss such proposals and, moreover, to acknowledge--albeit with substantial reservations--the possibility of implementing them....

The impression has taken shape that British leaders are not interested in a successful conclusion to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks. The Conservatives accord the Vienna talks an extremely modest place in their foreign policy statements. By underscoring in every way possible the importance of increasing the allies' military might in Central Europe--including the British Army on the Rhine--the Conservative leaders are continuing to insist on carrying out considerable reductions in the Soviet armed forces.

CHAPTER 4. England and Weapons Production

Over the last 20 years a new, very fundamental tendency has emerged in the approach of the British government, Ministry of Defence, and leadership of the leading military firms toward the implementation of rearmament plans--an increased focus on expanding West European military-industrial collaboration, primarily in the joint development and production of basic weapons systems. This has been reflected in the gradual shift from providing it all themselves to establishing an ever closer interdependency with the FRG, France, and other partners in this field. This process is having no small degree of influence on the formation of a West European imperialist center and is, naturally, attracting the attention of many researchers. This shift, begun in the sixties, is particularly noticeable for England.

Up to the mid-sixties, the British military industry supplied practically all the nonnuclear armaments to its armed forces and was first in Western Europe according to the major indicators. The government and the military industry did not then display a particular interest in developing joint programs with other West European nations, which, incidentally, were hardly ever conducted then, with the exception of arms production by American licenses.

The situation began to change rapidly in 1965-1966, though even earlier the development of such a costly and complex program by England and France as the creation of the supersonic passenger liner, the Concorde, demonstrated the British government's understanding of the importance of uniting the efforts of the West European states for implementing large-scale production projects of aviation equipment.

...[T]he British government analyzed the situation in the military-industrial field and drew from it certain practical conclusions for the future. The most precise presentation of them is contained in the 1966 *White Paper*. The statement points out that the growth in the cost of creating new weapon systems and the increase in their technological complexity was making independent programs by England and other West European states more difficult to do. Considering the natural "need" to further build up their military might, the compilers of this document argued that it was namely collaboration that would "diminish their share of expenditures on the creation of a system and that would ensure larger-scale production, which would considerably reduce the individual cost of the weapon and would improve its potential for export."

Developing such collaboration with the leading West European states was considered to be the most advantageous. The unification of men and equipment would, so the document claimed, make it possible to more effectively exploit the potential of West European military industry and to create the latest armaments that would not lag behind American ones. Preliminary agreement to rearmament plans and obtaining long-term understandings among the partners were viewed as important conditions for carrying out joint programs. The authors of the document did not, incidentally, rule out the possibility of complementing Anglo-American projects to develop certain systems. But, in their opinion, "the inequality between the resources of the United States and those of the West European states makes it difficult to find programs that would bring mutual benefits to both sides."²⁹

In subsequent years, one can frequently encounter the main theses of this statement, called upon to substantiate the policy of England's active participation in West European military-industrial collaboration, in statements by the leaders of the Labour and Conservative parties, in various documents, and in the works of British specialists.

The development of military-industrial ties between England and the other leading West European states has been primarily dependent upon the integration process, encompassing, along with other fields, the industrial field connected with the production of armaments and military equipment. It is obvious that the reasons that caused the unification of British and French efforts in the creation of the Concorde--the high cost of the program, its technological complexity, the problems of its sale--also determined to a great extent Anglo-French collaboration in the production of the Jaguar and the Anglo-West German-Italian partnership in the production of the Tornado. Taking this into consideration,

England's about-face from providing itself with "conventional" arms to a certain interdependency with France, the FRG, and Italy is completely natural.

However, England's military-industrial collaboration with its West European partners also has its own specific reasons that frequently play a more substantial role than these common factors, which bring about only the direction of the process. Having adopted a course to expand such collaboration, the British government has weighed its advantages and shortcomings, taking into consideration rearmament plans and the interests of military industry, and has made note of the main tasks of joint programs and the conditions for England's participation in them. The works of British specialists provide a kind of notion about these special reasons and calculations by England's leaders.

A series of brochures by the Institute for Strategic Studies, specially dedicated to arms production in Western Europe, became the first authoritative publication of these works and was done at the very same time as the approach to this issue was being formulated. The director of the institute, A. Buchan, in summarizing the conclusions of the authors of these brochures, generally advocated England's active participation in the development of West European military-industrial collaboration, above all in the production of aeromissile equipment. At the same time, he noted the need to retain the potential to carry out independent programs and to maintain sufficiently close ties with the U.S. The work essentially rejected the thesis about the desirability of uniting many West European states in joint programs, as had frequently been done earlier when producing armaments under U.S. licenses; on the contrary, it emphasized the efficacy of bilateral--and if worst came to worst--trilateral projects.³⁰

Of considerable interest in clarifying the position of British official circles on problems of West European military-industrial collaboration and in understanding the "internal mechanics" of making decisions was an article published in 1974 by the highly placed Ministry of Defence official, Hugh Green, who was directly responsible for implementing weapons production programs, including joint projects. Green views collaboration as one of the methods for acquiring arms, which should be combined with independent production and the purchase of certain American systems. Therefore, a careful analysis of how much the British armed forces are interested in such a system and whether it would be more advantageous to acquire it from the U.S. or to create it entirely on a national basis must precede the nomination of a proposal

to develop a West European program. While taking part in collaboration, England must, so Green notes, have the potential to influence significantly the implementation of a joint program and, moreover, seek the leading role. He has paid particular attention to retaining strict control over the transfer of British technology during the implementation of the project.

In Green's opinion, various levels of military-industrial collaboration are required at various stages in the project's implementation. Least of all, he believes, one should grant West European partners military research where it is desirable to act independently. But then at the costly stage of developing the weapons system, right up to testing the first prototypes, it is necessary to collaborate most actively with the other participants in the program and to divide the basic expenses with them. Then, when developing serial production, it is recommended to once again place great stress on using its own potential; to coordinate it but, for all intents and purposes, to do it separately.

Green considers collaboration in armaments production to be desirable in those circumstances where it meets England's interests and when it is with West European states whose military industry is at a sufficiently high level, first and foremost with France and the FRG.³¹

The development of the government's policy has been carried out in close contact with the leadership of the leading British weapons supplier firms. In principle, they have from the very start advocated the development of military-industrial collaboration. The government has received the greatest support from British Aircraft and Hawker Siddeley. In a published memorandum by the Society of British aero-missile companies, it was emphasized that henceforth, developments in the field could be assured primarily through "collaboration in joint projects with West European firms." Its expansion and intensification have been viewed as an inevitable consequence of long-term tendencies operating in the military-industrial field, and of the limited resources and potential of individual states.³²

But, while supporting such collaboration, the leaders of Britain's leading military-industrial firms have unequivocally made it understood that they are interested in joint projects to the extent that these projects allow them "to conclude the most favorable agreements with potential European partners." The memorandum also expressed the desire to limit the number of participants in the programs and to conduct them primarily with French and German firms.

In a number of other, less official statements addressed to Parliamentary committees and the Ministry of Defence, the leaders of the firms frequently noted, along with the advantages of expanding joint West European arms production, definite negative aspects too. Above all, they feared that the development of collaboration would lead to the transfer of the latest technology and valuable information to its

partners, which the latter could subsequently use in the competition struggle. They argued about the difficulties of a "just" distribution of orders and of an effective organization to control the programs. The leaders of several firms generally advocated continuing the production of armaments and military equipment on a national basis and were against increasing interdependency with the West European partners.

As a whole, the leading firms of England's aeromissile industry were in favor of an ever greater focus on implementing joint arms production projects. On the other hand, the small firms in this field, greatly dependent upon military orders, particularly Short Brothers and Harland, evaluated the prospects for collaboration for themselves fairly pessimistically and emphasized the advantages of national programs.³³ The leaders from the main radioelectronic industry companies taking part in West European projects have, while supporting the government's policy, at the same time noted the desirability of expanding national production, to a great extent for the sake of increasing exports. Ship-building firms preferred exclusively national programs.

Thus, one can hardly say that the course of England's active participation in joint West European arms production was unconditionally supported by all British military-industrial firms. Therefore, a great deal has depended on the position of the government and the Ministry of Defence and on their readiness to take the necessary steps in order to encourage the development of collaboration. And such a change was made. The Labour government's promotion of the thesis about the "need" to expand joint arms production in Western Europe has, since the mid-sixties, been accompanied by the conclusion of a whole series of agreements with France, the FRG, and other nations and by the development of vast programs for creating primarily aeromissile equipment....

Participation in joint West European arms production projects was essentially a privilege for only the leading British military-industrial firms. It is also no accident that a majority of them have depended on government financing of military RDT+E and the ones most involved in collaboration--Rolls Royce, British Aircraft, Hawker Siddeley--have been nationalized during the last 10 years.

One of the reasons for nationalization was the specific nature of preparing and conducting joint programs that requires the establishment of closer ties between the leadership of the firms and the government.

Just what advantages, from the viewpoint of England's ruling circles, has the expansion of West European military-industrial collaboration engendered?....

[Given the results of the collaboration on Tornado], by the end of the last decade, British specialists had begun to appraise more skeptically the potential for obtaining economic advantages as a result of joint production programs for such weapons systems. In one of his

statements, the Secretary of Defence frankly asserted that under the existing organization of West European military-industrial collaboration, a distribution of labor among the partners usually led to an increased cost for the projects and a prolongation of the time period, and made control over the general implementation of the program more difficult.³⁴

As the experience of the Tornado production demonstrated, one of the basic reasons for the difficulties that arose was the absence of a precise preliminary agreement on the degrees of participation and the production quantity. At first it was intended to produce no fewer than 1,000 aircraft, but after the FRG's unilateral decision in 1970 to reduce the size of its order, a redistribution of the degrees of participation took place and the scale of the program was made somewhat smaller....

...[O]ne very important quality from the viewpoint of proponents of continuing the arms buildup and joint West European projects is their relatively good protection from attempts, through some kind of production limits on a number of systems, to restrain military cost overruns compared to national programs. It is frequently claimed that thanks to the various guarantees that provide substantial penalties if such projects are broken off or modified unilaterally, the partners, by constantly controlling each other, ensure that the projects are executed. Indeed, if one looks at the creation of the Tornado, despite all the upheavals, it was completed.

But even such a system of mutual control can hardly always guarantee this result. Frequently, joint projects London has pinned great hopes on have failed right at the initial stage of agreement and development. A striking example of this was the British government's attempt to develop a program together with the FRG to create the "basic tank of the eighties" to replace the Chieftain and the Leopard. Starting in 1970, specialists from the two countries worked on an agreement about its technical characteristics, the project repeatedly figured in official statements, and it was discussed in talks between the Ministers of Defense, but the results proved to be naught. So, not having obtained an understanding with Bonn, at the start of 1977 the British government announced the termination of the agreement....

In summing up the main negative factors hindering the expansion and deepening of military-industrial collaboration, above all London has cited differences among the West European allies in selecting new weapons systems. These differences are manifested when determining the technical characteristics of the systems being created, the production time periods for them and their delivery to the armed forces. Because of these differences in particular, Secretary of Defence Frederick Mulley justified his refusal for a further agreement with the FRG on the issue of joint production of "the tank of the eighties." In turn, these differences are brought about by the special features of national

rearmament plans, which are put together with consideration to the development of the military and military-industrial potential of each state, and they cannot be eliminated without a certain amount of drawing together and coordination of these plans....

The development of ties between England and other West European states in the area of armaments production was impossible without the simultaneous expansion of intergovernmental collaboration and without the formation of the appropriate mechanisms to ensure the preparation and regulation of the joint programs and control over the activities of the consortia. Various plans for such coordination were advanced back at the end of the forties and beginning of the fifties. But until the seventies they all essentially remained on paper. The main reason for this was the absence of sufficiently developed West European joint arms production, that is, the object of such coordination. Due to its intensification and the development of a whole series of projects, the question about their regulation and the subsequent planning of a partnership of West European nations in military industry got on the agenda; it turned from a purely theoretical question into a practical one.

For England, collaboration with the United States continues to be a vital source for obtaining the latest arms and military equipment. For well-known reasons, since World War II England had enjoyed [greater] privileges in acquiring U.S. weapons systems as compared to the other West European nations. Collaboration with the U.S. in "conventional" weaponry plays no small role in the implementation of a whole series of British programs and has a definite influence on London's course with respect to a West European military-industrial partnership.

The predominant form of this collaboration is England's acquisition of U.S. systems or the production of them by license.... England acquires primarily the latest equipment and systems, the development of which requires large sums of money and the resolution of complicated scientific-technical problems. Here it is usually not a matter of purchasing ready-made U.S. systems but of licenses or weapons components. According to official data, the cost of such orders and deliveries was more significant at the end of the sixties when it annually amounted to not less than 300 million pounds sterling. In the seventies their cost decreased somewhat and did not, on the average, exceed 220 to 230 million pounds sterling....³⁵

Along with the well-known advantages of such a partnership for England, making it possible for her to acquire U.S. armaments and to exploit some of the innovations in military technology, there have also been, from the viewpoint of the British government and military industry, important negative factors. Above all, the United States has still bought relatively few British arms and equipment, much less than it has sold to England. According to the figures cited in the Ministry of Defence's annual statements, the balance of trade from 1970 to 1980 has amounted to 1:10 in favor of the U.S., on average.

Matters are roughly the same concerning the distribution of orders. Moreover, even given the situation that is not very favorable for the British military industry, attempts by British firms to sell arms or military equipment to the U.S. have come up against serious obstacles. Aside from the United States' traditional focus on providing for itself in this area and the difficulties in competing with U.S. corporations, the essential barrier that limits, for all intents and purposes, the sale of British arms is a legislative act prohibiting the acquisition of foreign systems if their cost is not less than 50 percent of the cost of a similar U.S. system.³⁶

In addition, all the arms and military equipment the U.S. has, nevertheless, acquired from England have been the best "achievements" of British military industry, frequently still not introduced into the armed forces of England itself. Washington planned in advance to purchase them and did so immediately after production began. In this connection, in buying a British weapons system, its components or a license, American firms have not simply sought to repeat the given system, but have almost always conducted their own supplemental work and modernization. It is true that the agreements usually provided for the continuation of collaboration at this stage, too, and the granting of portions of the orders to British firms; however, the leading role in the project inevitably passed over to the U.S. This has evoked an understandable dissatisfaction within England's business circles and has by no means contributed to their interest in carrying out joint armaments development.

In addition, the scale of American programs in itself has frequently been too large even for the leading British arms supplier firms. It is sufficient to note that the quantity of Harriers purchased by the United States, let alone the subsequent orders turned over to MacDonnell Douglass, exceeded the number of these planes entering England's Navy. Whereas the Pentagon planned to buy no fewer than 200 Harriers in the future, modified to the Navy's needs, the British government could allow itself to buy only 25 of these aircraft.³⁷ Given such a considerable difference in potentials, even a project that was initially purely British soon turned into virtually an American one once military-industrial collaboration with the U.S. was established.

Of course, this collaboration has given England the opportunity to acquire information directly about the development of arms production and military equipment in the U.S., but it is one thing to know about the partner's "achievements" and another to be able to quickly make use of them in one's own programs. The latter was, again, most frequently the case for U.S. firms.

All these factors have been considered in sufficient detail by the British government and military industry. They have made considerable efforts to eliminate, or at least diminish, the unfavorable consequences to England of the United States' leadership in bilateral military-

industrial exchanges and collaboration. These [steps] were reflected in the proposals advanced in the mid-seventies stipulating a definite change in this collaboration in accordance with British interests, as well as, on a more general plane, the restructuring of relations in this field between the West European allies on the one hand, and the U.S. on the other. In formulating these proposals and plans, London believed that in order to establish a more balanced exchange of arms, military equipment, and technology with the U.S., the selection of one of two paths was necessary.

The first was to cut back on purchases from the U.S. and to focus more on national production and West European military-industrial collaboration. It would lead to increased independence in the provision of "conventional" arms and military equipment and to the creation in the future of a relatively exclusive West European arms market in which England, France, and the FRG would dominate. The second path lies in obtaining an agreement from the U.S. to purchase a greater amount of West European-produced arms and military equipment, while maintaining, and even increasing, purchases of U.S. arms.

Each of them entails definite economic and political difficulties for England; however, selecting the latter one does not involve a change in existing relations and makes it possible to always return to the initial position, whereas selecting the former one involves a more substantial reorganization.

It is highly indicative that, even while making calls to crowd out American firms in the arms market in Western Europe, no British politicians or authoritative specialists advocated unilaterally limiting purchases from the U.S. or raising any kind of artificial barriers here. This was essentially thought to be an unrealistic and irrational decision. The following arguments have been cited as confirmation.

First, it has been claimed that any attempts to limit the purchases of American armaments and equipment is contrary to U.S. interests, and this could unfavorably affect interatlantic relations as a whole and decrease Washington's readiness in the future to make efforts to increase the American contribution to NATO.

Second, the West European states themselves are interested in the unimpeded acquisition of arms, military equipment, and technology from the U.S. For England, which has close bilateral ties here, eliminating obstacles in this exchange is a significant advantage.

Third, inasmuch as many U.S. systems have become the standard ones for the armed forces of most of the West European allies, a sharp reduction in the purchase of them could weaken the military might of these forces.

In addition, the United States' acquisition of British and other West European arms is still of too little importance for the realization of American plans to build up its military might and depends to a great extent on mutual understandings with the West European allies.³⁸ Therefore, in the event of unilateral reductions in purchases from the U.S. and, all the more, in the event of some kind of joint protectionist actions, Washington's retaliatory measures could, by their consequences, nullify the temporary advantages gained by England and the other West European states.

In large part taking these circumstances into account, the British government has advocated transforming its relations with the U.S. in the military-industrial sphere primarily through certain changes in the conditions of reciprocal arms deliveries in the interests of the West European allies. London believes that by the mid-seventies the conditions for this had become more favorable. The development of military industry in Western Europe and the expansion of collaboration to develop arms systems have established the prerequisites for greater independence in providing for their armed forces themselves and have at the same time improved their chances for concluding agreements over the sale of West European arms to the United States.

The campaign for the so-called standardization of arms and military equipment launched by the U.S. government and the NATO command have been a direct stimulus, accelerating the promotion of the British proposals. The Commander-in-Chief of the NATO joint armed forces in Europe, General Goodpastor, and his successor to this post, General Alexander Haig, in appealing to the allies, have argued that in the interests of strengthening the aggregate military might, it is necessary to strive for uniformity in weapons systems and their interchangeability or, at least, compatibility. They also continued an extremely ambitious plan to solve this problem, whose basic tenets were reflected in a semi-official NATO publication in mid-1975.

This plan noted that the parallel development and production of armaments with similar functions by the allies only led to a doubling of efforts and overexpenditures. In the opinion of its authors, the diversity of arms systems and military equipment lowers the effectiveness of the NATO countries' armed forces and impedes their cooperation. In order to change the situation, it was proposed to jointly work out a program to shape some kind of common system of military-industrial collaboration over the next 10 to 15 years in the North Atlantic Alliance.

Back in the first stage (1975 to 1978), the United States and the West European states were supposed to reach agreement on impending reciprocal purchases of arms and military equipment. In accordance with the proposals, the West European nations had to increase such purchases from the U.S. for the sake of "making a greater contribution to NATO and compensating for the maintenance costs of U.S. troops." It is true that for its part, the U.S. would be obligated to purchase several West

European systems for these troops. Along with this kind of balancing in the exchange, it was proposed to intensify the implementation of joint U.S.-West European arms production projects and even to establish a special mechanism for planning and coordinating such projects. In the final analysis, this was to lead to the standardization of allied armaments, the regulation of national programs and, what is more, "complete military-industrial interdependency."³⁹

It is obvious that the adoption of this plan by England and the other West European members of NATO would lead to increased U.S. influence in their arms development and production. The evolving West European military-industrial collaboration would inevitably be under American control. While recognizing this, the British government was guided primarily by an aspiration to maintain and consolidate Anglo-American ties in the military-industrial sphere and, at the same time, to continue to expand its collaboration with the West European states. In principle, London supported the arms standardization plan in NATO and did not object to the methods for its realization proposed by the U.S. At the beginning of December 1975, England's Deputy Secretary of Defence Redgers declared that one should select the most appropriate arms for NATO through the competitive testing of models of a number of arms developed in West European nations and in the United States, launch large-scale production of them, and outfit the armed forces of several or even most of the allies with them. It was thereby recommended to standardize NATO's naval missiles, antitank missiles, tanks, and infantry armaments.⁴⁰

At the same time, certain reservations were also expressed. For example, at the NATO Eurogroup session in December 1975, the Labour government's Secretary of Defence, Roy Mason, in examining the potential to establish a balanced exchange of arms between the allies, paid special attention to the need to increase purchases by the United States of systems produced in Western Europe. At this session, he and his colleagues, the Ministers of Defense from the other Eurogroup nations, expressed the desire for advance coordination of the West European states' policies--including France--on the problems of suitable changes in the transatlantic arms trade within a special consultative committee not subordinate to NATO. Only after this was it proposed to begin talks with the U.S. In pointing out the considerable difficulties in outfitting the allied armed forces with standardized arms and military equipment, England and the other Eurogroup members proposed the gradual attainment of this objective, not limited to any kind of rigid time period. It was considered desirable to at first agree to the military-technical characteristics of these systems and to make them interchangeable, and [only] then to go further.

All these qualifications hardly promoted the implementation of the American plan to establish a center of military-industrial collaboration between the United States and the West European nations. In making these qualifications, the British government was proceeding largely from

the interests of British military industry and was seeking to ensure the further development of a West European partnership in the production of arms and military equipment. It also took into consideration France's position with respect to the U.S. proposals. Paris came out quite definitively against the mandatory purchase of arms from the U.S., against the introduction of unified, standardized systems, and against solving these problems within NATO; instead it displayed an interest only in increasing sales of West European arms to the U.S. and in standardizing munitions, fuel, communications, etc.⁴¹

There is no doubt that the practical experience of collaboration between the two countries is of fundamental importance in appraising the British leaders' approach to problems of developing ties with the United States in the military-industrial sphere. As has already been noted, the leaders of England's Ministry of Defence believed competitive testing of models to be the basic method for selecting arms, which would then be mass produced and used to outfit the armed forces of the U.S. and the West European allies with them. In the seventies, NATO conducted several such tests, including tests of tanks, tank guns, surface-to-air guided missiles (SAMs), antitank missiles, and infantry weapons. In almost all of them, British arms were represented; however, the results did not prove reassuring for the British Ministry of Defence or military industry.

From 1974 to 1976, England, the U.S., and the FRG conducted a series of comparative tests of tanks and tank guns. The American gun was destined to be the most effective, while the West German Leopard was to be the "best tank." The U.S. and the FRG agreed in the future to collaborate in developing the tank of the eighties and in making its components interchangeable. This, for all intents and purposes, sharply reduced the chances for establishing a bilateral Anglo-West German partnership to obtain the same objective, which London had pinned no small hopes on. It did not even manage to obtain an order from the U.S. for British guns for the new American tanks.⁴⁵

In 1975, tests were concluded on two SAMs that interested U.S. military specialists: the British Rapier and the Franco-German Roland. Preference was given to the latter system, the license to produce it having been acquired by the Hughes Aircraft corporation. As a result, the largest acquisition by the U.S. of a West European arms system in the seventies did not bring the British government anything but disappointment. It is highly indicative that in this connection, one can note the fairly unanimous preference for traditional bilateral talks with the United States within business circles and among British military specialists.⁴³

It is unlikely that in the future England will abandon attempts to use weapons tests to force its own systems into the hard-to-penetrate U.S. market. But the tests that have been conducted have demonstrated the limited scope of this method and the extremely cautious approach of

the U.S. toward acquiring British arms and military equipment. The leaders of Marconi Electronics, having a great deal of experience in this area, noted in a memorandum for a parliamentary committee that even those British systems that are recognized as being better than American ones are, all the same, acquired very unwillingly in the U.S. "It is difficult to believe," they certified, "that the Americans would ever agree to make themselves dependent upon the delivery of a West European weapon system that would be of vital importance in ensuring their military might." Inasmuch as one can scarcely count on a change in this approach, then, in the opinion of the authors of the memorandum, American arms purchases in Western Europe will be even further limited, basically to the acquisition of individual components of the system and licenses.⁴⁴

While not agreeing to increase arms purchases from the West European allies, American companies have, at the same time, sought at all costs to expand the sale of its own systems....

London's devotion to plans for standardization and collaboration with the U.S. in this area has its own obstacles and frequently ends where it affects British or joint West European arms production programs. In these cases, the interested parties express rather categorically a negative attitude toward attempts by U.S. firms to sell their own systems in Western Europe. Thus, for example, even a demonstration of F-16s to representatives of the British Air Force at one of the U.S. bases in England disquieted these parties so much that the Labour government quickly received a "note of protest" from leaders of the nation's aeromissile industry.⁴⁵

London is seeking to expand its national and joint West European arms production, and not to increase purchases from the U.S., be it in accordance with a bilateral agreement or a multilateral understanding. Proof of this has been the position taken by British leaders on the issue of England's participation in the acquisition of an American warning and control system by the West European allies.

Based on military-political, military, and economic considerations, Washington has accorded great importance to the implementation of this large-scale NATO program estimated at 1.5-2 billion dollars. Initially, it was planned that England, the FRG, and other allies would acquire 27 Boeing-707 aircraft with special equipment, making it possible to detect and control aircraft, missile launches, and troop movements in Central Europe. The U.S. viewed the realization of this plan as an important step on the path to deepening military-industrial collaboration and strengthening NATO's military might.

Nevertheless, the Labour government, pointing to the high cost of the program and the limited state budget, did not express any particular desire to take part in it. The basic reason for London's restrained attitude toward the purchase was the fact that England was conducting

its own program to create an early warning system. The main contracting firms, Hawker Siddeley and Marconi Electronics, were actively in favor of continuing the work already begun in this area. Government orders for the British systems would, it was argued in statements by these firms' leaders in 1976, make it possible to expand military production and receive the corresponding revenues.

The government completely sided with them, despite pressure from the U.S., who was insisting on the purchase of the AWACS. In March 1977, Britain's Secretary of Defence Frederick Mulley confirmed the need for a British system for the armed forces and announced their intention to accelerate its creation which, incidentally, would not, in his words, be at variance with the NATO program.⁴⁶ However, in fact, England's decision has made the realization of the American plan more difficult and was one of the reasons for the delay in putting AWACS into service. Thus, the interest in developing military-industrial collaboration with the U.S. and standardizing armaments has become secondary when the fate of its own system is at issue. As the *Financial Times* noted in this connection, "in principle, the government is in favor of standardizing armaments and of solving all the problems within the framework of the Alliance, but in practice it does not wish to sacrifice any part of its own military industry."⁴⁷

To a great extent this approach conditions the attitude of the British government and military industry toward the American plan to shape a system for coordinating arms purchases within the alliance. In giving preference to existing forms of military-industrial collaboration with the U.S., London accords particular attention to balancing the trade of arms and military equipment in favor of England and the other West European allies and it insists on switching from the use of a "one-way street" to the use of a "two-way street." It is true that appraisals of how much this transition is possible are not unanimous. Official circles claim that since 1975 definite progress has been made here. England and the U.S. have concluded an agreement that provides for easing the conditions on British arms exports to the U.S. market. Several leading British arms supplier firms, including Marconi Electronics and Racal Electronics, took part, along with U.S. firms, in the fight for radio equipment orders for the U.S. armed forces. The latest British Air Force and naval missiles were demonstrated for military specialists from the Pentagon. However, until now, the results of all these efforts have been insignificant. England has not, essentially, succeeded at all in expanding its arms exports to the United States or in concluding a major deal compared to the sale of the Harriers. Production cooperation between British and American firms cannot compare to the rapidly developing West European partnership in this field.

As a result, attempts to adjust to a more equitable military-industrial collaboration with the United States on a bilateral basis have proven to be largely unsuccessful, despite the fact that, here,

England has enjoyed definite advantages and has exploited traditional close ties the other West European allies did not possess. The leaders of the arms supplier firms were forced to admit this first and foremost; in the words of a military policy specialist for the Conservative Party, G. Pattie, they [the leaders of the firms] are, in fact, convinced of the practical impossibility of achieving a balanced exchange by such a path.⁴⁸ Such an objective is believed to be realistic only for England, France, the FRG, and other West European partners operating together within a system of military industrial collaboration. While striving to achieve this, London is at the same time endeavoring to retain its close ties with the U.S. and to ensure the further unimpeded acquisition of American arms and military technology. Here the British government prefers to maintain, as in the military-policy sphere, a definite balance between Atlantic and West European trends, although of the two, more and more the predominant one is becoming the development of military-industrial collaboration in Western Europe and the formation of a corresponding system to regulate it.

CHAPTER 5. Participation in the Formation of a West European System of Military-Policy Collaboration

The expansion of ties among the West European states in the military and military-industrial spheres and the simultaneous deepening of the integration process in the European Community has established the prerequisites for the development of a West European system to coordinate collaboration. British leaders estimate the potential of these changes based primarily on how much they will affect their alliance with the U.S. and the "American guarantees." In focusing on strengthening NATO, London believes that any changes are acceptable only if they preserve and even improve the allies' aggregate military might and the level of cooperation among their armed forces.

In examining the problem of putting together a West European system for coordinating military-policy collaboration, the British government has always insisted on observing a certain correlation between its own prerogatives and the functions of a given system. Essentially, it has opposed any kind of limitations on the former in favor of the latter. And finally, any plans to develop a West European military-policy system up to the present time have been assessed by British ruling circles from the viewpoint of the extent to which they could ensure a dominant role for England in its activities. While admitting the U.S.' primacy within NATO, British leaders have been determined not to allow the direction of West European military-policy and military-industrial collaboration to be determined in Paris or in Bonn.

These factors are predetermining the attitude of British ruling circles to already existing mechanisms for collaboration and to proposals set forth to modernize them or establish new mechanisms. In analyzing England's policy in this area, one could say that within the British government's plans, there is taking place a reevaluation of the

roles of the various mechanisms of West European collaboration--the decreased importance of some and the increased priority of others. Above all, these are the West European Union (WEU); the NATO Eurogroup; the European Programme Group; and some still nonexistent system of military-policy collaboration among the nations of the European Community....

Summing up a review of the West European Union's role in British policy, one could say that during the seventies it did not by any means increase. London attached importance to the WEU's execution of its specific monitoring functions, but did not seek to turn the union into a center for coordinating the military-policy and military-industrial collaboration of its members. Such a change in the WEU's role is probably not considered to be necessary by the British ruling circles for the eighties either.

Since the beginning of the seventies, the NATO Eurogroup has played an extremely vital role in coordinating collaboration among the bloc's West European members and contributing to the increase of their contribution to the buildup of NATO's military might and to the development among them of military-policy, military, and military-industrial ties. Taking part in its activities are England, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Greece, Turkey, and since 1977, Portugal. Established by a British and German initiative in 1969, the NATO Eurogroup is of great importance in the execution of the British military-policy course in Western Europe.⁴⁹

Inasmuch as Eurogroup documents do not indicate the contribution of each nation individually, one can judge only roughly--based on known information about the British program to develop the armed forces--England's contribution to the joint effort of the West European allies. Being in power at the beginning of the seventies, the Conservative government sought to set an example for the rest of its partners, pointing, not without certain foundations, to the reequipment program it had launched. In 1971 it announced that England would assume the principal share in the buildup of the naval forces. One can fully assert that the majority of naval ships and submarines mentioned in Eurogroup statements have been launched under the British flag. Apparently, a considerable number of the military aircraft, tanks, artillery guns, and other armaments designated as a collective contribution have also joined the British armed forces.

The NATO Eurogroup partners have also sought to develop within its framework collaboration to increase the level of cooperation among the armed forces, basically encompassing military training and the military-technical aspects....

Along with efforts to expand collaboration in military training and cooperation among the armed forces, the Eurogroup partners have also made additional contributions to implementing programs to modernize

NATO's infrastructure. Almost half the monies they have allocated in accordance with EDIP has been designated for this very purpose. Statements by Eurogroup participating nations have particularly noted the intention "to accelerate work to establish an integrated communications system and the construction of aircraft shelters."⁵⁰ The second step was a component of the large-scale NATO program, NADGE. Here the FRG took the principal burden upon itself, paying for almost half the costs, whereas England's appropriations for this part of the EDIP were roughly half as much.⁵¹ After the program was completed in 1975, England and its Eurogroup partners continued to make significant contributions to NATO's infrastructure.

The experience of collaboration between England and the remaining Eurogroup participants in these areas makes it possible to say that the efforts that have been taken have affected only certain aspects of the military partnership. Attention has been concentrated on tasks, the accomplishment of which could be of "local" importance. The more general and vital problems of coordinating the national military planning of the participating nations and coordinating the programs to develop the armed forces and military training have, for all intents and purposes, remained outside the sphere of the Eurogroup's activities. Of course the constant efforts of the Eurogroup members to expand the coordination of military training and material-technical support have established the basis for posing new tasks that are more military-policy than military-technical tasks. But such a transition was limited by the auxiliary role of the NATO Eurogroup within the North Atlantic Alliance.

Until the mid-seventies, a no less important sphere of the NATO Eurogroup's activities up to the mid-seventies, which London paid considerable attention to, was the coordination of projects to develop and produce armaments. At that time, England and its partners made efforts to turn the Eurogroup into the principal center for such collaboration. As a result, at the start of the last decade, a special structure was formed and important decisions were made, the execution of which could noticeably affect the expansion of a West European military-industrial partnership.

At the end of 1970, largely on the initiative of England and the FRG, a subgroup of military specialists was created, headed by the representative from Belgium, which was entrusted with the task of studying the potential for coordinating national rearmament programs and developing plans for the joint production of individual armaments....

After 1973, the Eurogroup made no significant attempts to expand the coordination of training or the conduct of joint arms production projects. The documents either discussed other issues of military-industrial collaboration or they ascertained the potential for joint projects in the eighties and nineties.

Did such a consultative role for the Eurogroup suit the British leaders?

Works by specialists reflect a difference of opinion on this issue. At the end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies, many of them argued that coordination of West European military industrial collaboration should be carried out on a wider scale and at a higher level. The opinion expressed by then-director of the Institute for Strategic Studies, A. Buchan,⁵² the leader of the National Defence College, John Garnett,⁵³ and the well-known military specialist, N. Brown,⁵⁴ and others was that the center for such coordination should be designed not just for a preliminary exchange of information and consultations, but also for the selection of, preparation for, and control over the conduct of joint arms production projects. It was assumed that the governments would allot the center the necessary monies to carry out military RDT&E and would coordinate within its framework not only joint, but also national programs. It was frequently planned to even endow the center with certain national powers.

Practice showed the unreality or the prematureness of such an expansion of the center's functions of multilateral coordination for joint arms production among the Eurogroup nations. The British government also operated with this in mind. In providing for the conduct of regular consultations on the issues of rearmament and the joint production of arms and military equipment, it was relying on tried and proven bilateral or trilateral ties, above all with the FRG and France.

In 1972, when many British specialists were talking about the formation of an effective mechanism within the Eurogroup for West European coordination on joint arms production, a highly placed bureaucrat in the Ministry of Defence, Hugh Green, expressed his preference for the existing methods of partnership. While giving the importance of multilateral consultation and of future planning in subgroups its due and believing their activities to be quite useful, he was against the formation of any kind of organizationally separate center for the coordination of arms production in the Eurogroup.

First, as Green noted, the fact that ten West European nations will participate in the center's work does not change the existing situation whereby it is usually two or three states that join together in a joint arms production project. Artificially expanding the number of participants in the projects will only complicate their execution and increase expenses.

Second, for England, who is extremely interested in developing collaboration with France in this area, it does not make sense to insist on the formation of such a center within the Eurogroup. In that case, the French government would hardly join it and could, moreover, construe such a step as being aimed at curtailing traditional bilateral ties and

the work of the Anglo-French committee on preparing and conducting joint projects.

Based on this, Green has recommended that they not accelerate the creation of a center to coordinate joint West European arms production within the Eurogroup, but that they "discuss common problems of rearmament and establish a favorable climate" and stimulate the reaching of understandings among the interested nations in subgroups that are already functioning.⁵⁵

The Eurogroup's practical activities in this area since 1972 have developed precisely in this direction: expanding the exchange of information, studying the possibilities for joint projects, and preparing recommendations. Green's second prediction also proved to be correct: The French government did not take part in the work of the subgroups called upon "to pave the way" for joint arms production programs. But as has been repeatedly noted in statements by British government representatives and in works by specialists, no one center of coordination for such collaboration could be effective without France being brought into it....

In its response to the Eurogroup's proposal to take part in the creation of a new center for collaboration, at the beginning of December 1975, the French government agreed under the condition that the center being planned would operate independently of NATO and the Eurogroup and would be primarily concerned with coordinating arms programs and strengthening its position with respect to the U.S. The response also mentioned that the new center should be of an intergovernmental and consultative nature and that its decisions must not affect the interests of French military industry. In addition, Paris objected to including the coordination of U.S. arms purchases in its group of tasks.⁵⁶

The members of the NATO Eurogroup accepted the French government's conditions at their meeting on 8 December 1975. The new mechanism, called the European Programme Group (EPG), was established on 2 February 1976 at a meeting in Rome in which representatives from all the NATO Eurogroup nations and France took part....

A year later, in April 1977, the WEU Council instructed the Standing Armaments Committee to join the EPG's work on studying "the position of the participating nation's military industry with the aim of standardizing and developing joint production." Reports appeared that it was thanks to the EPG's activities that it was possible to expand exchanges of information and to outline a number of possible joint programs.

Nevertheless, by the start of the eighties, the participants in the EPG had not been able to achieve any significant results. They were not able to put together an effective center for coordinating West European military-industrial collaboration.⁵⁷ For the present, the EPG's

activities are repeating what has already been done in the Eurogroup's committee in this area and are using the same methods and forms: the preparation of recommendations by specialists and their acceptance by representatives from the participating nations. But there is one extremely vital difference--France's participation in this work. Even if the EPG's activities are limited to coordinating rearmament planning and searching for possibilities for joint projects, carried out further by already interested parties, then in this case one could speak of an important qualitative improvement in the development of mechanisms to regulate West European military-industrial collaboration: the formation of a center with the participation of all three leading states.

The formation of the EPG bears witness to the tendency toward unification in this area and to the need for British, French, and West German ruling circles to "finish building" the existing mechanisms for military-industrial collaboration and its regulation which, before this, encompassed either individual programs or a series of bilateral programs and the system coordination for impending joint projects in all their scope, among all the West European allies.

The potential of the European Programme Group in this sphere depends, first, on the development of the foundation for joint West European arms production programs, the attitude toward which in London, Bonn, and Paris is determined by many factors and, second, on France's readiness to coordinate its national rearmament plans within its framework, not only formally, but also in fact.

The experience of the work of the Eurogroup committees and, subsequently, the activities of the EPG to coordinate arms production have shown that the rapid creation of a unified center regulating a number of joint programs and a center playing an active role in their development and execution is unrealistic. There remains the gradual development of coordination, particularly in the preparation of projects.

Members of the Eurogroup are interested not in turning it into an autonomous center for West European collaboration, but in making it so that it adds to the military partnership in NATO and contributes to its intensification. In the seventies this orientation predetermined France's refusal to take part in the Eurogroup's work. Its "achievements" in the development of West European military-policy and military-industrial partnerships turned out to be relatively limited. All of this has been stimulated by the search by proponents of establishing a West European military-policy system for another, more complete and far-reaching solution, which they frequently tie in with the integration process in the European community.

CONCLUSION

The result of the conduct of the British military-policy course in Europe has been the retention and even the increase of England's contri-

bution to the armed confrontation owing primarily to the qualitative modernization of its military might and the expansion of its ties with its allies. But if one asks whether these efforts, which have required considerable enough expenditures of forces and money for England, have given Britain any kind of real advantages (even from the viewpoint of those who cannot imagine ensuring security any other way than by maintaining and increasing the level of military might of the British armed forces in NATO) in terms of confrontation, the advantages have been, to put it mildly, indefinite and based on the expectation that they will have to oppose some kind of mythical "threat." The position of the leading West European powers in NATO, which supplied corresponding military might and developed military industry, was used basically to preserve and strengthen England's position in Western Europe and its privileged collaboration with the U.S.

Of course, one must not completely rule out the possibility of a situation arising in Europe or beyond its borders where the British leaders could, even contrary to the nation's fundamental interests, become involved in a military adventure. The Anglo-Argentinian conflict once again confirmed that they have by no means renounced attempts to attain their objectives in the international arena with the help of military force. But still, an armed confrontation with the socialist community is scarcely considered by England's ruling circles to be desirable.

One should emphasize that there does exist a quite real potential to influence the development and conduct of England's military-political course in the context of its greater conformity to the true interests of ensuring the nation's security. Here, a great deal depends on who is in power. The Labour leaders, with all their vacillations and inconsistency during the seventies, displayed a greater readiness to act in this direction than did the Conservative leaders. It would, of course, be an oversimplification to suppose that within the leadership of the Conservative Party there are no politicians who are inclined to take the step, sooner or later, of making suitable modifications in at least individual components of the British military-political course, but all the same, such changes are still more probable in the event the Labourites come to power, possibly in alliance with the other centrist parties.

Much also depends on how much England will continue to follow the U.S. and subordinate the missions of its military-political course to NATO objectives which are, in the final analysis, determined in Washington. It is not ruled out that as far as putting together a West European center, an active participant of which in the past decade has been England, there could be created a system of military-policy collaboration among the West European states not such as there is now--one promoting first and foremost increased NATO military might--but one less dependent upon the U.S., focused on directly realizing the interests of the West European allies.

An examination of England's collaboration with the West European states in the military-policy and military-industrial spheres makes it possible to conclude that such a tendency does exist and is developing. It is another question as to how the formation of such a system will affect the situation in Europe. While not seeking to give a predetermined response to this, we will note, all the same, the potential for several positive changes; at least taking into account the more obvious interest of the West European states in preserving the opposing groupings on the continent, the level of tension and confrontation has not reached a dangerous limit; in the future it will more likely be reduced than increased.

Certainly, a more intelligent way out would be not to continue a North Atlantic focus or to strengthen a West European focus in the formation of the British military-policy course, but to intensify a focus on developing relations and reaching agreements in order to lessen tensions and limit arms with the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations. The experience of the seventies has demonstrated that England's ruling circles were, to one extent or another, interested in having such a path remain open. And it is namely in this direction, through a change in British policy of the correlation between the roles of its military-political course and its interest in lessening tensions and disarmament in favor of the latter that it is possible to ensure lasting security in Europe, including the security of England.

NOTES

1. *Materials of the XXVI Congress of the CPSU* (Moscow, 1981), 20.
2. G. Williams and A. Williams, *Crisis in European Defence* (London, 1974), 286.
3. *NATO Letter*, Jan 1969, 27.
4. *Strategic Survey, 1974* (London, 1975), 46.
5. *Sunday Times*, 31 Mar 1974.
6. B. Burrows and C. Irwin, *The Security of Western Europe* (London, 1972), 50.
7. *International Affairs*, No. 1, 1978, 46.
8. *The Military Balance, 1977-1978* (London, 1977).
9. Burrows and Irwin, *op. cit.*, 48-50.
10. Their NATO names, respectively: Allied Command Europe's Mobile Force; Standing Naval Force Atlantic; Standing Naval Force Channel; Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean.
11. Burrows and Irwin, *op. cit.*, 85.
12. *Defence Policy After Review: Army Restructuring* (London, 1975).
13. *NATO Letter*, Sep-Oct 1972.
14. *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1977*, 29.
15. *Daily Telegraph*, 8 Dec 1979.
16. *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1977*, 22-23.
17. *NATO Review*, Jan-Feb 1975.
18. *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1970* (London, 1970).
19. *British Forces Germany*, 1975, 10.

NOTES (Continued)

20. Contributing to this committee, whose name derives from the first letters of the participating countries--FINABEL--are representatives from the ground forces' staffs of France, Italy, The Netherlands, the FRG, Belgium, England, and Luxembourg. See *The Ground Troops of the Capitalist States*, 6.
21. *British Forces Germany*, 1975, 12.
22. Williams and Williams, *Crisis in European Defence* (London, 1974).
23. *Times*, 26 Feb 1973.
24. Its accepted name is NADGE (NATO Air Defence Ground Environment).
25. This system was called NICS (NATO Integrated Communications System).
26. *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1976*, 11.
27. *NATO Review*, Sep-Oct 1976, 7-8.
28. *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1981*, 7.
29. *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1966* (London, 1966), 45.
30. A. Buchan, *The Implications of a European System for Defence Technology* (London, 1967).
31. *The Defence of Western Europe* (London, 1974).
32. *Guided Weapons*, 108.
33. This spectrum of opinion was revealed during meetings of a special parliamentary committee in 1976 to which representatives from the main aeromissile industry firms were invited.
34. *Guided Weapons*, 205; see also: *Defence Policy After Review*, 229.
35. *Statements on the Defence Estimates* (London, 1965-1979).
36. This was in effect until 1976 when the U.S. Senate adopted an amendment making it somewhat easier to export West European arms and equipment to the United States.

NOTES (Continued)

37. *The Economist*, 11 Oct 1975. In 1979 the implementation of this program was in question in the United States. A protracted fight flared up in the Pentagon among the armed forces' staffs about the expediency of continuing it. See: *Parliamentary Debates*, 1979, Vol. 960, 19 Jan.
38. According to estimates by British specialists, during the seventies the United States purchased less than 1 percent of its arms and military equipment abroad.
39. *NATO Review*, Jul-Aug 1975.
40. *Times*, 4 Dec 1975.
41. See, *Defense Nationale*, May 1976.
42. *Times*, 20 Oct 1976.
43. *Ibid.*, 10 Jan 1975.
44. *Guided Weapons*, 92.
45. *Times*, 3 May 1975.
46. The British AEW system is based on Nimrod naval patrol aircraft and allows primarily for surveillance of aircraft, ships, and submarines. The cost of the program is tentatively set at 100 million pounds sterling, or three times less than England's proposed share on the purchase of AWACS. See: *Parliamentary Debates*, 1977, Vol. 929, 31 Mar.
47. *Financial Times*, 22 Apr 1977.
48. J. Bellini and G. Pattie, *A New World Role for Medium Power[s]* (London, 1977), 83.
49. For the formation of the NATO Eurogroup, see: *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, No. 8, 1973.
50. *NATO Letter*, Dec 1970, 8.
51. *Current British Foreign Policy*, 1971, 148.
52. *Europe's Futures, Europe's Choices* (London, 1969), 24, 26-27.
53. *The Defence of Western Europe*, 70.

NOTES (Continued)

- 54. See: N. Brown, *op. cit.* [The translator has found no previous reference to Brown's book in the entire monograph.]
- 55. *The Defence of Western Europe*, 106-107.
- 56. *Defense Nationale*, May 1976, 22-24.
- 57. See: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Dec 1979, 187, 195-196.

G. Kolosov, "Great Britain's Military-Political Course at the Start of the Eighties," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* [World Economics and International Relations], No. 1, 1983, 97-102.

In one of her first interviews as Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher set forth an ambitious plan to strengthen the West's position in the international arena. In her words, the global nature of opposing socialism demands a unification of efforts from the capitalist states, even including the formation of some kind of "global alliance." In this connection, very close attention must be paid to increasing the military might of the western nations.¹

At the December session of the NATO Council in Brussels in 1979, the Conservative government unqualifiedly supported the plan proposed by the United States to station new U.S. medium-range nuclear systems in Western Europe. Along with this, the government resolved to help England make the transition to a new strategic arms system, it is implementing numerous programs to develop its general purpose armed forces, it is increasing expenditures on military needs, and it is expanding military-political and military-industrial cooperation with its NATO allies.

Government statements persistently single out bloc opposition on the European continent as the thing of primary importance. The Ministry of Defence's Blue Book for 1981 noted that England was "the only one of the European states to make a contribution to the alliance's strategic nuclear force, in addition to providing much of NATO's naval and air forces in the Channel (the English Channel--G.K.) and in the Eastern Atlantic, let alone ensuring the security of its own territory."

London pins no small hopes on the further development of West European military and military-industrial cooperation in which England is seeking the leading role. But in contrast to the start of the previous decade, today the question of an Anglo-French nuclear partnership has been removed from the agenda, and principal attention is paid to focusing cooperation so as to fulfill the common tasks of the North Atlantic bloc. The Conservative leaders also react with great restraint to the proposal occasionally set forth to create an autonomous West European military-political system based on already existing mechanisms for cooperation or some kind of new ones. Thatcher has declared that the implementation of such proposals could only damage the cohesion of the NATO countries and would therefore not contribute to the fulfillment of such an important policy task, which is being carried out by her cabinet, as consolidating Western Europe's ties with the United States within the North Atlantic alliance.²

The global claims of British ruling circles also remain fairly significant. Despite its loss of vast colonial possessions, England did manage to retain several fragments of her former empire. These are

primarily Hong Kong, Brunei, Gibraltar, Diego Garcia, and finally, the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. In addition, it is trying to strengthen military cooperation with a whole series of developing countries that are, as a rule, members of the Commonwealth. From year to year British ships are sent on maneuvers in seas very far away from the nation's shores. In official statements, the continuation of "imperial" policy is usually motivated by aspirations to "counter the Soviet threat" in other areas of the world and to ensure "the safety of communications." But the genuine objectives of the British leaders lie elsewhere. As the military operation in the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands convincingly demonstrated, it is a question of attempting at any price to retain its remaining colonial possessions for itself, which are of either economic or military interest. Apart from everything else, this operation, according to the calculations of Thatcher and her supporters, was to remind the world that Great Britain is "the mistress of the sea," able to assert her "rights" in any area, even thousands of miles away. The conduct of such a policy exacerbates serious contradictions between England and developing states, as well as certain capitalist states.

The recurrences of global ambitions that have been manifested quite noticeably at the start of the eighties are caused by the British leaders' determination to oppose progressive changes, together with the United States and its NATO West European allies, everywhere the West's economic and political interests are affected. One of the steps in this direction was the dispatch of a naval squadron on maneuvers being conducted last year by the U.S. in the Persian Gulf. Statements by England's Ministry of Defence repeatedly underscored the desirability of coordinated actions by NATO allies beyond the boundaries of the North Atlantic Treaty. A graphic example of such coordination was the United States' assistance to England during the Anglo-Argentinean conflict.

England's present leaders are placing greater and greater stress on the development of military cooperation with the United States, especially in the area of nuclear arms. The most dangerous step in this direction recently was the Conservative government's agreement to station new U.S. missiles in the country. The Conservatives have done and continue to do no small amount to implement NATO's Brussels decision fully and on time. Back in July 1980 they announced, without any kind of stipulations, their readiness to give two bases--Greenham Common (Berkshire) and Molesworth (Cambridgeshire)--where it is planned, in total, to station no fewer than 160 cruise missiles, or more than one-third of the total number planned for Western Europe. At Greenham Common, preparatory work has already begun to get it ready to accept the new U.S. medium-range nuclear weapons systems by the end of 1983.

The development of cruise missiles in England significantly increases the danger of the country being drawn into a nuclear conflict, especially if one considers the scenarios being elaborated in Washington for fighting a "limited" nuclear war in Europe. Nevertheless, in their statements Conservative leaders stress their determination to achieve

the planned objective and have even suggested to the United States that they would partially pay for the costs of preparing the bases set aside to receive the cruise missiles. As a result of the Soviet-American talks, the emergence of a possibility to limit medium-range nuclear weapons systems in Europe did not evoke a positive reaction from Thatcher or her colleagues. On the contrary, the Conservative government does not even consider the buildup of U.S. nuclear arms currently being undertaken to be sufficient. It proposes returning once again to a discussion of the deployment of American neutron weapons on the territory of West European states. In turn, Thatcher appraised the postponement of their production as "an erroneous decision," impeding the further modernization of the so-called tactical component of the U.S. nuclear arsenal on the European continent. But then Reagan's sanctioning of large-scale production of neutron weapons received the complete approval of the Conservative government.

In advocating the buildup of nuclear arms, England's leaders are at the same time trying to follow the United States in elaborating strategic plans. For example, Great Britain's Ministry of Defence's Blue Book for 1981 made an attempt to justify the U.S. focus on conducting a counterforce strategy. This document argues that the use of nuclear weapons can be controlled, without resorting to a general war of annihilation. "Escalation," claim the document's authors, "is not a self-developing process, but is determined by the decisions of people. Therefore, it is entirely reasonable, even necessary, to elaborate plans through which it would be possible to provide and implement the potential, making it possible to end the war before it leads to a global catastrophe."³ Preparations in and of themselves for a nuclear war and, mainly, the attempt to convince the nation's public of the possibility and even desirability of conducting, it represent an extremely dangerous and alarming tendency in the formation of British military-political doctrine for the eighties.

The strengthening of ties with the United States in the area of nuclear arms is observed within the framework of the bilateral Anglo-American partnership. Having decided to replace the British Polaris with a new, more powerful system, the Conservatives turned to the U.S. administration for assistance, expecting to acquire the Trident system. The final agreement for this deal was confirmed by Carter and Thatcher in July 1980. It was reported that England would rely on U.S. assistance in obtaining the equipment and technical information necessary to deploy this system and in using U.S. training command centers. It is intended to construct the nuclear submarines in British shipyards. This program is designed for 15 years, and its cost has been determined by the Ministry of Defence to be 5 billion pounds sterling in 1980 prices.⁴

After these four nuclear submarines with Trident-2 missiles are brought into the inventory, the number of available warheads will grow several times over and will reach almost 1,000. As a result, according

to the well-known British expert Lawrence Freedman, the use of missiles of this type deployed on just one nuclear submarine can inflict greater damage than all the Polaris missiles England now has.⁵

Along with the planned buildup of strategic nuclear forces, noticeably greater attention than before is now being paid to operational-tactical and tactical nuclear weapons. Statements by England's Ministry of Defence especially underscore the importance of the broad-scale outfitting of the air force with British-produced nuclear bombs. The "advantages" of arming naval aviation airplanes and helicopters with nuclear depth bombs are being examined.

The interest of current British leaders in building up the nuclear forces predetermines their approach to the problems of limiting nuclear arms. While advocating in words the conduct of Soviet-American talks, the Conservative government has, at the same time, underscored the "need" to significantly improve the U.S. nuclear arsenal in Europe and does not intend to reexamine its own plans for developing its nuclear forces. Having, at the present time, agreed with the well-known NATO formula of "deploying new U.S. medium-range systems at the same time as [conducting] talks to limit them," the Conservatives are doing everything they can to implement, first and foremost, the former aspect of it very soon.

The British Navy occupies a special place among the nation's armed forces. Its role and interventionist tendencies were clearly apparent during the Anglo-Argentinean conflict. According to government statements, at the beginning of the eighties, England possessed 200 naval ships and submarines primarily focused on executing tasks in the Northeast Atlantic. In this connection, an ever greater role within the British fleet is being played by nuclear attack submarines, the latest destroyers and frigates equipped with missiles and helicopters and, finally, aircraft carrier-cruisers having Harrier naval aviation planes on board. The first of this series of aircraft carrier-cruisers, the Invincible, was, as is known, the flag ship for the British squadron in the South Atlantic, while the second one, the Illustrious, was launched last year and is going through testing. At the same time, the number of ships of earlier construction is being reduced and a reorganization of auxiliary services is taking place. Such a modernization of the British Navy will, so the Conservatives expect, make it possible to use the navy not only to execute NATO tasks in the Northeast Atlantic, but also, and to an even greater extent, to conduct operations outside the bloc's established zone of operations. The existence of a sufficiently powerful navy makes it possible for the British leaders to effectively assist the U.S. in realizing its plans to create and utilize a rapid deployment force.

The Conservative government is making great efforts to carry out a substantial modernization of the British air forces. Here, among other programs, the primary place is allotted to putting the multipurpose

fighter-bomber Tornado into service, [an aircraft] created by England together with the FRG and Italy. According to government plans, it is intended to replace more than one-third of the total number of England's Air Force planes with the Tornado during the eighties, although its cost has now already exceeded all preliminary estimates.⁶ It is not ruled out that a portion of the Tornado planes will be used as nuclear weapons carriers.

Appreciable changes are taking place in the armament and composition of the British ground troops. At the beginning of this decade they were equipped with improved Chieftain tanks, new air defense systems, and antitank missiles. Fundamental attention was paid to raising the combat capability and to reinforcing the British Army on the Rhine located in the FRG.

Beginning in 1969, units of British ground troops, along with marines and special subunits, have been fulfilling police functions in Ulster, where they are used to suppress movements by the Catholic segment of the population. During the past decade, between 10,000 and 15,000 soldiers have been there at one time or another for a 4-month "practice" or have gone through preliminary training for police service.

Implementing numerous programs to strengthen military might, maintaining a sufficiently high level of armed forces, and participating in maneuvers and other measures within NATO inevitably leads to increased expenditures on military needs. After the NATO resolution made in 1977 for an annual 3-percent real increase in military appropriations, their constant growth has been evident.

This tendency was manifested even more definitely after the Conservatives came to power, repeatedly emphasizing their determination to spare no money for military needs. As a result, from 1979 through 1982 the real growth of appropriations to England's Ministry of Defence came not to 3 percent, but to 5 percent per annum. For fiscal year 1981-82, Margaret Thatcher and her colleagues set these appropriations at 12.3 billion pounds sterling and for 1982-83, 14.5 billion pounds sterling. England surpassed France in total expenditures on military needs and caught up with the FRG in the per-capita proportions of these expenditures. Such efforts, given an extremely slow increase in the GNP, have led to the fact that the portion of the GNP going to military purposes has risen from 4.9 percent in 1979 to 5.2 percent in 1981.⁷ In 1982, along with the "usual" increase in military expenditures, the Conservative government spent no less than 2 billion pounds sterling to conduct the military operation in the South Atlantic. The planned upkeep of a considerable contingent of armed forces there will certainly require new tens and even hundreds of millions of pounds sterling.

The production of arms and military equipment is an integral part of the British government's military-political course. At the start of the eighties, British military industry continues to occupy a leading

position in Western Europe, lagging somewhat behind only the French. An ever greater portion of the budget of England's Ministry of Defence is going to the development, production, and acquisition of new armaments and military equipment. Whereas in the last decade these monies made up one-third of the appropriations for military needs, now they have exceeded 40 percent and in fiscal year 1981-82 they reached 5.4 billion pounds sterling. Of this sum, 1.7 billion pounds sterling was spent on military-type RDT&E. In addition, no small amount of money for expanding military production has also been allocated through other channels, particularly from the Ministry of Industry's budget. Revenues from the export of British weapons and military equipment and the sale of licenses to produce them have grown; during the seventies they quadrupled, and in 1981 they came to 1.5 billion pounds sterling.⁸

This material foundation makes it possible to carry out numerous rearmament programs and to finance the activities of British firms and state enterprises in the military-industrial sphere. Most of all, money has been spent on the development and production of antimissile equipment, somewhat less on the construction of naval ships and their armament, while expenditures on arms for the ground forces take third place.

No fewer than 400 contractors take part in fulfilling government programs and numerous export orders. But for all intents and purposes, production of the main armaments systems and military equipment is carried out by three dozen firms and state enterprises, while the rest usually act as subcontractors, delivering individual components of the equipment. Three-quarters of the orders (in terms of cost) go to roughly 18 of the leading supplier firms that make up the nucleus of the British military-industrial business.

England is now playing a more active role than previously in deepening military-industrial cooperation among the states of Western Europe, which has, since the end of the sixties, been considered in London to be a necessary condition to implement large-scale arms production programs, primarily antimissile equipment. Many programs for creating new military airplanes, helicopters, and tactical missiles are being filled by British firms and state enterprises jointly with French, West German, and Italian companies. To implement them, West European consortiums have been formed, the most important of which is Panavia, where the leading role belongs to British Aerospace. After completing the model of the multipurpose Tornado aircraft, it is planned to retain this consortium and to turn it into the main production center for military aircraft in Western Europe; and they are making efforts to draw the French air-missile industry into Panavia. On the other hand, British Aerospace is taking part in the activities of the Franco-West German consortium, Euromissile, that is concerned with the production of tactical missiles.

The expansion of West European military-industrial cooperation has necessitated the creation of appropriate mechanisms for coordinating

it. At the start of the eighties, the most actively functioning mechanism of this type remains the [Independent] European Programme Group formed in 1976 (largely on England's initiative). But the prospects for its further activity depend first on the status of relations between the West European allies and the United States in the military-industrial sphere. While advocating an intensification of joint arms production in Western Europe, at the same time British leaders are not curtailing imports of American systems, equipment, and licenses necessary to implement many military programs. A factor of no small importance, also predetermining the future of West European interstate regulation of arms production, is the development of military-political ties, particularly in the area of coordinating the planning of national programs to develop the armed forces and unify military doctrines.

The Conservatives' military-political course and the growth of expenditures on military needs inevitably connected with it evoke active opposition on the part of opposition parties and various antimilitary organizations. Authoritative specialists on military issues have criticized individual aspects of this policy, particularly the Conservatives' decision to shift to a new strategic arms system.

Changes in the Labour Party leadership's approach to these issues are attracting attention. Whereas at the end of the seventies Labour's leaders, headed by Callaghan, on the whole supported the buildup of NATO's military might, approved the decision for an annual 3-percent increase in military appropriations, and sanctioned a program to modernize the Polaris, unbeknownst to Parliament and even to most of the members of the cabinet, the Party's present leaders are frequently questioning in their speeches not only much of what the current Conservative government is undertaking in the military-political sphere, but also the approach of its own predecessors.

Back at the Party's conference in October 1979, leftist Labourites extracted from Callaghan and his supporters the adoption of a resolution calling for abstention from deploying U.S. cruise missiles in England and for not making the transition to a new strategic arms system. Proposals were set forth at this conference aimed at curtailing British nuclear forces and at withdrawing all U.S. nuclear weapons systems from the country's territory.

At the next Labour conference in October 1980, a resolution was adopted condemning the conduct of a policy by the United States and England's Conservative government "based on the threat to use nuclear weapons." Many of the conference participants advocated a refusal to acquire Trident, the closing of American bases with nuclear weapons located on British territory, and even the withdrawal of England from NATO.¹⁰

In determining the character and potential consequences of such changes, one should, in our view, take into consideration a number of

things. On the one hand, it was long ago noted that when in opposition, Labour leaders appraise the buildup of nuclear weapons by the United States and its NATO allies more critically than when they are in power and they pay closer attention to the demands of nuclear disarmament adherents within the Party's ranks. The Labour leaders' pre-election promises about changes in British military and political policy often have not been fulfilled or have been only partially fulfilled once the Party has come to power. At the same time, it is necessary to take into consideration not only historical experience, but also the effect of factors capable of leading to the disruption of continuity in the conduct of British military-political policy. An important new element is the noticeable weakening of the positions of authoritative supporters of nuclear arms modernization within the "shadow cabinet." All the same, one can still hardly speak about the predominance of the opinion of those who insist on a resolute refusal to hand over British bases for U.S. cruise missiles. Michael Foot, judging from his appearances as leader of the Labourites, has noticeably toned down his approach and prefers not to define precisely what steps the Labourites will take in this area in the event they come into power nor how exactly they intend to revise the corresponding resolutions of the Conservative government.

Certainly the approach of British Social Democrats to this problem merits attention, having recently managed to become a sufficiently influential political force. Inasmuch as the Social Democrats are at a stage of both organizational and ideopolitical formation, it is still too early to talk about the existence of any clear-cut principles on military-political matters they might have. Rather it is a question of their leaders elaborating several preliminary propositions.

In his recently published book, the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the Labour government and now one of the leaders of the Social Democrats, David Owen, advocates generally preserving the positive progress made in the last decade in East-West relations. He accords particular importance to renewing Soviet-American nuclear arms limitation talks. Owen postulates that their principal task during the start of the eighties should be to work out agreements to reduce intermediate-range systems in Europe. While not directly advocating a refusal to station cruise missiles in England, he does in fact question the necessity of this decision by the Conservatives. He has serious objections about the intended switch from Polaris to Trident.

Rodgers comes from a more rigid position, having occupied the post of Deputy Secretary of Defence in Labour governments. He maintains that stationing U.S. cruise missiles in England is "necessary" within the plan to militarily oppose the Soviet Union, and will contribute to the strengthening of the Anglo-American nuclear partnership. If in the near term the Soviet-American talks manage to reach an understanding that provides for a significant reduction in Soviet intermediate-range missiles, then it would be possible for NATO allies to refuse deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe. But he considers such

an outcome unlikely. With respect to building up British nuclear forces, Rodgers takes a position similar to Owen's approach. Although not objecting to modernizing Polaris or replacing it with a more modern strategic arms system, Rodgers has opposed the acquisition of Trident, given the high cost of this system. It is impossible, according to his estimates, to implement the program outlined by the Conservative government without making simultaneous, significant reductions in general purpose forces and curtailing a whole series of conventional arms production programs. Based on these considerations, Rodgers advocates having a special discussion of the Trident decision in Parliament and a reexamination of it.

The opinions of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party and, to an even greater extent, the leaders of the Labourites, about the elaboration and conduct of a military-political course in large part reflect the attitude of a broad segment of the British public toward these issues. The mass movement unfolding in England of people opposing a buildup in nuclear arms here is having no small effect, and in terms of Labour's position, it is having even a determining effect.

The rapid and frequently spontaneous development of this movement in England and other West European nations beginning in 1979 was brought about as a reaction to the infamous NATO Brussels decision to deploy new U.S. intermediate-range nuclear weapons systems. To an even greater extent, it was caused by the realization of an increase in the quite real danger of a nuclear conflict breaking out in Europe as a result of an exacerbation in military opposition, the conduct of a counterforce strategy by the United States, or the expansion of a crisis situation. According to public opinion polls, whereas in August 1980 only 20 percent of those polled advocated the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the country's territory, in February 1982 their number had reached 50 percent. Roughly half of those polled also did not see the need for retaining the British nuclear force, and 63 percent were against the planned acquisition of Trident. Not only a majority of Labourites, but also half of Liberal and Social Democrat supporters, and even more than a third of Conservative supporters were against the deployment of U.S. cruise missiles in England and the transition to Trident. But one must not overestimate the degree of influence of the antimilitary movement on the formation of the official London military-political course in the foreseeable future. The current Labour leadership's approach to military-political problems should not be thought to be definitively shaped. There is room for appreciable vacillation, particularly in the matter of deploying cruise missiles in the country. Frequently Labour's leaders strive to find compromise decisions that do not affect such foundations of the military-political course as the alliance with the U.S., membership in NATO, strengthening the armed forces, and retaining the nuclear arsenal. One way or another, the Conservative government now has the potential to realize its military-political decisions, which will prove infinitely more difficult to cancel.

NOTES

1. See *Time*, 14 May 1979, 13.
2. See *The Times*, 17 Mar 1982.
3. *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1981* (London, 1981), 13
4. *Ibid.*, 14.
5. See L. Freedman, *Britain and Nuclear Weapons* (London, 1980), 76-77.
6. In 1981 the British Ministry of Defence estimated the cost of Tornado at 11.4 million pounds sterling and an improved model of it for air defense at 14.3 million pounds sterling. In 1984 it is planned that 18 percent of the total expenditure on armaments will go to the production of Tornado. *The Financial Times*, 23 Jun 1982.
7. *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1981*, 67.
8. *Ibid.*, 48.
9. Respectively: 40, 32, and 20 percent of the total expenditures on armaments production in 1981.
10. See *Report of the Annual Conference and Special Conference of the Labour Party, 1980* (London), 160-165.

S. Madzoevskii and E. Khesin, "Great Britain in Today's World," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* [World Economics and International Relations], No. 8, 1980, 50, 54-58, 61-63. Excerpts.

In the lengthy process of changes in England's world position, one can observe patterns common to all of the leading capitalist states. As a result of profound shifts in the global correlation of class forces, the relative weight of the imperialist powers has diminished while the role and importance of the socialist states and the nations liberated from the former colonial and semicolonial world has increased. At the same time, under the influence of the law of inequality in the political and economic development of capitalism and within the framework of the overall process of the weakening of imperialism as a system, a particularly specific change is taking place in the position of each individual imperialist power within the world economy and politics. The purpose of this article is to elucidate the essence of such changes in England's international position. In this connection, although the phenomena discussed below should not be viewed in isolation from the history of the postwar period as a whole, attention is concentrated mainly on the changes characteristic of the past decade.

I

If one considers the entire series of economic, political, and military factors, England is today, at the start of the eighties, indisputably one of the five leading powers of the capitalist world--along with the U.S., France, the FRG, and Japan. Moreover, compared to the latter two, she has certain political and military-strategic advantages ensuing from the results of World War II. England is one of the three nuclear powers of the capitalist world and a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Since the beginning of the seventies, she has, along with France and the FRG, played a leading role in the European Economic Community and has, at the same time, although in reduced form, retained her "special relationship" with the United States. England has until now possessed the most far-flung "economic empire" abroad, after the U.S., and has the potential to use the Commonwealth's mechanism in order to achieve her political objectives....

The reliance of England's ruling class on military might and on the role of being the U.S.' main ally (within and outside NATO) in the confrontation between the states of the two [world social] systems has had an extremely contradictory influence on the change of England's place in the world. One cannot deny that the existence of its own nuclear weapons and a modern military industry, large by West European scales, has to a certain extent contributed to strengthening London's political influence in the area of interimperialist relations. At the same time, such an "advantage" has been paid for with negative consequences for the nation's economy and population.

During the entire postwar period the share of resources being used for military purposes has, despite a gradual reduction, remained considerably greater than the other leading capitalist states (except the U.S.). In 1978, military expenditures represented the [following] percentages of the gross national product: England--4.7; the FRG--3.4; France--3.3; Italy--2.4; and Japan--0.9.* In addition, the proportion of expenditures on military research and development within the overall sum for RDT&E is also higher than the average; in other words, the amount diverted of scientific and technical cadres and qualified manpower from productive purposes is especially high here. Thus, the military guidelines of the British leadership act in direct contradiction to the line proclaimed by them to improve the economy's scientific-technical base. As is evident from documents and government statements by the Conservatives (at the end of the fifties) and the Labourites (in the mid-seventies), London cannot ignore the interconnection between the high level of military expenditures and the relatively low level of effectiveness of the civilian economy. The facts, however, are such that the long-ago noted determination of the ruling circles to hold the military trump cards in their hand has proven, right up to our day, to be predominant in determining state policy in this sphere.

...Over the past decade there have been, in our view, very fundamental changes [in Britain's role in the world economy and politics]. There is currently, first and foremost, a far-reaching transformation of the structure of British imperialism toward "Europeanization."

II

During the formation of the main centers of imperialist rivalry, for many years Great Britain was "neither here nor there." All attempts by London to find a "middle of the road" between joining the West European group and its "special relationship" with the U.S. as a junior partner not only did not ensure it independence and the status of an independent middleman, but, on the contrary, led to the relative and far-from-"resplendent" isolation of Great Britain within the system of interimperialist interconnection.

Today it is a different situation. England occupies quite a specific place within the U.S.-Western Europe-Japan triangle and acts within this framework as a component of the West European center. For 10 years already England has been an active participant in the expanding system of coordination among the foreign policy courses of the nine EEC members. At the same time, the existence of isolated states within the West European center preserves the nature of ties of each participant, including Great Britain, with other imperialist powers.

* *The Military Balance 1979-1980* (London, 1979), 94-95.

In such ties, its orientation toward Western Europe in the economic and political spheres goes well with the North Atlantic tendency in the military sphere. In this respect, England is no different, generally and as a whole, from the other members of the EEC (except for France), but in the depth and intensity of its relations with the U.S. in the nuclear sphere, she still stands apart. The British nuclear force includes U.S.-produced components and is controlled according to jointly elaborated programs and with the assistance of common communication means. U.S. nuclear forces make use of bases, communication hubs, and early detection systems located on British territory. During the seventies a new Anglo-American base began to operate on the island of Diego Garcia--a British colonial territory in the Indian Ocean. During discussions in Washington about various aspects of the nuclear weapons problem, certain doors in the White House, State Department, and Pentagon that are closed to all other [nations] still remain ajar for the British.

At the same time, the correlation of London's West European and North Atlantic military ties in the nuclear and nonnuclear spheres are different. A definite "Europeanization" of its nonnuclear component following the Eurogroup's programming is taking place, uniting the majority of the European members of NATO (without the participation of the U.S. and Canada)....

In sum, in all the main spheres of England's mutual relations with the other imperialist powers, except in nuclear weapons, the tendency to increase the West European component prevails. Despite the distinctive quality of London's ties with Washington, a substantial shift has taken place in England's position within the imperialist system....

Throughout the entire postwar period, right up to the present time, England has played an important political and military role in the combined efforts of the imperialist powers to consolidate the capitalist system in Europe within the context of the growing might of the socialist community and the forces of social progress in the West European nations.

It is sufficient to recall London's initiatory role in the creation of NATO, the West European Union, and the Eurogroup and its efforts to stabilize the North Atlantic bloc during the time of crisis created by France's withdrawal from NATO's military organization. One can also point to the influence London has exerted, together with Bonn and Paris, upon the EEC's policy for the political development of Portugal, Greece, and Spain after the collapse of their fascist regimes. At the juncture of the seventies and eighties the Conservative government that came to power, together with the one in Washington, played a principal role in NATO adopting a long-term program to qualitatively strengthen nuclear weapons located in Western Europe....

The issue of shifting the center of gravity of British imperialism's interests is still only a question of proportions, a long-term tendency. After all, of all the West European states, even today it retains the strongest politico-economic position in the former colonial world and the most durable ties with the U.S. At the same time, the change taking place, to "face toward Europe," represents a key element in the broad-scale progress of changes in England's place within the world and within the hierarchy of the imperialist powers.

V

A complex series of contradictory changes in the correlation of forces between England and the other imperialist powers can also be observed in the political and military spheres. Within and outside the framework of the Commonwealth, England has ties with Asian and African states and still has somewhat greater political influence in the developing world than do the other West European powers and Japan. Even so, this advantage is, on the whole, decreasing. In the Middle East, for example, during the seventies, the political role of France proved to be no smaller than the British one. It is especially obvious that England's political influence in the Far East and in Southeast Asia has fallen considerably compared to Japan's role, and the correlation of forces between them has shifted in the latter's favor. At the same time, in Africa, south of the Sahara, Great Britain still retains greater potential to influence the course of events politically than the other West European powers, despite the considerable acceleration of France's policy.

Meanwhile in Western Europe, both in the seventies and today, another tendency has prevailed. During the fifties and sixties, England's political position here weakened steadily, while the position of France and the FRG became stronger. At the first stage of the integration process in continental Western Europe, there took shape--as a consequence of London's refusal to participate in it--a kind of "duumvirate" between Paris and Bonn: it directed the formation of the West European imperialist center in the interests of both nations. During the past decade, however, the situation changed substantially: the "duumvirate" turned into a "triumvirate," with London's participation.

As is apparent from the recent conflict between London and Paris, serious differences still remain between England and the other main participants in the Community on the issue of financing the EEC's agricultural policy. But the maneuvering field of British diplomacy in Western Europe has visibly expanded.

In the political sphere of the West European center's activities, England still plays a smaller role than do France or the FRG; however, the gap has been reduced considerably. The main change lies in the fact that since the start of the seventies, London has participated directly

and on an equal footing with France and the FRG in all sections of the Community and at all of its levels, including the highest political levels of authority (the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the Commission [of the European Communities], the Parliament and the mechanism for coordinating foreign policies).

At the same time, in one of the decisive spheres of world politics, relations between the states of the two systems, England's influence at the end of the seventies and beginning of the eighties has diminished compared to the influence of France or the FRG. During the Conservatives' stay in power (1970-1974 and 1979 to the present), London has carried out a more rigid policy than Paris and Bonn on the central problems of detente. Here, British ruling circles have relied primarily on the special place Great Britain occupies within the entire system of the region's military interconnections and they have attempted to play their relatively strong military-political cards in the dangerous and complex game. As a result, England plays a less weighty role than France and the FRG in the normalization and stabilization of relations between East and West.

Since its advent to power in 1979, the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher has supported, more actively than the U.S.' other NATO partners, the Carter administration's policy--hostile to the cause of peace--to undermine detente. London has implemented a series of measures to curtail political and economic contacts with the USSR. In this connection, one cannot help but recall that during the postwar period there were times when, among the West European powers, England acted as the main champion of detente and was one of the initiators of the development of mutually beneficial economic relations with the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist community. Right up to the second half of the sixties, she was a partner of the Soviet Union and the U.S. in elaborating the first, very important international agreements in arms limitations: the Limited Test-Ban Treaty (1963) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). In our day, too, attempts to reach an agreement on the complete banning of all types of nuclear weapons tests are being carried out on a trilateral basis--between the Soviet Union, the U.S., and Great Britain. Thus, there do exist such traditions of British diplomacy, the renunciation of which at the present time is leading to a weakening of London's influence over the European continent's political life and over world politics as a whole.

* * *

Whereas in the past decade there has generally been observed a tendency for England's international position to gradually weaken compared to the other leading capitalist nations, this tendency is not, of course, by any means irreversible. It is far from ruled out that particular factors could, with time, lead to a certain stabilization of Great Britain's position and role in the international arena. The factors are a decisive rejection of obsolete strategic concepts,

inherited from the imperial past; the adoption of more energetic measures to raise the production efficiency and to adapt it to the changing circumstances of the world market; and finally, the refusal to follow the lead of the policy aimed at exacerbating tensions in the world. Here, of course, much depends on the further evolution of the domestic political situation in the country itself. Today, as is known, in the oldest of the capitalist powers, significant social and political forces are operating that demand radical and constructive changes in all the basic spheres of public life.

A. V. Golubev, "Soviet-British Relations at the Turn of the Eighties," *Voprosy istorii* [Questions of History], No. 7, 1984, 43-58.

The problems of Soviet-British relations have always attracted the attention of Soviet historians. Their works thoroughly examine such important questions as the objective prerequisites for the development of these relations in various areas; the struggle between the two tendencies--positive and negative--within Great Britain's ruling circles on matters pertaining to relations with the USSR; the foreign policy concepts of Great Britain's main parties; and the special features of Soviet-British relations at various stages of their development.¹

These problems, a change in the role Great Britain plays in the international arena, and the specifics of Soviet-British relations in the postwar period (particularly during the years of detente) have been closely examined in the book by V.G. Trukhanovskii and N.K. Kapitonova, *Soviet British Relations, 1945-1978* (Moscow, 1979). The authors draw the well-founded conclusion that in the seventies, during detente, Soviet-British relations rose to a new level. At the same time they also point to the activization of opponents of detente in Great Britain. Soviet-British relations at the turn of the eighties have been examined in generalized works on the history of the USSR's foreign policy.² In recent years works have also been published on the special features of the formulation and conduct of Great Britain's foreign policy.³ However, works specially devoted to Soviet-British relations in this period, to the special features of the stage in their development, and to new factors determining their nature at the turn of the eighties virtually do not exist. This article attempts to show the principal lines of development in political relations between the USSR and Great Britain during the rule of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government.

The Soviet state has always advocated normal and stable relations with Great Britain, which is one of the most developed countries in the West. It is a nuclear power, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the USA's closest ally, an active member of the EEC and NATO, and a participant in many international organizations. Great Britain has retained considerable standing among the developing countries. All this underscores the importance of the status of Soviet-British relations for the whole world. However, the history of their development shows that they are notable, as a rule, for their instability. When, during the seventies, the question of improving the stability of Soviet-British relations came onto the agenda, it was evident that an optimal way to achieve this was to develop the legal foundation for collaboration in various areas, a system of organizations contributing to its development, and the main forms and directions whereby this collaboration is carried out.

These questions were raised at high-level talks in Moscow in February 1975 and during subsequent bilateral contacts. By 1979 various agreements had been concluded determining the forms and directions of collaboration in the trade-economic and scientific-technical areas and a protocol on consultations was signed, which is very important for developing mutual relations in the political sphere. According to this protocol, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for both countries must conduct regular consultations on matters of mutual interest.⁴ Practice has shown that these consultations have truly been an important element in political relations between the two countries. They are carried out at various levels, including at the level of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and have become sufficiently regular. During these consultations, a broad range of international problems and questions of bilateral relations have been examined.

Steps were also taken in the area of military detente; in particular, in February 1975 the Declaration on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed. As Great Britain's then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, James Callaghan, noted, this was a "unique declaration proclaiming a period of especially close Anglo-Soviet collaboration."⁶ In October 1977 the Agreement on the Prevention of an Accidental Nuclear War was signed. The USSR and Great Britain took part in the European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in talks to limit armed forces and arms in Central Europe, and in talks to conclude a treaty on a complete ban of nuclear weapons testing. Important new features also appeared in the development of trade-economic, scientific-technical, and cultural cooperation between the two countries.

However, in the second half of the seventies the conflict over what the attitude toward the Soviet Union should be intensified and the opponents of detente became more active in England. This was caused by a variety of reasons. First, there was disappointment among certain groups in the West with detente, which had not led to the "evolution" of the socialist community countries on the capitalist path. Second, the development of military detente realistically raised the issue of arms reductions, which was at variance with the interests of the military-industrial complex, including the largest British monopolies. Third, the successes of the national liberation movement and the objective process of changing the correlation of forces in the so-called Third World were perceived by the West's conservative circles, including Great Britain's, to be the result of Soviet foreign policy. Following the U.S. administration of Jimmy Carter, Callaghan's Labour government took a number of steps that noticeably worsened Soviet-British relations; in particular, it tried to exploit cultural contacts in order to pressure the USSR. Thatcher's Conservative government has subsequently used this method on an even greater scale.

The increased activity of the opponents of detente in Great Britain was reflected particularly clearly in the foreign policy concepts of the Conservative Party, in opposition until 1979. Whereas in 1974, speeches

by Conservative spokesmen on foreign policy matters (R. Maudling in the House of Commons and Lord Carrington in the House of Lords) acknowledged the obvious fact that there is no alternative to a policy of detente, and works by theoreticians in the Conservative Party often repeated appeals for a "more pragmatic approach" to foreign policy and for consideration of the realities of the international situation, the situation changed when the right wing headed by Thatcher, came to power in the party at the beginning of 1975.

In 1975 and 1976 Thatcher made a number of speeches on foreign policy that proclaimed a course of confrontation with the socialist countries. She accused the Soviet Union of striving for "world supremacy," without any kind of justification. Even the conservative *Times* called it an "oratorical exaggeration."⁸ Thatcher's position was, however, supported by many prominent Conservatives. The objections by adherents of a more moderate foreign policy line, including the Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the Conservative's "shadow cabinet" (the "cabinet" formed by the opposition party), R. Maudling, were simply not taken into account when the Conservative's foreign policy platform was elaborated. At the Conservative Party's annual conference in October 1976 a document was adopted whose foreign policy section basically coincided with Thatcher's program. The document spoke about the "Soviet military threat" and underscored the determination to attain a "genuine detente from a position of strength" that, in essence, meant pressuring the USSR to make unilateral concessions in various areas.⁹ "It became obvious that Margaret Thatcher was developing a line in international affairs, and especially in relations with the Soviet Union, that was, at least in words, much more rigid than my own," wrote Maudling subsequently, having been dismissed from the Conservative's "shadow cabinet" shortly after the conference.¹⁰

The position of the Conservative Party reflected the mood of the British monopolies and the military-industrial complex, as well as that part of the British ruling class directly interested in exploiting the developing countries. This was particularly manifested, for example, during the debates on the military budget from 1975 to 1979. Even the Labour government's timid attempts to limit somewhat the growth rate of military expenditures constantly encountered fierce resistance from the Conservatives who cited the "growth of the Soviet military threat." Thatcher, as subsequently became evident, actively exploited the anti-Soviet mood of the Conservatives not only in debates with the Labourites, but also as a means for strengthening the unity of views within her own party. In 1978 many prominent Conservatives acknowledged that their party was virtually split. Such party leaders as Ian Gilmour, Peter Walker, and others, came out against Thatcher's economic program. However, their foreign policy views were notable for their anti-Sovietism and it was precisely for this reason that Thatcher selected anti-Sovietism as an instrument for strengthening her own authority as a party and, later, as a national leader. Naturally, the views of Thatcher herself also played a definite role. "She has no

experience at all in international affairs and her views on the surrounding world are unknown," wrote the weekly, *The Observer*, on 16 February 1975 shortly after the election of Thatcher as leader of the Conservative Party. However, Thatcher's anticommunism was not a secret. The same publication later wrote about her notions of the Soviet Union: they are notable for "dangerous simplification."¹¹

The Conservatives' foreign policy concept was definitively validated during the 1979 general Parliamentary elections and with the formulation of the new government's program. The Conservatives' pre-election document, the *Conservative Manifesto*, placed the main emphasis on "strengthening defense," increasing military expenditures, and modernizing the so-called independent nuclear force. There was no mention at all in this document about the importance of developing relations with socialist countries, including the USSR, or about a policy of detente.¹² However, the first statements by the Conservative government's spokesmen after its victory in the election contained, along with statements about the need to "strengthen defense" (meaning a sharp increase in military expenditures) and develop cooperation with its NATO partners, a promise to establish "more stable, more predictable, and more productive relations" with the East.¹³ As practice has shown, however, the Conservatives do not intend to take specific steps in this direction.

The composition of the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs eloquently testified to the real intentions of the new government. It is true that the Secretary himself, Lord Carrington had, on the whole, the reputation of being a relatively moderate politician, but his closest aide, representing him in the House of Commons, Lord Privy Seal Gilmour, was well-known as a zealous anticommunist. The same could be said about at least two state secretaries (actually, first deputy secretaries)--Peter Blaker and Richard Luce. Thus, in 1979 a government came to power in Great Britain with an openly anti-Soviet program, whose practical activities in foreign policy led, from the very start, to complications in Soviet-British relations.

The Soviet government, guided by the principle of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems, has striven to support normal relations with England. It took a number of steps directed at developing a dialogue. "We are prepared to go further along the path of expanding and deepening cooperation with Great Britain if, of course, the same intention is displayed on the British side," it was emphasized in the Soviet leadership's greeting to visitors of the USSR's National Exhibition, which opened in London in May 1979.¹⁴ The USSR's determination to develop interstate relations with Great Britain and to continue the process of detente was underscored during the meeting between Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.N. Kosygin and Thatcher during her short stay in Moscow on 26 June 1979.¹⁵ "The Russians want to establish more cordial relations with the new government," noted the *Financial Times*.¹⁶

The Soviet government has striven to actively exploit existing mechanisms for bilateral relations in order to work out a dialogue with Great Britain's government. In accordance with the 1975 Protocol on Consultations, consultations took place in London in June 1979 between spokesmen from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and Great Britain at the level of deputy ministers, during which a broad range of questions concerning international politics and bilateral relations were discussed. On 26 August 1979 during work at the XXXIV Session of the U.N. General Assembly a meeting took place between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from the two countries.

During its first months of rule, however, the Conservative government launched an anti-Soviet campaign in which members of the government were initiators and active participants. Secretary of Defence Francis Pym declared that the USSR represents the same kind of threat to peace as Fascist Germany did in the thirties.¹⁷ Appearing in Luxembourg on 18 October 1979, Thatcher threatened the Soviet people "with suffering no less" than during World War II.¹⁸ Her speech evoked the outrage of the British public, *The Tribune* characterized it as "one of the most appalling and damaging mistakes" ever made by a British Prime Minister.¹⁹ In November 1979 a prominent member of the Conservative Party, F. Bennett, made a proposal in Parliament to recall the British ambassador from the USSR and to lower [Britain's] representation level to a charge d'affaires.²⁰ In this context, Pym's statement that "detente, not confrontation, is the leading strategy of the Western alliance" sounded like undisguised demagoguery.²¹ The anti-Soviet campaign was designed to justify the aggravation of the government's course with respect to the USSR and [to justify] the arms build up. "The British public was purposefully prepared ahead of time to assimilate those ideas and proposals that government intended to carry out," the progressive British columnist H. York wrote on this matter. In summing up the first year of Thatcher's rule, her biographer particularly noted her "hawkish attitude" toward the USSR.²³

The British government took the next step on the path of confrontation with the Soviet Union at the beginning of 1980 when, in fulfilling its international duty, the Soviet Union--at the request of the Afghan government--sent a limited contingent of troops into Afghanistan territory. Attempts by imperialist circles to thwart the development of the revolutionary process in this country were a failure. Representatives from the British government attempted to prove that events in Afghanistan foreordained a deterioration in Soviet-British relations. In point of fact, from their first days of rule the Conservatives focused on a policy of confrontation with the USSR. They used the events in Afghanistan as a pretext to pump up anti-Sovietism, to exacerbate relations with the USSR, and to justify a new spiral in the arms race.

On the heels of the U.S., Great Britain adopted a number of so-called sanctions against the USSR. In the EEC, Great Britain attempted

to play the role of "coordinator" of anti-Soviet actions on a European-wide level; however, these attempts did not meet with success among its partners. Thus, although limitations were introduced on trade with the USSR, their scale was far from what the British government was seeking. The position of Great Britain's partners in the EEC also limited to a considerable extent the potential of the Tories themselves to use sanctions against the USSR.

Specific measures were announced in Parliament in a special government statement of 24 January 1980. It called for abolishing contacts at the highest and ministerial levels, for refusing military exchanges that had taken place since 1975, for intensifying ideological warfare against the USSR, and for limiting trade-economic and cultural exchanges. The Conservative government also tried to limit all contacts between British citizens and citizens of the socialist countries--which, incidentally, contradicted the spirit and the letter of the "third basket" of the Final Act of the European Conference (which the British government has repeatedly defended).²⁴ Soon the question of boycotting the Olympic Games in Moscow had been brought to the fore. But despite the various forms of pressure the Conservative government used, British sportsmen took an active part in the Moscow Olympiad.

The Thatcher government strove to exploit events in Afghanistan in order to justify its aggressive foreign policy and military course and to counteract the policy of detente. Imperial habits, which have visibly manifested themselves during the years of Conservative rule, and the determination to view vast regions of the globe as spheres of British influence also played a role. As subsequently became known, the prominent Conservative, former Prime Minister and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Douglas Hume sent a special memorandum to the Parliament's Foreign Policy Committee in which he called upon the government to "exploit" the existing "situation."²⁵ In striving to restore British influence in countries in the Middle East, the Tory government hastened to make use of this recommendation. A detachment of British warships was sent to the Mediterranean at the beginning of 1980. At the same time, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Lord Carrington made a trip to countries in Southwest Asia. A number of other visits followed this one. Later, Great Britain supported the decision by the U.S. government to create a "rapid deployment force" and announced that it would also create such a force.

England also attempted to exploit the Afghan events to strengthen its influence in the EEC. This was manifested especially graphically when the EEC's economic sanctions against the USSR were being determined and also during the elaboration of the so-called plan to neutralize Afghanistan, suggested by Lord Carrington. Thus, a precedent was set that could subsequently be useful to British ruling circles in order to substantiate England's rights to a determining role in the elaboration of the EEC's foreign policy line. But all attempts by Great Britain's ruling circles, together with the U.S., to put pressure on the USSR and

to force it to renounce its support of the Afghan people's revolutionary struggle were a complete failure.

The sober voices of those who saw the danger of pumping up anti-Soviet hysteria were heard in Great Britain. When Lord Carrington, appearing in Parliament on 6 February 1980, declared that the West was displaying "weakness" in its relations with the East and called for a return to a "cold war" policy, it provoked the following commentary from Milford, a member of the House of Lords: "I am extremely disturbed by the danger created by the hysteria of certain 'cold war' knights" who, as he noted, strive "to use events in Afghanistan to increase international tensions, to accelerate the arms race, and to create new obstacles on the path to detente."²⁶ *The Tribune* noted that the threat to detente arose not as a result of the policies of the Soviet government--as British Conservatives maintained--but because of the U.S. administration's course, supported by Thatcher and aimed at expanding the arms race in Europe and throughout the world.²⁷

The fact that the development of normal relations between the two countries responds to the interests not only of the USSR, but also of Great Britain, was acknowledged by many Conservatives. Thus, in January 1980 Lord Carrington spoke of the need "to retain the channels of communication" with the Soviet Union, including political consultations provided by the protocol of 1975, although the British government intended to conduct them at a lower level. Carrington underscored that although events in Afghanistan did influence Great Britain's attitude toward the USSR, the British government nevertheless wanted to continue talks if this would be in keeping with its interests.²⁸

Several factors limited the possibilities for the practical manifestation of anti-Sovietism: the experience of the policy of detente, which meant much more for Great Britain as a European nation than it did for the U.S.; the need to continue a dialogue on limiting the arms race, whose rejection could have serious internal political consequences for the Conservatives; and, finally, the pressure by realistic politicians and influential business circles interested in trade with the East and by the country's progressive public. Lord Carrington, who has repeatedly declared that perpetual confrontation with the USSR is not in any circumstances in the nation's interests, indicated the following possible areas of cooperation: England should strive "for agreements on arms control and commercially justified trade and for other mutually beneficial agreements."³⁰

Soviet-British relations in 1980 and 1981 made an extremely complex picture. On the one hand, the USSR displayed a constant readiness for dialogue, which was especially necessary in the context of exacerbating the international situation. On the other hand, the British government, declaring its determination to retain channels of communication with the USSR, did not fully resume the dialogue, putting forth preconditions that were obviously unacceptable to the Soviet Union.³¹ The anti-Soviet

campaign continued as before in England. For example, on 1 October 1980 **The Daily Telegraph** declared that "it is a historical mistake to regard Russia as a civilized power and as a legitimate member of the international community." The CPSU's Central Committee report to the twenty-sixth Party Congress characterized the state of Soviet-British relations as "stagnant--and through no fault of our own."³²

In May 1980 at the first meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and Great Britain since the announcement of sanctions, "the readiness of the parties to develop and preserve a dialogue" and their intention "to develop relations based on full equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and respect for national sovereignty and the mutual interests of the parties" was confirmed.³³ However, positive changes in Great Britain's position did not take place and on 25 September 1980, during a new meeting with Lord Carrington, A.A. Gromyko, a member of the Politburo CC CPSU and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed the fact that Great Britain's foreign policy course was "aimed at supporting the extreme militaristic trends in the NATO countries' policies in European and world affairs."³⁴

At the end of 1980, when martial law was introduced in the Polish People's Republic, a new outbreak of anti-Soviet hysteria took place in Great Britain. Having forgotten its own declaration of 14 December 1981 to conduct a "policy of noninterference" in Polish affairs, the British government announced new sanctions directed against both Poland and the USSR. With respect to the Soviet Union, they boiled down to include certain limitations on the movement of Soviet diplomats and trade representatives in Great Britain.³⁵

At the same time, bilateral contacts continued in 1980 and from 1981 to 1983. Consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and Great Britain were conducted twice in 1981 and twice in 1983, those in 1983 being at the level of deputy ministers. The range of questions discussed was expanded; for example, whereas in 1981 they basically discussed the situation on the Middle East, in 1983 international questions of paramount importance such as detente and arms limitation moved to the fore.³⁶ Meetings between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs continued to be an important channel of bilateral communication. They were held in 1981 and 1982 during the session of the U.N. General Assembly, in November 1982 in Moscow, and in January 1984 in Stockholm during the Conference on Measures to Strengthen Trust and Security in Europe. As before, during these meetings the intention of both powers to develop bilateral contacts was confirmed. In November 1982 the parties came out in favor of developing a political dialogue and business relations between the two countries. At the meeting in January 1984 it was noted that "cooperation, not confrontation responds to the vital interests of the peoples of both nations and the cause of peace and security on the continent."³⁷

In July 1981 Great Britain's Secretary of Foreign Affairs Lord Carrington paid a working visit to the USSR. At the talks, special attention was paid to the so-called plan to neutralize Afghanistan, worked out by the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to this plan, in the first stage of talks to settle the Afghan issue, representatives from Afghanistan's legal government were excluded and in the second stage representatives from the Afghan counterrevolutionaries were included. According to Carrington's plan, representatives from the great powers and the U.N. General Secretary were to participate in the first stage of the talks and in the second stage [representatives] from states neighboring Afghanistan. However, this attempt to dispose of the country's fate behind its own people's back was rejected by the Soviet state.³⁸ The Conservatives strove to place the responsibility for the deterioration in Soviet-British relations on the USSR. Thatcher hypocritically expounded on the fact that in the event the Soviet side accepted this plan the potential would arise to "open a new chapter in relations between East and West."³⁹ However, the real plans of the Conservatives were different; in an interview just before the start of his visit, Lord Carrington openly stated that the main objective of the trip was to put pressure on the Soviet Union.⁴⁰

While the Soviet government has viewed the development of bilateral relations as one of the prerequisites for detente and as an essential factor in preserving peace and international security, Great Britain's government has, on the contrary, attempted--by pressuring the USSR--to extract concessions from it on the most varied questions, touching on the internal politics of the socialist countries in a number of cases. The conduct of this rigid line has met with dissatisfaction even within certain circles of British diplomats. Observers have noted, moreover, certain disagreements between Thatcher and her Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including questions of relations with the USSR (naturally, the differences were a matter of nuances).⁴¹ Opposition spokesmen in Parliament have tried to exploit these disagreements and have repeatedly accused the Prime Minister and her closest associates of negatively influencing the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Once Lord Carrington retired, in April 1983 he made an appeal to end the "war of nerves" and to begin a new dialogue with the USSR. His successor to the post of Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Francis Pym, who was retired in June 1983, spoke 3 weeks after that in Parliament on foreign policy issues and noted that Thatcher's line with respect to the USSR during all the years of her rule boiled down exclusively to "firmness," whereas what was urgently needed was to combine "firmness and dialogue."⁴²

Despite the deterioration of Soviet-British relations, from 1979 to 1983 the foundations of the previously created structure of bilateral relations were still able to be preserved. As was noted at a meeting of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Pact nations in October 1980, thanks to the principled and, at the same time,

restrained policy of the socialist nations, it was possible "not to permit the destruction of existing normal political contacts and ties between the states."⁴³ But while the structure of bilateral relations in the political sphere was preserved as a whole, Great Britain's Conservative government used it much less productively than its potential allowed for. For example, during a meeting with A.N. Kosygin in Moscow in June 1979, Thatcher devoted all her attention to the so-called Vietnamese refugee problem, clearly counting on creating a propagandistic effect unfavorable to the USSR in the West.⁴⁴

The British side's unconstructive approach to the possibility of expanding the Soviet-British dialogue was vividly manifested in the conduct of the British delegation at the Madrid meeting of the All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. From the very first days of the meeting's work, the USSR advocated bringing it to a very quick and successful close, continuing and deepening the multi-lateral process begun in Helsinki, and adopting a substantive and balanced final document. The determination of the socialist countries to achieve the expansion of cooperation in all areas and to ensure the continuity of the all-European detente process was reflected in the Prague Declaration of the Warsaw Pact States adopted in January 1983.⁴⁵ Turning to the participants at the Madrid meeting in May 1983, the USSR expressed its readiness to accept a draft final document submitted by a group of neutral and nonaligned nations.⁴⁶ This contributed enormously to the successful conclusion of the Madrid meeting in September 1983.

Great Britain's position was entirely different. Long before the start of the Madrid meeting, the British government introduced in Parliament the practice of semiannual surveys of the "execution of the Final Act," which were not about the government's actions to implement it but about the policies of the socialist countries. In fact, the "surveys" contained unconcealed slander of real socialism. Presenting one of them on 2 July 1980, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Blaker declared that at the forthcoming meeting, Great Britain would pay particular attention to fulfilling commitments made in Helsinki by other countries, primarily the socialist countries, while "the prospects for developing new initiatives in Madrid at the present time are not reassuring."⁴⁷ As the *Financial Times* emphasized, "the Western powers are seeking a meeting in order to denounce the Soviet Union," while the USSR is trying to "turn the discussion toward disarmament issues."⁴⁸ In his speech at the opening of the meeting, Blaker blamed the USSR for the complication of the international situation.⁴⁹ Subsequently, too, in Madrid, the British delegation adhered, in the words of *The Times*, "to a most overtly anti-Russian line."⁵⁰

As General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, K.U. Chernenko, noted at a meeting with Thatcher on 14 February 1984 in Moscow, "provided the British side [displays] the proper readiness, bilateral relations between our nations could also be more substantive."⁵¹ In the

Queen's speech after the Thatcher government had come to power in May 1979, establishing stability in Soviet-British relations was set forth as a paramount task; meanwhile, during the years of Conservative rule, not only the effectiveness, but also the stability of relations between the two countries has been lowered, a fact Lord Carrington was forced to acknowledge in November 1980.⁵²

The Thatcher government's anti-Sovietism has been manifested throughout Great Britain's foreign policy. It chose a policy of unconditional support of the U.S. In the words of *The Tribune*, Thatcher's policies in all fundamental issues of international life have simply been an echo of the U.S. State Department's course.⁵³ Great Britain has expressed its complete solidarity with Ronald Reagan's policy regarding the USSR. It was no accident that it was in the British Parliament that the U.S. President proclaimed a "crusade" against socialism in June 1982. In a toast raised in Reagan's honor during a reception at No. 10 Downing Street, Thatcher called his speech a "triumph" and lauded it because the President had called for "a long-awaited offensive in the name of freedom."⁵⁴ The British government has supported virtually all the main U.S. foreign policy actions, including the creation of a "rapid deployment force" and its policies in Lebanon and Central America. Even the invasion of Grenada--a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations--undertaken without consultations with London, was, in the final analysis, approved by the Thatcher government. Here London cited the need to "counteract communism" on a global scale. The sole exception was the British government's resistance to Reagan's attempt to apply sanctions against British companies supplying equipment to the USSR for the construction of the Urengoi-Uzhgorod gas pipeline; in this matter, both the prestige and vital economic interests of Great Britain were affected.

The reason for such a policy lies primarily in the commonality of the class interests of the ruling circles of the two imperialist powers, which does not, of course, rule out rivalry between them. Both the Reagan government and the Thatcher cabinet represent the most aggressive circles in the West. In an interview on the occasion of the second anniversary of her rule, the British Premier singled out as the most important moment in international relations the advent to power of a President in the U.S. with foreign policy views coinciding with her own, first and foremost in matters of relations with the East.⁵⁵ Also of no small importance was the determination to exploit assistance from the powerful ally in order to strengthen Great Britain's position in the world.

The closeness of the U.S. and Great Britain's positions on all fundamental foreign policy issues has also been reflected in British policy vis-a-vis her West European partners in NATO and the EEC. As a 9 March 1982 editorial in the *Financial Times* stressed, "the main objective of British foreign policy in the future must be strengthening the alliance (NATO--A.G.)." In fact, this meant, first and foremost,

consolidating "Atlantic solidarity," that is, the readiness of the West Europeans to support U.S. policy.⁵⁶ On the heels of the U.S., the British government called upon its allies "to redouble their military efforts" and to accelerate the deployment of new U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe. Thatcher acted as an active proponent for expanding NATO's spheres of influence. In May 1982 at a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from NATO countries, it was Great Britain and the U.S. who resisted the proposal by a number of European nations to include the word "detente" in the communique.⁵⁷ The Thatcher government's position contributed greatly to the adoption of a political declaration supporting the deployment of medium-range U.S. missiles in Europe at a conference of the heads of the major Western states in May 1983.

The anti-Soviet trend of British foreign policy was also manifested in relations with the developing countries. When visiting near- and middle-eastern countries in 1981 and 1982, members of the Conservative government constantly spoke about the "Soviet threat" to the nations in this region. Often the talks concluded with a discussion of military contracts or agreements to supply military aid.⁵⁸ At talks with Indira Gandhi in April 1981, Thatcher tried to convince the Indian leadership that relations with the USSR could be built only "from a position of strength." A bit earlier, in January 1981, Great Britain's Secretary of Trade cautioned Indian business circles against expanding trade and economic ties with the USSR, as this could supposedly lead to "political dependency;" he called instead for expanding contacts with the West.⁵⁹ These statements did not achieve their purpose. India has continued to develop relations with the USSR.

Statements by members of the British government about the existence of the "Soviet threat" to the countries of Southeast Asia were rebutted by even the extremely conservative parliamentary Committee on Foreign Policy Issues after studying the situation that has taken shape in this region.⁶⁰ In reality, it was namely Great Britain's policy that contributed to the growth of instability in a number of areas of the world. In July 1980 it became clear that British weapons in significant quantities were arriving in Afghanistan for fighting the legitimate powers in the country, although earlier representatives from the British government--including Thatcher--claimed that weapons supposedly were not being supplied nor would they be to the Afghan counterrevolutionaries.

In the context of the policy of global confrontation with the USSR, also revealing is the Conservatives' aspiration to develop military-political cooperation with China "first and foremost on the basis of strategic considerations."⁶² The basic form of this cooperation has been the delivery of the latest types of armaments to China. As *The Tribune* noted, Thatcher viewed the expansion of these deliveries "not in the light of future trade with China, but as a part of its rigid policy with respect to Russia."⁶³ After the Conservatives came to power, a brisk exchange of military and industrial delegations began between

China and Great Britain and a series of contracts were signed to deliver various armament systems to China. In the spring of 1980 an exhibition of British military equipment was set up in China. In 1981 military-strategic materiel made up 25 percent of British exports to China.⁶⁴ During Thatcher's visit to China in September 1982, her determination to support anti-Soviet tendencies in China's policies were displayed with sufficient clarity.⁶⁵

Summing up the first 2 years of Thatcher's rule, the bulletin *Politics Today*, published by the Conservative Party, claimed that Great Britain was once again "playing a leading role in world affairs."⁶⁶ But in reality, the British government's anti-Soviet course did not meet with support from the majority of the developing countries or even a number of Great Britain's West European allies. As *The Observer* noted on 20 March 1983, the Conservatives' anti-Sovietism hindered them from playing their role in developing relations between East and West, although it is this path that could lead to increased prestige and influence for Great Britain in the world, would strengthen its security, and would thereby meet the country's genuine interests.

The problems of military detente occupied a significant place in Soviet-British relations during the period under examination. In all basic issues of disarmament and limiting the arms race, the Soviet side has introduced constructive proposals, emphasizing its readiness for private and general, bilateral and multilateral talks and agreements on these matters based on the principles of equality and identical security for all parties. In words, the British government has not rejected a course toward disarmament. However, its spokesmen have constantly stressed their desire for talks "from a position of strength." The Conservatives, having come to power on the slogan "strengthen defense," have devoted primary attention to increase military expenditures. "The government is convinced that peace can be preserved only from a position of strength. Therefore, both conventional and nuclear means of defense for Britain must be reinforced," pointed out *Politics Today*.⁶⁷ And each time in order to substantiate such a policy, the myth about the "Soviet military threat" was trotted out. By using the most diverse methods--counting some types of armaments in isolation from others, overstating numerical data, ascribing aggressive intentions to the USSR, and so forth--the Conservatives sought to justify the arms race. At the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on Disarmament in June 1982, Thatcher declared that it was namely NATO's nuclear weapons that ensure the preservation of peace between East and West.⁶⁸

In rejecting the USSR's peace initiatives one after another and in contributing in every way possible to the build-up of NATO's military potential, the British government sought from the USSR unilateral concessions in exchange for the complete restoration of a dialogue between the two nations. At the same time the Conservatives could not openly declare their rejection of the policy of disarmament. They felt strong internal political pressure inasmuch as the masses understood that any

nuclear conflict, even a "limited" one, would mean the extinction of Great Britain. It was for this reason that all government statements stressed a "readiness" for arms control.

The results of the Thatcher government's activities on disarmament proved extremely disappointing. A statement by the Prime Minister on this issue made in November 1982 contained 15 points; however, most of them turned out to be simply an enumeration of multilateral negotiations Great Britain participated in or of proposals by NATO countries Great Britain supported. Hence, there was declared support, but not binding in any way, for the SALT II Treaty (the Conservatives announced this after the treaty was signed) and, at the same time, London's participation in NATO's notorious "dual decision" adopted in December 1979, which led to stationing new U.S. missiles in Europe and to a significant deterioration in the international situation. The Conservatives also presented this step as a part of the disarmament process.⁶⁹ The British government repeatedly declared that it would strive for concrete, not general, agreements on arms control.⁷⁰ But when the USSR put forth these kinds of initiatives, they were immediately rejected by Great Britain. In the Committee on Disarmament and in the UN, British delegates voted against the creation of nonnuclear zones in Europe, against working groups for disarmament issues, and against other Soviet proposals. In explaining this position, a spokesman for the British government Lord Trefgarne declared in March 1982 that "there are problems of greater importance to which the United Nations needs to turn its attention."⁷¹

The British government's determination to conduct its policy "from a position of strength" and its negative attitude toward arms limitations were manifested especially clearly in the issue of stationing U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. From the first days of their rule, the Conservatives announced their support of this plan. All Soviet proposals were rejected. Great Britain, as Secretary of State for Defence Lord Stratton acknowledged, played a principal role in the adoption of NATO's "dual decision" in December 1979.⁷² In this connection, the British government cited its determination to achieve a "position of strength" in negotiations with the USSR and the need to strengthen NATO. "It will be a disaster for the entire Alliance (NATO-A.G.) if the decision to modernize theater nuclear forces is not actually adopted," declared Thatcher.⁷³ While actively supporting the U.S. in this matter, Great Britain, at the end of 1979, also initiated talks with the U.S. about help in modernizing its "independent nuclear force,"⁷⁴ and it reached an agreement on the sale of the Trident missile system.

NATO's decision to deploy new U.S. missiles in Europe intensified international tensions. The Soviet Union did not abandon attempts to achieve reductions in nuclear arms in Europe and to prevent a new spiral in the arms race. Even *The Times* was forced to admit that the USSR sincerely wants a dialogue with the West on arms control issues.⁷⁵ At the end of 1981, the USSR unilaterally ceased deployment of new medium-

range missiles in the European portion of its territory. In December 1982 the Soviet Union proposed reducing the number of its medium-range missiles to the level of the British and French nuclear forces. At that time the British government obtained the real potential to actively influence the course of Soviet-American talks about deploying medium-range missiles in Europe, by supporting the Soviet initiative. However, London hurriedly rejected it and instead of this, supported Reagan's "zero" and "intermediate" options. In December 1983 the deployment of U.S. missiles began in Western Europe, including England. In Yu. V. Andropov's statement of 25 November 1983 it was emphasized that the governments of the western countries, including Great Britain, took all the responsibility for the consequences of such a policy. The Soviet Union was, in turn, forced to take appropriate retaliatory measures.⁷⁶

Great Britain's government rejected the Soviet government's proposal to freeze all nuclear weapons at existing levels. In the U.N. the British delegation voted against this proposal. London also responded by refusing the Soviet government's appeal containing the text of the USSR Supreme Soviet's decree of 16 June 1983 and the memorandum that proposed to freeze nuclear arms quantitatively and qualitatively. This memorandum was delivered to the British ambassador in Moscow on 21 June 1983.⁷⁷ The British government also refused to promise not to use nuclear weapons first.⁷⁸ In May 1983 Thatcher declared her readiness to use nuclear weapons without hesitation.⁷⁹ The refusal to support Soviet proposals to freeze nuclear arms and not to use nuclear weapons first is explained to a considerable extent by the fact that the Conservatives set about implementing the program to modernize their "independent nuclear force," expecting to increase its yield several times over and to thereby expand NATO's potential for a first strike.

As has already been noted, after coming to power, Great Britain's Conservative government announced its support of the SALT II Treaty and talks on a complete nuclear test ban. However, when the U.S. refused to ratify the treaty and broke off the talks to cease nuclear testing, the British government did not consider it necessary to take any kind of steps to influence its ally. By acquiring the Trident II missile system from the U.S., Great Britain objectively contributed to removing beyond the framework of SALT a significant portion of NATO's nuclear potential.

Great Britain, like the other NATO countries, has [adhered to] an unconstructive position at talks to limit armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. The British government supported U.S. chemical weapons, the production of neutron weapons, and stationing weapons in space. The Conservatives sharply increased the nation's military expenditures, which came to 16 billion pounds starting in 1983. By 1986 it is planned to increase them by 20 percent compared to 1980. During this time the gross national product should grow by only one percent.⁸⁰

The Conservatives' determination to continue a policy of "strengthening defense" while retaining the previous negative attitude

toward disarmament issues was confirmed at a 1983 conference of the Conservative Party and during the pre-election campaign in May and June of 1983. All the main opposition parties in Great Britain--Labour, Liberal, and Social Democrat--came out against this government policy with varying degrees of decisiveness. The problems of fighting for detente and disarmament took a prominent place among the resolutions of the 38th Congress of the Communist Party of Great Britain in November 1983. The peace movement also reached an unprecedented scope in England.

In the context whereby the Conservative government's policy aimed at limiting political contacts with the USSR has reduced the effectiveness of the structure of bilateral relations established in the mid-seventies, political contacts on a nongovernmental level have come to assume special significance. Their importance was underscored during a visit of Great Britain's former Prime Minister Harold Wilson to the USSR in April 1983, of former Prime Minister John Callaghan in October 1983, and of a delegation from Great Britain's Liberal Party headed up by its leader David Steel in January 1984.⁸¹ Questions about political interrelations were advanced to the foreground in a number of forums in which they had previously occupied a secondary position. Certain channels of Soviet-British contacts at the nongovernmental level began to acquire a multilateral nature, which was particularly important given the complication of the international situation. For example, during the September 1983 traditional "Edinburgh Talks" in which prominent scientific, public, and military figures from the USSR and Great Britain took part, seeking a broad exchange of views on issues of international relations and disarmament issues, a representative American delegation took part for the first time.⁸² Ties between Soviet and British peace supporters were strengthened.

Economic factors have had considerable influence on the development of Soviet-British relations in the political sphere. Attempts by the Conservatives to limit all types of contacts with the USSR created resistance from portions of Great Britain's business circles interested in developing mutually beneficial trade. The Conservatives could not ignore the demands of businessmen "to open the political umbrella" over trade and economic cooperation and, in a number of cases, they took specific steps to reestablish disrupted trade and economic ties. In 1982 and 1983 the 10th and 11th sessions of the Soviet-British Permanent Intergovernmental Commission on Scientific-Technical and Trade and Economic Cooperation were successful. During these sessions an understanding was reached to expand mutually beneficial cooperation.⁸³ Responding best of all to the interest of British business in trade with the USSR was a whole series of conferences and seminars dedicated to the problems of developing Soviet-British trade, which was organized by the USSR Trade-Industrial Bureau, the British-Soviet Trade Bureau, the Conference of British Industry, and other organizations. At such a conference that took place in January 1984 in London, a spokesman from the British government noted the interest of British firms in developing

economic cooperation with the USSR and expressed a readiness "to encourage mutually beneficial trade between British firms and Soviet organizations."⁸⁴ Commodity circulation, having noticeably dropped off during the first years of Conservative rule, once again began to expand in 1982-1983.

The years 1979 to 1983 occupy a special place in the 60-year history of Soviet-British relations. They represent the start of a new complex and contradictory stage in these relations, when everything attained in previous years has been seriously tested. The course of Thatcher's Conservative government toward confrontation with the USSR and limiting contacts in virtually every key direction has led to a deterioration in Soviet-British relations. This has contributed to a growth of tension in the world and an escalation of the arms race. A deterioration in Soviet-British relations contradicts Great Britain's national interests, for its security, as a result of such a policy, has by no means been strengthened. Therefore, the struggle between the two tendencies in Great Britain's ruling circles has become more acute. The positive tendency has been reflected, in particular, in the expansion of political contacts on a nongovernmental level, as well as in trade and economic cooperation. The Soviet Union is continuing its struggle to return to detente and to develop long-term, stable, and mutually beneficial cooperation with Great Britain in all areas, which is in keeping with the genuine interests of both countries and of all mankind.

NOTES

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4. See *Documents and Material on the Soviet-British Talks in Moscow of 13-17 February 1975* (Moscow, 1975).
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6. J. Callaghan, *Challenges and Opportunities for British Foreign Policy* (London, 1975), 11.
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16. *Financial Times*, 5 Jul 1979.
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22. G. York, "Military Psychosis on the Shores of the Thames," *Problemy mira i sotsializma*, No. 7, 1980, 89.
23. H. Stephenson, *Mrs. Thatcher's First Year* (London, 1980), 88.
24. *Parliamentary Debates*. House of Lords (hereinafter *PDHL*), vol. 404, col. 530.
25. *Consequences of Soviet Expansion for British Foreign Policy*. Vol. 17 (London, 1980), 405.
26. *PDHL*, vol. 404, col. 1371, 1436.
27. *Tribune*, 11 Jan 1980.
28. *PDHL*, vol. 404, col. 530.
29. See, for example, the account of his speech of 21 July 1980 in the *Financial Times*, 23 Jul 1980.
30. *PDHL*, Vol. 404, Col. 535.
31. For example, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Blaker spoke about this in Parliament on 6 October 1980 (*PDHC*, Vol. 991, Col. 471).
32. *Materialy XXVI s"ezda KPSS* (Moscow, 1981), 25.
33. *Pravda*, 18 May 1980.
34. *Ibid.*, 26 Sep 1980.
35. *Survey of Current Affairs*, 1982, Jan, 8-11, Mar, 67-68.
36. The next consultations between the Soviet and British Ministries of Foreign Affairs were conducted in February and March 1984 in Vienna and London respectively. A wide range of international problems were discussed during them, including the cessation of the arms race and disarmament, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and bilateral relations (*Pravda*, 22 Feb 1984; *Izvestiya*, 31 Mar 1984).
37. *Pravda*, 16 Jan 1982 and 21 Jan 1984.
38. *Ibid.*, 8 Jul 1981.

39. *The Times*, 2 Jul 1981.
40. *The Sunday Times*, 5 Jul 1981.
41. See, for example, *Ibid.*, 9 Jan 1983.
42. *The Times*, 22 Apr 1983; *Morning Star*, 30 Jun 1983.
43. *Pravda*, 21 Oct 1980.
44. *Ibid.*, 28 Jun 1979; *Financial Times*, 5 Jul 1979.
45. *Pravda*, 7 Jan 1983.
46. *Ibid.*, 7 May 1983.
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50. *The Times*, 8 Apr 1981.
51. *Pravda*, 16 Feb 1984.
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58. For example, John Nott's visit to Saudi Arabia in June 1981 and talks of the British military delegation in Pakistan in February 1982 (*Financial Times*, 12 Jun 1981 and *Izvestiya*, 23 Feb 1982).
59. *The Times*, 16 Apr 1981; *Financial Times*, 21 Jan 1981.
60. See, *Consequences of Soviet Expansion for British Foreign Policy*, vol. 17.

61. *PDHC*, vol. 977, col. 727-728. For greater detail about Great Britain's policy in this region, see, R. Ovanesova, "New Things and Old in Great Britain's Middle East Policy," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, No. 2, 1982.
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63. *Tribune*, 2 Nov 1979.
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65. *Survey of Current Affairs*, Oct 1982, 320.
66. *Politics Today*, no. 8, 1981, 127.
67. *Ibid.*
68. *Survey of Current Affairs*, Jul 1982, 234.
69. *Politics Today*, No. 22, 1982, 402-403.
70. *Survey of Current Affairs*, Oct 1981, 293-294.
71. *PDHL*, vol. 419, col. 403-404.
72. *Ibid.*, vol. 403, col. 1390.
73. *Ibid.*, vol. 975, col. 1069.
74. *Ibid.*, vol. 935, col. 535.
75. *The Times*, 10 Mar 1981.
76. *Pravda*, 25 Nov 1983.
77. *Ibid.*, 22 Jun 1983.
78. *PDHL*, vol. 425, col. 574.
79. *The Guardian*, 1 Jun 1983.
80. *PDHC*, vol. 983, col. 1023.
81. *Pravda*, 20 Apr 1983; *Izvestiya*, 26 Jan 1984; *Morning Star*, 18 Oct 1983.
82. *Pravda*, 19 Sep 1983.

V. Kelin, "USSR-England: Experience in Cooperation in Combating a Common Danger," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* [World Economics and International Relations], No. 8, 1984, 105, 111-113.*

...Today there are political figures who are striving to resolve the historical dispute between capitalism and socialism by means of force. Some of them, in Washington, having openly proclaimed a "crusade against communism," are elaborating plans to "destroy socialism as a social system," and are laying a material base for these ideas in the form of the development, production, and accumulation of monstrous weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear ones. Other political figures (in Western Europe) are accompanying Washington in the conduct of this adventuristic policy and are themselves relying on the policy of "from a position of strength." They obviously do not wish to consider the fact that artificially created tension in international relations affects the peoples' vital interests and their own nations, and a nuclear explosion, if it occurs, bears a threat to all human civilization.

Given the situation that has taken shape, there is an interest in the experience of cooperation between the Soviet Union and states with a different social system in order to prevent the dangerous development of international elements fraught with grave consequences. Such experience exists in the USSR's relations with England; it is rich in content and it has not exhausted itself; rather, it is becoming more relevant than ever before.

* * *

In the first half of the eighties, in the face of the danger of a nuclear catastrophe, the Soviet Union advanced an entire complex of proposals aimed at changing the course of events for the better. [In doing this], it acted together with its friends and allies in the Warsaw Pact, and took into account the antinuclear, antimilitary sentiments among broad segments of the masses in the West European nations (and not only there), as well as the positions of realistic political figures in these states.

In the mid-eighties, as at the end of the thirties and, all the more, in the forties, resolving problems of security also depends on how relations take shape between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on the one hand, and the leading Western states--including England--on the other. It also depends to what extent states with different social systems are capable of cooperating with each other primarily in the main area, in eliminating the threat of nuclear war and ensuring lasting peace.

* Although most of this article concentrates on Soviet relations with Britain during World War II, only those sections that deal with the present day have been translated.

As for the Soviet Union, in this sense its course has been extremely clear-cut and consistent; it goes to the roots of the ideas of V. I. Lenin who, back in the first years of Soviet power, emphasized: "...The differences that we have with England we do not under any circumstances consider to be insurmountable." All the important foreign policy documents and statements by Soviet leaders relating to this contain a sense of readiness to develop normal, constructive, mutually beneficial ties with the capitalist states, including England. Such a political line finds its practical embodiment in the concrete affairs of the CPSU and the Soviet state in the international arena and in those proposals for cooperation the Soviet Union, along with the other Warsaw Pact countries, has addressed to the U.S. and the West European members of NATO, including, naturally, England.

The other side of the issue is represented by the position of England's ruling circles, primarily those political figures who today are at the helm of ruling the state. The present leaders of the British Conservatives, taking active part in the arms race, zealously supporting Washington's militaristic course, and having given the territory of their country for the deployment of new U.S. first-strike nuclear missiles, have thereby born direct responsibility for the growth of tensions and for the increase in the level of nuclear danger.

The leader of the present Conservatives, Prime Minister of England Margaret Thatcher, has formulated a quite definite attitude toward the Soviet Union and communism. "I became interested in communism," she recounts, "when I was 16 or 17 years old when I read about it for the first time.... I understood then that they (the Communists--V. K.) set themselves a global objective, to gain world supremacy, which they have been striving for in various ways. And this impression has never left me; not that this thought has always haunted me. No, it is almost in my blood."

It is obvious that such notions, which distort the essence of matters and are separated from reality, have an effect on the practical course of Great Britain's ruling circles with respect to the Soviet Union. It is no accident that under the present Conservative government a significant decline in Soviet-British relations has taken place. At the 26th Congress of the CPSU it was noted that they are at a "standstill," which has arisen not by fault of the USSR by any means, and which is not in the interests of either our nation or England. During a meeting of parliamentarians from the USSR and England in Moscow in January 1984, the Soviet side saw that the Conservative government is bearing its share of the responsibility for the general deterioration of the international situation. Great Britain's agreement to station cruise missiles (a first-strike weapon) on its territory does not by any means contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of good neighborly relations.

The growth in the West (including the British Isles) of the alarm among a broad segment of the masses, in various political circles, about their present-day and future has introduced a definite, new factor into

the situation. Suddenly calls began to rain down from official circles in the Western states to begin a dialog between the Soviet Union and the U.S., between East and West. There are appearing more and more often those wishing to play a kind of intermediary role in shaping such a dialog--not just on issues of limiting the arms race, but also on a broader plane.

Incidentally, what kind of dialogue is this and for what objectives? The question is a fundamental one. If it is to achieve concrete, mutually acceptable agreements in the interests of eliminating the threat of nuclear war and strengthening peace and security, that is one thing. No one could deny the need for such a dialogue. But if the calls for a dialog are designed to camouflage the same militaristic course of Washington and the other NATO countries, the talks themselves to be used as a screen for implementing arms race programs--and the facts are just such--then that, obviously, is quite another thing.

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Pact nations have formulated their attitude toward the dialogue very precisely and clearly: the communique from the meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Pact member states, which took place on 19-20 April 1984 in Budapest, underscores the fact that an improvement in the situation and a return to detente require a dialogue among states on the fundamental issues of preserving and strengthening peace, a dialog that is serious and equitable, imbued with a sense of responsibility.

In this connection, the participants of the meeting were convinced that there are no issues impossible to resolve through negotiations if they were conducted with a constructive approach and the political will to achieve favorable results, with a full accounting of the peoples' vital interests and the interests of peace and international security. This is confirmed by the experience of international relations.

There is a solid basis for such a dialogue: a broad series of proposals and initiatives by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. They open up the potential for achieving mutually acceptable agreements that would make it possible to save mankind from the nuclear threat, would put a stop to the arms race--primarily nuclear arms--and would shift to disarmament. Many of these well-known proposals lie on the negotiating table at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament, at the Vienna Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, and at other forums. The Soviet side invariably places these issues at the center of attention during its bilateral contacts, consultations, and talks with representatives from other countries, too. England, along with its allies, will respond to these proposals; nuclear danger will be moved aside, security strengthened, and peace fortified. Not a single nation's interests would suffer if the principles of equality and identical security were to be observed.

There is one more vitally important thing. In advancing their constructive proposals, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries are displaying a readiness, in a positive spirit, to change their opinions and to study proposals by other nations aimed at weakening and eliminating the threat of nuclear war, putting a stop to the arms race, [establishing] detente, and strengthening security. The socialist countries are thereby clearly demonstrating to the extreme that they approach issues of war and peace in an extraordinarily responsible, extensive, and flexible manner.

The experience of cooperation between the Soviet Union and England during the Great Patriotic War demonstrates that the potential, in principle, for such relations between states with different social systems does exist and, in certain periods of historical development, when the level of danger grows, they become a necessity. It is necessary only that each nation display the political will for this and realism in evaluating the present and more remote future. The Soviet Union has such a will. Today the threat of nuclear war hanging over mankind is actively commanding all nations to take the path of cooperation so as to postpone a terrible catastrophe.

During a meeting in Stockholm, which took place in connection with the start of work by the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in January 1984, A. A. Gromyko and Great Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Geoffrey Howe agreed that the 60 years that have passed since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries provide a convincing example that cooperation, not confrontation, responds to the vital interests of their people and to the cause of peace and security on the continent.

The Soviet Union assumes that the current situation in the world can be corrected. K. U. Chernenko emphasized this in his message to the delegation from the Assisi municipality and representatives from the order of Franciscans. [The world situation can be] corrected through the joint, united efforts of state powers and citizens, regardless of their political, religious or philosophical views, social position or party affiliation. There is no higher goal than preserving the human race. There is no more important task than working so that dreams for a lasting place and for the prosperity and well-being of the people do not remain just a beautiful utopia. The path toward this is not easy, but it is obvious: to renounce confrontation, to firmly take the road of detente, cooperation, and peaceful coexistence, and to begin a radical reduction of arms based on the principles of equality and identical security.

Capt. 1st Rank A. Karemov and Col. G. Semin (Retired), "Certain Provisions of the Military Doctrines of the Basic NATO European Countries," *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* [Foreign Military Review], No. 6, 1983, 7-11. Excerpts.

True to their peace-loving policy, the Soviet Union and other socialist community countries are doing everything they can to improve the international climate, curtail the arms race and, in the final analysis, prevent a new world war.

Underlying Soviet military doctrine are the progressive ideas of protecting the socialist gains of the workers and strengthening peace and the peoples' security. In tirelessly fighting for peace, the Soviet Union has unilaterally refused to be the first to use nuclear weapons and recently, in the name of the socialist countries, it put forward new constructive proposals for mutual arms reductions in Central Europe.

The U.S. and leading NATO European countries adhere to completely different doctrines, striving, through force, to delay the natural course of historical development, to preserve imperialism's position, and to clear the way for the implementation of its [imperialism's] aggressive, global plans. They do not hide the fact that their military doctrines not only do not rule out the possibility of using nuclear weapons first, but are, in fact, based on this dangerous plan of action for unleashing a war.

Ruling circles in Great Britain, the FRG, and Italy have, under pressure from the U.S. administration and under the pretext of the "Soviet threat," which they have thought up, approved a NATO resolution for an annual military appropriations increase of 3 percent (there is now even talk about 4 percent), and for building up the bloc's nuclear forces in Europe by deploying 464 cruise and 108 ballistic (Pershing II) medium-range missiles by the end of the eighties (beginning in 1983). France supports these resolutions although it does not belong to the military organization of this aggressive bloc.

In their militaristic preparations, the basic NATO European nations take into account not only the requirements of the bloc's coalition military strategy, but also the provisions of U.S. military doctrine. They also consider changes in strategic issues, particularly in views about the development of the armed forces and methods for conducting military action.

However, despite the subordination of the participating countries' military doctrines to bloc interests, they also have their own particular national content and provide guidelines on questions of preparing for war, taking into consideration the economic development, foreign policy, and geographic position of each state.

Great Britain's Military Doctrine

In recent decades Great Britain's military doctrine has been developed under the influence of changes in the nation's role and place in the international arena as a result of the disintegration of the British colonial empire. British authorities have attempted to preserve their position in their former colonies and dependent nations, as well as to strengthen [Britain's] leading position in Western Europe, not admitting that France and the FRG have surpassed Britain in military and economic might.

In pursuing its aggressive objectives and striving to increase its prestige in NATO, Great Britain has been expending enormous sums for military purposes (for fiscal year 1982/83 more than 14 billion pounds sterling were appropriated). In this connection, it has displayed increased involvement in fulfilling the armaments plans outlined by the bloc in comparison to the other nation-participants. Even the military conflict with Argentina (April-June 1982), which the Conservatives exploited primarily to restore their lost political position within the country, was passed off by the Thatcher government as a "great contribution to the defense" of the West, as a practical test of the strong and weak aspects of allied commitments and new weapons systems, as well as the potential for deploying major mobile units of NATO armed forces.

The political essence of the doctrine is aimed at resolving socio-political contradictions in the world with the aid of military force in the interests of the nation's ruling class. In accordance with this, the Soviet Union, the world socialist system, and the national-liberation movement are defined as the main opponent.

The present Conservative government has, since its first days in power, proclaimed a rigid course in its relations with the USSR and other nations of the socialist community. [It has done this] to undermine the Soviet Union's position and influence in the world, to disrupt the existing correlation of forces in Europe, and to achieve the West's military superiority over the Warsaw Pact nations.

Great Britain's military-political leadership believes that these objectives can be attained only through the common efforts of NATO and the entire capitalist world, headed by the U.S. The Conservative government has repeatedly declared that Great Britain's loyalty to the aggressive North Atlantic bloc is of paramount importance and nothing will lead to the violation of its commitment to the alliance. At the same time, it underscores the fact that under the conditions where former colonial nations pose the question about a new international economic order, protecting the interests of the NATO member states beyond the zone of the bloc's "responsibility" acquires great importance, particularly in seizing and retaining sources of raw materiel and important military strategic regions.

A "special relationship" has taken shape between Great Britain and the United States of America, primarily in the military-political sphere, based on their "nuclear partnership," where one can note its great dependency on the U.S. The Conservative government is following the lead of U.S. imperialism's foreign policy, whereby it is counting on maintaining its weight and influence in European affairs. Therefore, it is no accident that its doctrine is, to a great extent, in keeping with the provisions of U.S. military policy, as well as with NATO's coalition strategy.

Great Britain's leadership has adopted a policy of restoring its lost position in the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf, in Southeast Asia, and in other areas of military-strategic importance. Official British spokesmen frankly state that they are prepared to use armed force if the situation is exacerbated in any of these areas. To do this, the Ministry of Defence has been nurturing plans to create its own "rapid deployment force," following the American model, with whose help it would be possible to quickly and effectively carry out direct armed intervention in the affairs of developing states.

Great Britain has been assisting the Pentagon in every way possible in creating new military bases and expanding existing ones on its territory, pledging to ensure their high combat readiness. Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government, actively supporting its "partnership" in the North Atlantic bloc, was among the first to agree to station 160 U.S. cruise missiles on its territory, has kept a squadron of four to six ships in the Indian Ocean for many years, and is, together with the U.S., pressuring West European nations to get them to increase their contribution to the strengthening of NATO troop groupings.

Practical measures by the ruling circles confirm the policy adopted to militarize Great Britain, including enormous and constantly growing military expenditures, active participation in the arms race, the strengthening of the nation's military-industrial potential, and improvements in its infrastructure and civil defense.

When distributing budget allocations, the Ministry of Defence pays particular attention to the main programs: modernizing the strategic nuclear force, reorganizing and improving general purpose forces, purchasing weapons and combat equipment, as well as conducting wide-scale research, development, testing and evaluation in the military sphere. Great Britain is a highly developed industrial nation, is one of NATO's arsenals, and provides weapons not only for its own armed forces, but also for many states in the world. The dominant position in industry, trade, and finance is occupied by the monopolies connected with military production.

Within the system of European TVDs [theater of military action], Great Britain is set apart in a special zone, on whose territory a large

number of important military targets and installations have been established (including airfields, naval bases, warehouses, and communication hubs). Preparations for war are conducted in close collaboration with the Pentagon: the country maintains more than 20,000 American servicemen and the United States uses eight air bases and several naval basing centers. Here are located American munition warehouses, including nuclear munitions, and communication hubs.

Following the White House's example, the Thatcher government has stepped up its work to create new types of chemical weapons. In particular, it plans to equip the armed forces with binary chemical warfare agents.

British specialists examine the nature of potential wars, taking into account the strengths of the opposing sides, the scope of military action, and the means of armed combat used. They consider the most likely to be a war between the two coalitions (the NATO bloc and the Warsaw Pact Organization). They also do not rule out the possibility of a war being waged against developing nations where, in their opinion, Great Britain's economic and political interests will be in jeopardy. The armed conflict with Argentina over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands can serve as a graphic example of this.

In terms of the scope of military action and the means of destruction used, Great Britain's doctrine distinguishes two types of wars: a general nuclear war and a limited (including a local) one.

The doctrine recognizes the unlimited use of nuclear weapons in a general war in the form of a nuclear attack, and the possibility of conducting limited wars not only outside the NATO zone, but also in Central Europe. At the same time, British specialists react with great restraint to the idea advanced by the White House of unleashing a "limited" nuclear war in Europe, seeing in this an increased threat to the British Isles.

It is believed that a war in Europe with the unlimited use of nuclear weapons can begin by a surprise attack or after a short period of increased tension, as well as through the use of only conventional means of destruction at the beginning of the conflict, then tactical nuclear weapons, and subsequently strategic ones.

In the area of the development of the armed forces, the military doctrine requires compact, mobile, and well-balanced troops and naval forces that would be capable of ensuring the attainment of political objectives and the execution of strategic tasks in any likely conflicts.

The overall number of regulars in Great Britain's armed forces in peacetime is maintained at 330,000 to 340,000 personnel. They consist of Ground Troops (judging from the latest press reports, they number about 163,000 people); Air Force (92,000); and Navy (73,000). In terms

of its mission, the British command divides its armed forces into strategic nuclear and general purpose forces.

Assigned to the former are four nuclear missile submarines outfitted with Polaris-A3 missiles (with 16 ballistic missile launching tubes) and six torpedo devices. In the opinion of British specialists, the warheads for these missiles have already become obsolete (the boats were put into the fleet's service at the end of the sixties) and cannot provide an effective breakthrough of an antimissile defense. At the start of the seventies, Great Britain began to implement the Chevaline program, providing for the creation of a new MIRV-type warhead which, in the British command's estimation, would significantly increase the striking power of these forces. Because the service time of the first British SSBNs will expire at the beginning of the nineties, it is planned to replace them with new ones, armed with U.S. Trident I missiles and, in the future, with Trident IIs. It is intended that four or five boats will be built.

All remaining staffs, divisions, and units belong to the general purpose forces, consisting of four armored and one artillery division; six detached brigades and many special units and subunits (their inventory consists of more than 1,100 tanks, about 5,700 armored personnel carriers and combat infantry vehicles, more than 340 field artillery guns, and roughly 250 army aviation helicopters); more than 30 squadrons of combat aircraft (up to 450 units, excluding combat training ones); more than 210 ships and launches; up to 30 combat aircraft; and more than 120 helicopters in naval aviation, as well as a marine brigade.

Each branch of the armed forces has nuclear weapons carriers: Lance-guided missiles (12 launchers) and nuclear artillery guns in the Ground Troops; Buccaneer, Tornado, and Jaguar carrier-aircraft in the Air Force; and naval aviation carrier-aircraft (Sea Harrier).

This kind of structure in the armed forces, in the British command's estimation, makes it possible to employ them flexibly and in various wars and conflicts. As Great Britain's Secretary of Defence has underscored, the rapidity with which a powerful naval grouping was dispatched to the South Atlantic during the Anglo-Argentinan conflict was possible because of the high level of professionalism, preparedness, and mobility of the British armed forces and civil service. In his opinion, this will allow them to react efficiently and in a timely manner under any circumstances both in the NATO zone and outside it.

On issues of armed forces' training, the methods of their combat use and the conduct of combat action by the troops, Great Britain's military doctrine operates fully on the provisions of NATO's coalition strategy, which Britain has adopted unconditionally. Military development is carried out with the aim of improving the organizational structure of the branches of the armed forces and increasing the mobility,

fire, and striking might of divisions outfitted with new types of weapons and combat equipment.

Foreign specialists view Great Britain's strategic forces, on the one hand, as a supplement to American ones and, on the other hand, as NATO's nuclear force in the theater of war.

The combat use of general purpose forces is anticipated only as part of NATO's joint armed forces, above all, in the Central European and Northern European TVDs, while the Navy would be used in the Eastern Atlantic and in the English Channel. In certain cases, the possibility is granted for the participation of limited British troops outside Europe's boundaries when "protecting the interests" of Great Britain by way of "rendering assistance" to the nations of the British Commonwealth.

Foreign specialists believe that 90 percent of the units and divisions of the British ground troops, all combat aircraft, nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, and up to 85 percent of the basic types of ships could be transferred to the disposal of the supreme command of NATO's joint armed forces in Europe. For example, even in peacetime, the size of the British Army on the Rhine (55,000 men), which is deployed within the Northern Army Group, is planned to be doubled in the event of an armed conflict. The intention is to use Great Britain's Marines, equipped with landing craft and helicopters, primarily in the Northern European TVD.

The British Air Force is entrusted with the tasks of supporting the Ground Troops and Navies of its NATO allies in the European theater of war and in the East Atlantic, as well as protecting its own territory and sea lines of communication from the air.

The nation's Navy must, according to doctrine, gain and retain supremacy in areas of military action, deliver nuclear-missile strikes, conduct assault landing operations, combat the opponent's submarines and surface ships, and protect sea lines of communication.

Lt. Col. I. Vladimirov, "Great Britain's Military Policy," *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* [Foreign Military Review], No. 7, 1981, 7-12.

The current military-political situation in the world is characterized by an acute struggle between two trends---a course of restraining the arms race, strengthening peace, and protecting the peoples' freedom on the one hand, and a policy of aggression, undermining detente, of threat and intervention in other people's affairs, and suppressing liberation movements on the other. As a result of the sharp increase in the aggressiveness of imperialist forces, the clouds have thickened on the international horizon at the beginning of the eighties. "Adventurism and a readiness to gamble the vital interests of mankind in the name of narrow-minded mercenary objectives," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress, "this is what is being manifested quite markedly in the policies of imperialism's most aggressive circles." These features are fully inherent in British imperialism, whose leaders are attempting to revive the dangerous times of the "cold war."

After the fall of the British empire, Great Britain's economic situation consistently worsened, it gradually lost its military and political positions abroad, and lagged more and more behind the other industrially developed Western states. At the present time, in terms of the size of its gross national product and volume of industrial output, Britain occupies fifth place in the capitalist world after the U.S., Japan, the FRG, and France. The nation's chronic difficulties, as the foreign press writes, have secured for it the reputation as "the sick man in Europe."

Nevertheless, Great Britain still remains one of the leading capitalist powers and its ruling circles have been making persistent attempts to reestablish the lost positions of British monopolies and to return the nation to its former greatness. In this connection, reliance is placed on building up military potential, accelerating the arms race, and carrying out an aggressive military-political course. Imperial ambitions and the manifestation of adventurism and fanatical anti-Sovietism are most characteristic of the Conservatives. "To make Britain great" and "to become a leader, not fall among those left behind" were the slogans that the Conservative Party set forth during the Parliamentary elections in May 1979.

From its very first days in power, the government headed by the "iron lady," Margaret Thatcher, proclaimed a *rigid course in its relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries* intending to build them from "a position of strength." This program determines the entire content of Great Britain's military policy at the present stage. Its main objectives are to undermine the position and influence of socialism in the world, to disrupt the "existing correlation of forces in Europe, and to ensure the West's military superiority over the

Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries. As before, the foundation of British military policy lies in close cooperation with the United States, active participation in the military-political measures of the North Atlantic bloc, and support of the West's aggressive actions in dangerously explosive areas of the world. However, according to the appraisal of foreign specialists, in contrast to previous years, its overtly anti-Soviet and militaristic character has been deliberately intensified.

Having selected a rigid foreign policy orientation, the Conservative Party has chosen the path of an unrestrained arms race and militarization of the country. This was most fully reflected in the defense White Paper. The British Tories' budget is guns instead of butter. Upon coming to power, the Conservatives reviewed most of the government programs established by the Labourites and announced an *increase in military expenditures* of roughly one billion pounds sterling. It should be emphasized that, despite exacerbated economic and social difficulties, Great Britain is spending a larger portion of its gross national product on militaristic preparations than the other NATO countries.

However, in August 1980 it was decided to increase military expenditures by yet another 200 million pounds sterling. Thus, the military budget for fiscal year 1980-81 reached the astronomical height of more than 11 billion pounds sterling. Nevertheless, for fiscal year 1981-82 it established a record figure of 12.25 billion pounds sterling, which represents 11.8 percent of the state budget. The main portion of the monies is earmarked for arms purchases and raising the combat and mobilization readiness of the armed forces.

The decision about the new increase in military appropriations was taken in the context of a deepening economic crisis in the country. The Conservative government, by openly protecting the interests of the military-industrial complex, is conducting an economic course that has proven to be a tragedy for hundreds of thousands of British workers. At the present time 2.5 million people are gripped by unemployment.

While millions of simple Englishmen do not know how to make ends meet, among the "merchants of death" (the 16 largest corporations connected with military production) a "golden rain" of highly profitable orders is flowing in. The Thatcher government has established a *program to build up the potential of Great Britain's strategic nuclear force*. The Resolution, Repulse, Renown, and Revenge SSBNs operating with Polaris-A3 missiles are planned to be replaced at the beginning of the nineties with new ones, armed with improved U.S. Trident-1 missiles and, in the future, with Trident-2s.* To implement this program it is

* For greater detail on the prospects for developing British SSBNs, see *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie*, No. 6, 1981, 65-68.--Ed.

planned to allocate not less than 5 billion pounds sterling, although it is expected that the final figure will be much higher. Given that the new boats will only enter service at the start of the nineties, one billion pounds sterling was allotted to executing the Chevaline project: the creation of a new MIRV-type warhead for the Polaris-A3 missiles. At the same time, talks are being carried on with the U.S. about delivering fissionable material to Great Britain in order to manufacture about 800 nuclear warheads for the Trident-1 missiles. The construction of enterprises to produce enriched uranium is being speeded up.

The Conservatives' militaristic aspirations were no less clearly visible in the field of developing conventional arms. Additional large appropriations have been set aside for the production of modern combat equipment for the ground troops. The rearming of the British Air Force and Navy is going ahead at full steam.

The Tory government has fully *subjugated its foreign and military policies to the interests of American imperialism*. As the British press has written, in commenting on the results of Thatcher's visit to the U.S. (in February 1981), the new U.S. administration was "captivated by the British Prime Minister's readiness to cooperate with the White House" in adventures undertaken by the Pentagon in all corners of the globe. The objective of this visit was, in the opinion of the foreign press, to more closely carry out military interaction with the United States, to more actively involve the West European countries in intensifying the arms race, and to force them to take more rigid positions in relations with the Soviet Union. On the whole, Thatcher enthusiastically supported Reagan's aspiration "to begin a new crusade against communism."

Following the lead of adventurist U.S. policy, Great Britain's ruling circles are assisting the Pentagon in every way possible in the creation of new and the expansion of old military bases on its territory. According to data in the British *New Statesman* journal, the U.S. has 103 bases and other military installations in Great Britain, including eight air bases, seven nuclear munitions warehouses, and ten electronic reconnaissance centers.* This whole web of "a nest of aggression," over which the British government has no control, is serviced by 27,000 Americans. Not one of these bases is designed for Great Britain's security. On the contrary, as the journal notes, in accordance with agreements operating within NATO, the British command is obligated to provide "regional defense for U.S. bases" located on its territory.

* For greater detail about U.S. military bases and installations in Great Britain, see *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie*, No. 5, 1980, 26--Ed.

In its ardor to confirm Great Britain's reliability as an American ally, who conducts a course pleasing to the United States, the Thatcher government is resorting to the most dangerous steps. Recently the Conservatives have launched a campaign to equip British armed forces with new types of chemical weapons--so-called binary toxic agents. In this connection, they are ready to have American depots keep these lethal reserves on the country's territory. At the same time, Great Britain itself is stepping up work to create its own new generation of chemical weapons. Expenditures for these purposes are provided for in the defense *White Paper* for fiscal year 1980-81. According to reports in the foreign press, in the strictly classified research center in Portsdown, a special training ground has been built where they perfect methods for conducting chemical warfare. The British press, citing the testimony of soldiers who participated in tests of binary toxic agents at this training ground, writes that they "lost their coordination and sense of touch." Such dangerous measures show that London is cynically violating the Geneva Convention and other international agreements that forbid barbaric warfare weapons. In supporting the United States' sinister plans to turn Western Europe into the forward staging area for chemical warfare, Great Britain is not only itself actively participating in these plans, but she is also putting pressure on other NATO countries, seeking an agreement ahead of time for stationing U.S. chemical weapons on their territory.

The British government's servility was also graphically manifested in the fact that it was "the only hawk in Europe" supporting the Reagan administration's intention to deploy neutron weapons in Europe.

In achieving its military-political objectives, Great Britain attaches particular importance to *increasing its role within the North Atlantic bloc*. It has assigned most of the combat-ready divisions and units of its Ground Troops and Air Forces to NATO. The British contingent is at the disposal of the bloc's command over mobile forces designed for action in European TVDs. Great Britain's ships are regularly assigned to the permanent divisions of NATO's joint naval forces in the Atlantic and in the English Channel and they are periodically sent to the Mediterranean Sea to participate in exercises. In wartime it is planned to transfer a large portion of the national naval forces, including the SSBNs, to the bloc's disposal.

In actively advocating a build-up of the bloc's military preparations and strengthening "Atlantic solidarity," the British leadership is setting an example for the remaining West European participants in intensifying the confrontation with the socialist community. British Conservatives were some of the first to support the resolution of the NATO Council's May (1978) session to increase military expenditures annually by 3 percent in real terms. Nor did they relinquish the crown in the implementation of the NATO plan to strengthen the bloc's nuclear might that was approved by the December (1979) session of the NATO Council. The government of Great Britain was the first among the West

European countries of the North Atlantic Alliance to determine the area for deploying 160 new medium-range U.S. nuclear missiles, which will begin in 1983. During the first stage, 96 cruise missiles will be deployed at the airbase in Greenham Common (Berkshire County), then 64 at the airbase in Molesworth (Cambridgeshire). Considering the growing resistance of the public in Europe, especially in the FRG and the Netherlands, to increase NATO's nuclear arms, Great Britain's Secretary of Defence considered it necessary during his visit to the U.S. in March 1981 to confirm his support to implement unconditionally the decision to deploy U.S. medium-range nuclear missile weapons in a number of West European states.

Recently new and extremely dangerous tendencies have emerged in the activities of the Conservatives both in NATO and throughout their foreign policy. More than 10 years ago, Great Britain announced the withdrawal of its troops from areas "east of the Suez." But now, having revived the old imperial call "Britannia, rule the seas!," the Conservatives have adopted a policy of reestablishing British military-political positions in the Near East, especially in the Persian Gulf area, including a direct military presence in the region.

The growth of the Tories' geopolitical appetite was graphically demonstrated in March 1981 by the visits of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, India, and Pakistan. He openly declared that his government was ready to use armed forces if the situation became exacerbated "in the Persian Gulf area or in any other spot." In order to do this, the country was establishing its own "rapid deployment force," following the American model. Thus, it is a matter of overt colonial claims and Great Britain's determination to carry out direct military intervention in the affairs of the developing states.

London's gendarme aspirations are viewed in the foreign press in light of its readiness to expand the borders of the North Atlantic bloc's zone of responsibility. This was manifested in its encouraging the Pentagon to create a powerful military complex on Diego Garcia, which would keep the entire Indian Ocean basin in sight, and in its sending British combat ships to this region. This was also reflected in Great Britain's support of American plans to organize a NATO "rapid deployment force." During her visit to Washington, Margaret Thatcher pointed out an "urgent need for a new military policy [which would operate] beyond the North Atlantic," in connection with the need "to protect the vital interests of the bloc's nations" in the Persian Gulf zone and in Africa. As the Prime Minister declared, Great Britain was prepared to make her contribution to the creation of a NATO "rapid deployment force," which could be utilized not only in the Persian Gulf region, but also in other areas of the world. Visiting Washington after Thatcher, Secretary of Defence John Nott noted that "in coordination with our allies, some forces have already been trained for this kind of intervention."

In planning intervention in the "Third World," the British aggressors are relying on their bloody experience in "pacifying the population and bringing order" acquired in *Northern Ireland*. For many years now, British imperialism has continued to suppress the democratic movement in Ulster through the force of weapons and the most brutal repression. Northern Ireland has been turned into a training ground where Britain's armed forces acquire combat experience, work out the tactics for the so-called neutralization of progressive organizations and movements, and test new models of weapons and combat equipment. The British armed intervention in Ulster has for a long time now borne the character of a colonial war.

With the Thatcher government's advent to power, *Great Britain's relations with China have been appreciably stepped up on an anti-Soviet and militaristic basis*. During his visit to London in October 1979, Premier of the State Council of the PRC Hua Guofeng expressed a harmony of views between the Conservatives and the Maoists in many aspects of international relations, particularly on the issues of further building up NATO's military might and creating a global anti-Soviet front. In attempting to play the "China card," at the present time the British leadership is offering the PRC modern offensive weapons, no longer tying their sale to China's signing of contracts to acquire other industrial produce. An agreement was reached to open up PRC representation in London for arms purchases. An exchange of military delegations has been established on a permanent basis. Foreign observers believe that there is a direct calculation lying behind Great Britain's readiness to expand military political ties with China's leadership: to exploit its hostility toward the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community in the interests of imperialism.

To conceal the aggressive trend of their foreign policy, British ruling circles are diligently whipping up the myth about the "Soviet military threat." Immediately after the election, Thatcher declared: "I view the Soviet threat as a global phenomenon. The Russians' objective is world supremacy." Following this, she called for the immediate formation of a close alliance between the Western states and Japan in order to counteract the USSR as well as to undermine the influence of socialism and the national-liberation movement. In justifying NATO's decision to deploy U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe, the "iron lady" stressed that they are capable of causing the Soviet people the same kind of colossal suffering [the Soviet Union] experienced during World War II.

Such an overtly hostile position by the Conservatives has led to the fact that Soviet-British relations, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted in the CPSU's Central Committee report to the 26th Party Congress, are at a standstill but not because of the Soviet Union. However, the British leadership's reaction to new Soviet peace initiatives set forth at the 26th Congress demonstrates that it [the leadership] does not intend to renounce its adventuristic policy. Not even having [bothered

to] delve into the essence of the Soviet proposals, Great Britain's government hastened to reject them. In particular, appearing in Parliament on the following day after the 26th Congress of the CPSU was convened, Thatcher declared that the moratorium proposed by the Soviet Union on the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe by the NATO countries and the USSR was unacceptable, as it was supposedly advantageous only for the Soviet side. The British government was left virtually alone in Western Europe, not having supported Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's proposals to conduct high-level Soviet-American meetings. As before, the Conservatives permit talks with the Soviet Union only from "a position of strength."

Practical measures to undermine detente, to escalate the arms race, and to achieve military superiority over the socialist community clearly confirm the dangerous nature of Great Britain's military policies. The revival of imperial ambitions and the determination to play the role of world gendarme together with the U.S. are indicative of the intensification of its aggressive trend. This course is leading to an exacerbation of tension in the world, the emergence of new breeding grounds for armed conflicts, and an increase in the threat of nuclear war. This creates the need to follow vigilantly the machinations of British imperialism.

V. G. Trukhanovskii, "England's Nuclear Policy (1979-1984)," *Voprosy istorii* [Questions of History], No. 6, 1985, 22-50.

On 1 June 1983, British readers, who are old hands at all kinds of sensationalism, were quite surprised when reading a statement by England's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the newspapers. It molded the British government's policy on nuclear armaments.¹ This statement makes a study of the present British Conservative government's policy in the area of nuclear armaments extremely timely. Such analysis is particularly important today when the paramount task of states and peoples is to remove the threat of nuclear war from mankind, a threat that is growing because of the aggressive policy of the U.S. government and certain other NATO countries, and when the problem of nuclear arms is the subject of important international negotiations. With this as the starting point, in this article the author has attempted to examine British nuclear arms policy from 1979 to 1984.

In striving to protect mankind from a nuclear catastrophe, the Soviet Union has come forward with a proposal to make relations between the nuclear powers subject to certain mutually agreed-upon, obligatory norms whose objective would be to prevent nuclear war. [These norms include] a refusal to propagandize nuclear war, a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first and not to allow them to be distributed in any form, assistance in creating nonnuclear zones, and a policy to reduce nuclear arms right up to abolishing them. This is a constructive program to prevent nuclear war that responds to the needs of the conditions existing in the world. It is addressed to all nuclear powers together and to each one individually; consequently, it is also [addressed] to England.

London and its NATO allies have responded with silence to this very important Soviet proposal. An examination of the Conservative government's nuclear policy helps understand their silence.

Margaret Thatcher became the leader of England's Conservative Party in 1975. By that time she had already proven herself as a figure of extremely rightist views in domestic and foreign policy. She had already come out as an advocate of a "strict course" in domestic affairs and in foreign policy, and had complained publicly that Britain was losing its colonial possessions and former position as a world power.

As leader of the party, Thatcher made a number of trips to other countries, in particular the U.S., the FRG, and Canada. In her speeches during these trips she consistently demonstrated her "British ultra-patriotism" and a "strict course" in foreign policy. At that time Thatcher had already come out against the relaxation of international tensions; the results of the Helsinki Accords on security and cooperation in Europe did not suit her. Even U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear arms limitation talks evoked her displeasure. All this was accompanied

by the propaganda of the myth about the Soviet Union's "military superiority" and the "Soviet threat" and by the falsified interpretation of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Similar attacks also extended to other socialist countries. Reactionary circles in the U.S., the FRG, and several other countries applauded the leader of the British Conservatives, having reflected their views too. Clever correspondents for the bourgeois press began to call Thatcher the "iron lady." Her first significant political successes came not at home, but during this tour abroad. In England her absolute rule as leader of the Conservative Party was established more slowly, but it became a fact in 1977.

On 3 May 1979 general parliamentary elections took place in England. During the election campaign, the Conservatives, led by Margaret Thatcher, made widespread use of the false thesis about the "Soviet military threat." They declared that they intend to take a position of active confrontation and rigid opposition to the Soviet Union and, with this aim, they will develop new arms programs and will increase military expenditures. The *1979 Conservative Manifesto* provided for "strengthening England's defense and cooperation with its allies in protecting our interests in the world in the face of the growing threat."² It became clear both verbally and in writing that the threat supposedly emanates from the Soviet Union, socialism, and progressive movements.

In the elections, the Conservatives were victorious, gaining a solid majority in parliament, which made it possible for them to begin to implement their political line. The main element in the Conservative government's foreign policy activity was anti-Sovietism. One example of the manifestation of hostility with respect to the USSR was an interview of the British Secretary of Defence Francis Pym, given by him on the 40th anniversary since the start of World War II. The Minister went so far as to say that the Soviet Union now represents the same kind of threat to peace as fascism did in the thirties. The Soviet press appraised this statement as blasphemous and as a manifestation of the preoccupation with anti-Sovietism.³

This Conservative position has predetermined their policy with respect to British nuclear weapons while the Thatcher government has been in power.

The first nuclear problem the new government encountered was the Chevaline program. It was adopted in 1973 by the then Conservative government of Edward Heath and for many years was carried out by both the Heath government and by the Labour government of Harold Wilson that replaced it. Both governments kept the program in deep secrecy, hiding its implementation from the people, from parliament, and from the full staff of the government; only a small group of highly-placed Conservatives, and later Labour, ministers knew about it.

For the Thatcher government, the Chevaline did not represent a complex problem. The program was at the completion stage and its results were to be introduced onto missile-carrying submarines. Modernizing and increasing the yield of nuclear weapons followed from the Conservatives' foreign policy line.

Official mention of the Chevaline project was first made by Secretary of Defence Pym in an address to parliament in January 1980. He stated that it was a "very essential and complex improvement of missile warheads, including changes in the control of the launch system as well. This was not a system with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles--MIRVs. But it did include improvement of the devices for penetrating the enemy's antimissile defence and for maneuvering warheads in space."⁴ Pym announced that the project was "close to completion" and that its cost came to one billion pounds sterling.⁵ Improvements in the Chevaline program primarily aimed to ensure the best possibilities for British missiles to penetrate Soviet defenses. Hence, giving the missiles the capability to change their flight course, the angle of their reentry into the atmosphere, and their increased speed of descent was [designed] to mislead enemy defenses. The warhead was to separate itself earlier, before arriving into the zone where defense devices are operating. Along with the warheads, the missile also carried diversionary devices--false warheads--that could be used by the enemy in place of real ones. Also strengthened was the protection of the missile's internal electronic system from the effects of nuclear explosions that could take place close by.⁶

The number of warheads on each missile was doubled, from three to six. Each of them had a thermonuclear charge with a yield of 40 kilotons.⁷ By increasing the number of nuclear warheads, England fundamentally changed the balance of nuclear forces in Europe, made it less stable, which, in turn, made talks to lower nuclear confrontation in Europe more difficult. At the same time, the Chevaline program spurred other powers such as France to follow the British example, which intensified the nuclear arms race.

The government's *White Paper* on military expenditures for 1982 reported that "the Chevaline program will ensure the effectiveness of the British nuclear submarine fleet, armed with Polaris missiles, until such time as the Trident missiles replace them. The Chevaline program is now completed. The new system will soon begin operational service."⁸ Indeed, the modernized missiles began to be put into service in the summer of 1982. Francis Pym postulated that the Chevaline system would maintain the Polaris missiles at the necessary level "for 10 years or thereabouts."⁹

British authorities have emphasized in every way possible the autonomy of the Chevaline program and its independence from the U.S. However, the above-mentioned *White Paper* reports that test launches of missiles with the Chevaline system were carried out from the Renown

submarine at the beginning of 1982 off Cape Canaveral (U.S.), "which represents an important final stage in the implementation of this program."¹⁰ All tests of warheads and missiles with the new system were carried out on U.S. testing grounds--on Cape Canaveral in Florida and in Nevada.

The Conservative government did not restrict itself to completing the Chevaline program. At the end of 1981 it began to outfit existing Polaris missiles with a new engine that, so the Ministry of Defence maintains, "will ensure the retention of the effectiveness of our present deterrent strategic forces until the Trident missile goes into operation in the 1990s."¹¹

As for Trident, the Conservative government immediately advocated adopting the program to create a new fleet of nuclear-powered, missile-carrying submarines that would be outfitted with these missiles and would replace the current Polaris submarines during the nineties. The lively discussion in the seventies, deliberately stirred up by supporters of the arms race, about whether or not to create a new generation of nuclear weapons laid the groundwork psychologically and through propaganda, initiating a new spiral in the British nuclear arms race.

The Conservatives came to power, having already decided beforehand, that they would seek to retain the nuclear force and would organize its replacement with more modern systems. One of the first subcommittees established by the Thatcher government was subcommittee Misc.7, which was concerned with nuclear rearmament. According to a tradition assimilated by both Labour and Conservative governments, this body consisted of an extremely small circle of highly placed ministers: Prime Minister Thatcher, Secretary of Home Affairs William Whitelaw, Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of Defence Francis Pym, and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Lord Carrington. It is revealing that other ministers, as well as the military, were kept away from the subcommittee's work.

The Misc.7 subcommittee moved forward quickly in its study of the problem, because the predecessor Labour government had already laid a lot of the groundwork, and the line on nuclear policy for both the Conservatives and the Labour ministers was essentially one and the same. On 26 October 1979 Pym had already publicly announced that the government "would continue to improve the Polaris fleet so that it would remain a means for deterrence into the 1990s." "Moreover, the question is already being studied about what measures must be undertaken in order to ensure the operation of British nuclear potential after this period, once this proves necessary."¹²

In January 1980 Pym set forth in detail the government's position on this matter to the parliament. This was the first discussion of a nuclear problem in parliament in 15 years. He reported the government's

determination to replace Polaris with another system in due time, although he did not say how it would be replaced (this, he says, is still not decided), but he did report that the cost of the replacement would amount to 4-5 billion pounds sterling. The "vagueness" in the secretary's statement regarding what would replace the Polaris seems strange. If it was unclear, then on what did they base the replacement cost figure? It was the usual failure to tell all, which a deputy of the Defence Secretary partly demonstrated then and there. He stated that "the preferred replacement is ballistic missiles based on submarines."¹³ The secretary formulated the "strategy of deterrence" and pointed out that it, like all previous British strategic plans, was aimed against the Soviet Union. Returning once again to this question in parliament on 15 July 1980, Pym noted: "As I clarified in detail in January, we fundamentally intend to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet leadership's way of thinking."¹⁴ In January the Conservative majority in parliament had voted for the government's policy in nuclear arms.¹⁵

In July 1980 an official agreement was concluded between England and the U.S., validated in the form of an exchange of letters between Prime Minister Thatcher and President Carter. On 10 July 1980, Thatcher wrote that at the beginning of the nineties it would be necessary to replace the Polaris missiles now in England's arsenal with more modern ones. Having studied the various alternatives, the government had come to the conclusion that the Trident I system responded best to its needs and would ensure the maintenance of active deterrence right up to the beginning of the 21st century. "Therefore, I would like to ask you if the U.S. government would be prepared to supply England with Trident I missiles on the same basis as it supplied Polaris missiles, according to the 1962 agreement between the two countries. The British government would like to buy the Trident I missiles from the U.S. with the corresponding equipment and support, including units for individual control and reentry into the dense strata of the atmosphere, excluding only the warheads themselves, which will be manufactured in England." In this document, the British Prime Minister made an important pledge: "To assign the forces that will replace the Polaris to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as the Polaris are now assigned." With the exception of cases when the government of the United Kingdom can decide that higher national interests are at stake, the forces that will be created in the future will be used for the international defence of the Western alliance under all circumstances."¹⁶

Thatcher wrote that this agreement would not contradict the current and future international commitments of the agreeing parties. England's Prime Minister, obviously to please the U.S., emphasized that her government "supports NATO's long-term defence program to strengthen conventional arms and the armed forces." England has increased its military expenditures substantially, in accordance with the NATO decision. And so as to underscore the importance of the concluded transaction for the U.S. even more, Thatcher assured Carter that "the objective of the government of the United Kingdom is to use weapons that

are economical as a result of collaboration with the United States in the production of the Trident I missile system and in the improvement of conventional armed forces."¹⁷ This pledge was to once again underscore that the transaction was good for the U.S., and that any savings by England would be used for arms within the NATO framework.

The texts of the letters validating the agreement were agreed upon beforehand, and the President's response followed on 14 July. Carter wrote that the U.S. attached importance to England's nuclear force and was prepared for close collaboration in its modernization. Therefore, the U.S. would supply England with Trident I missiles on conditions in accordance with U.S. legislation. The President emphasized that he accords great importance to the fact that England's nuclear force with Trident missiles will be assigned to NATO and to the fact that England will convert the financial benefit from Anglo-American cooperation in the nuclear sphere into improvements in its own conventional armed forces.¹⁸

In developing the Anglo-American agreement on cooperation that thus took shape to create the future British nuclear submarine fleet with Trident I missiles, an exchange of letters took place between the two countries' Secretaries of Defence, and complicated and prolonged talks on the technical and financial aspects of the concluded transaction were initiated.

The day after receiving Carter's reply (i.e., 15 July 1980), the government informed the Parliament of its decision *post facto*, a tradition with respect to nuclear arms. Secretary of Defence Pym appeared before the House of Commons with a statement in the government's name. He stated that he intended to announce the eventual replacement of the presently operating Polaris strategic missile nuclear force with the Trident missile system. The Secretary then related that a careful study of what to replace the Polaris missile system with had been conducted. "We concluded," Pym declared, "that the best alternative from the viewpoint of effectiveness and cost was the Trident ballistic missile system developed in the U.S., launched from submarines."¹⁹ President Carter, the Secretary continued, gave assurances that the United States supports England's intention to retain its own strategic nuclear force in the future and is prepared to aid England in this matter. The Secretary then cited the exchange of letters on the question between Thatcher and Carter, which were published on 15 July.

The fact that the letters were published several days after they were exchanged has a dual meaning. First, the Conservative government rushed the adoption process of the decision in order to present the country with an accomplished fact. Second, publishing the letters on the day of the debates meant that the British voters would learn of what had happened and would be aware of it for only a short time and, consequently, would not be able to influence the members of the House of

Commons in time; public opinion would not have an effect on the content of the debates in the House of Commons.

The Secretary explained that the agreement reached with the U.S. followed the same lines as the agreement concluded in 1962 in Nassau between [Harold] Macmillan and [John] Kennedy. "We here in England will ourselves design and build our own submarine and will manufacture the warheads," stated the Secretary. "But we will buy the Trident missile system in the U.S., equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads." After the missile system is purchased in the U.S., it will be under full British ownership and will be under British "operational control, but we must assign our entire strategic nuclear force to NATO, just as is the case with the Polaris missile submarines today." The new nuclear missile-carriers will begin service in the 1990s. It is intended to build four or five submarines for these purposes. It has now been definitely decided to build four boats; the question of building a fifth will be decided in 2 or 3 years.²⁰

The government claimed that the overall cost of the new nuclear submarine fleet would come to 5 billion pounds sterling (1980 prices). Pym explained that taking this sum out of the defense budget would not lead to decreased attention on conventional arms; they will continue to be developed and modernized.

To sweeten the pill for workers in England, the Secretary dwelled at length on the fact that it was the government's intention to entrust as large a share as possible of the manufacture of the new nuclear fleet to British industry: "a minimum of 70 percent of the total cost will be spent in England and this will lead to the creation of a considerable number of jobs."²¹ The Secretary said that the creation of new missile-carriers will demonstrate England's devotion to NATO and her readiness to cooperate with members of this alliance. "Our strategy, as well as the strategy of our NATO allies, is exclusively and absolutely defensive."²² This was the usual, traditional attempt by British ruling circles to portray the aggressive NATO strategy (and the British) as defensive and peace-loving. The reference in the Secretary's speech that all this was being done because of the military threat from the USSR and that the Conservative government was building up its nuclear potential and all other types of armaments "exclusively for the purpose of preserving peace and preventing war" was obviously erroneous. Just as false was the claim that all these measures are being taken "as long as a far-reaching agreement on arms control has not been reached as a result of current negotiations."²³

The position taken by the Labour opposition when discussing the government's announcement was lethargic and indeterminate: that in the final analysis, it was in the Conservatives' hands. Speaking for the Labourites, Deputy Rodgers brought a complaint against the government on a procedural matter; he, you see, would want the Prime Minister, not the Secretary of Defence, to make such an announcement²⁴--as if that would

have changed the essence of the matter. But the opposition did not expose it and did not attack it. It is probable that the traditional bipartisan position of the rightist Labourites in nuclear matters had an effect.

The Liberals were more definite in their speeches than the Labourites. Their spokesman [?] S. Ross, for example, declared: "Does the Secretary know that the deputies sitting on the Liberal bench have invariably and consistently come out against the entire concept of an independent nuclear deterrent force? Therefore, its report today has not given us joy.... Many thinking people in England have come out against a replacement for Polaris."²⁵

As a result, the House of Commons supported the government's decision to construct a new generation of missile-carrying submarines with the Trident-I missile system.

In the development of this policy, talks continued with U.S. representatives and on 30 September 1980 the two governments exchanged notes, representing an official agreement, which stipulated that the 1962 agreement for England's acquisition of the Polaris missile system in the U.S. would also determine the delivery procedures of the Trident-I missile system to England.²⁶ Soon, however, these understandings were fundamentally changed by events. Hereinafter, it was already no longer a question of the Trident-I, but of the Trident-II.

The defense *White Paper*, published in 1982, reflected two fundamental tendencies in the British government's nuclear policy. Dissatisfaction with this policy among rank and file British citizens became stronger and stronger, causing serious anxiety within the government. The *White Paper* attempted to knock the wind out of mass speeches. "The public's interest in defence problems," we read in this government document, "is greater today than it has been for a number of years. We...assume that this statement on military issues will contribute to a better understanding of these matters."²⁷ It was intended to create in the minds of British citizens a perception that was favorable for the government of its actions in the unfolding arms race.

The political heart of the 1982 *White Paper* was anti-Sovietism and animosity toward the Soviet Union.

The forward by the Secretary of Defence stated that "the primary threat to the security of the United Kingdom emanates from the nuclear and conventional arms of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies."²⁸ From this viewpoint, the *White Paper* also interpreted the development of events in the world during the previous year, 1981. Having correctly noted that the tension in relations between West and East had continued to increase, the authors of the *White Paper* attempted to formulate the reasons for this, naturally laying the responsibility at someone else's door. As a result, they turned out a list of those

events in the world that did not suit the British government and supposedly represented a danger to England. This was the Soviet Union's military aid to the Afghan people, aimed at helping them preserve their revolutionary gains, which were opposed by mercenary gangs sent by the imperialists, including the British. This was the aid to socialist Poland upholding revolutionary gains from an attack of domestic and foreign counter-revolutionaries; such was the Soviet Union's strengthening of its own defense in the face of growing NATO aggressiveness.²⁹ It turned out that it was namely for these reasons that British ruling circles focused their military policy against the USSR.

The government was worried about the alarm its military policy raised among the British people. "We recognize the sincerity of those who criticize this decision (to create a new generation of nuclear missile-carriers) on moral grounds."³⁰ To calm the critics, they used the argument about the "Soviet threat" and a promise to seek "multilateral arms limitations," and they carefully selected the figures meant to convince everyone that, on the whole, this step was not very expensive, but was almost cheap.

The *White Paper* noted that on 15 July 1980 the British government announced its decision to replace the presently existing Polaris missile submarine fleet with new boats and new missiles (i.e., the Trident-I). However, in October 1981 the U.S. reported that it intended to create another missile, the Trident-II, to be delivered into the service of the U.S. Navy starting in 1989. "This turned out to be an additional factor that had to be taken into consideration," says the *White Paper*.³¹ True, it was silent as to why the U.S. presented England with an accomplished fact in this matter. But something still had to be said to the British rank and file about this and the authors of the *White Paper* acknowledged: "When in July 1980 we made the decision to select Trident-I as the replacement for our Polaris, we thought that the United States would not make a decision about whether or not to develop the Trident-II for 2 or 3 years." It turned out, however, that the new U.S. administration speeded up the decision about the Trident-II program.³²

Further on, the *White Paper* states that the new missile system will be a modernized version of the former missile: a multistage, solid fuel ballistic missile with a multicharge warhead that has multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. In size, it will surpass its predecessor. The situation is such that at the end of the nineties the U.S. will replace all Trident-I's with Trident-II's, having built new Ohio-class boats for this. In this case, it would be England alone that would be using the Trident-I, which would create a series of new and complicated problems inasmuch as the production of the missiles and their use on British submarines is connected with the United States by many threads.

This reasoning is, of course, correct, but at the same time, the existing situation clearly illustrates the "independence" of the British military nuclear potential.

The *White Paper* contains an extensive list of particularly technical problems, the solution to which must be sought in talks with the Americans. They are discussed in such detail and so verbosely that the reader instinctively suspects that this was done intentionally to create the semblance of extensive information, but to give it in such a way that the nonspecialist could not understand it. In reality, this was done to demonstrate the false sense of democracy in this area. It is false because the government had already made the final decision beforehand and now it was only necessary to "sell" it to the Parliament and the people in favorable packaging. The *White Paper* reported that "taking all these considerations into account," the government had decided "to opt for the Trident-II system for our next generation of nuclear strategic deterrent."³³

The 1982 *White Paper* should have presented the reader with an unpleasant financial surprise. It contained a mass of figures and a dubious discussion on "what is costlier and what is cheaper;" all this did not clarify the problem as much as it complicated it. However, the bitter truth had to be told. "At the same time, in July 1980, when the government's decision was announced,...the cost of the Trident program was assessed at a sum of 4.5 billion to 5 billion pounds sterling."³⁴ But now the "overall cost of the force with Trident-IIs will come to 7.5 billion pounds sterling."³⁵ In 1984, specialists already assessed the cost of the Trident-II program at 11.5 billion pounds sterling.

In July 1983 debates took place in the House of Commons over the government's 1983 Defence *White Paper*. The debates were notable not because they discussed the document, the officially proclaimed course of the British government to increase its military preparations, the inflation of the arms race, and the pumping up of military hysteria. All of this had been done in similar situations before. The difference from the past was that the compilers of the *White Paper* and the people taking part in its discussion in Parliament were in a state of chauvinistic ecstasy from the "small victorious war" unleashed by England a year and a half before in the South Atlantic against Argentina over the colonial possession of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. Against the backdrop of England's decline over many years, this "victory" turned the heads of British politicians.

The government's *White Paper* for 1983 stated unconditionally: "We have demonstrated perfectly clearly in a number of statements following one after another that the main threat to the security of the United Kingdom is the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies."³⁶ This falsehood, as the reader has probably already noticed, invariably migrates from one *White Paper* to another. There then followed discussions about what the Falklands campaign had shown. Along with its value for the British armed forces, obviously exaggerated by the authors of the *White Paper*, it supposedly "demonstrated with utmost clarity that the success of the policy of deterrence depends to a decisive extent on the determination of who is the potential enemy."

Then, not corresponding at all with reality, the authors maintained that: "We have ensured the preservation of peace in Europe for more than three decades because the Soviet leadership has had no doubts about the collective capabilities and decisiveness of the NATO allies in protecting their freedom."³⁷ There is an obvious untruth in this 1983 **White Paper** formula. Attributing the credit to NATO for preserving peace in Europe means falsifying history. For history has corroborated two facts that knock down this claim: the Soviet Union has not committed one action, even of the smallest size, which could be viewed as disrupting the peace in Europe; moreover, it has consistently advocated strengthening it, at the same time England and its allies have repeatedly created situations in this area that undermine the cause of peace. On the "credit" side of the ledger for England and NATO are: creating aggressive military blocs; bringing an enormous quantity of arms into Western Europe, including nuclear ones; invariably untwisting a [new] spiral in the arms race; and, finally, whipping up anti-Soviet hysteria as a way of ideologically supporting the arms race and confrontation with the Soviet Union and its allies. Such are the objective facts.

The 1983 **White Paper**, in terms of whipping up falsehoods about the "Soviet threat," surpasses previous similar government documents. Commenting on the **White Paper**, England's new Secretary of Defence Michael Heseltine stated: "The center of our defence policy is, as before, the threat emanating from the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies."³⁸

The growth of the antimilitary, antinuclear movement among the British people has worried the government and it has used the **White Paper** to weaken the movement as much as possible. The section on nuclear forces began with a paragraph attempting to prove that the government, "in moving to meet the public's growing anxiety regarding the role of nuclear arms," had launched an unprecedentedly widescale campaign to discuss this problem, including an examination of "a number of radical alternatives to our current strategy."³⁹ "Under this government there have been more discussions in Parliament about the nuclear problem," and there has been a large quantity of governmental information published.⁴⁰ This [claim] must be understood thusly: They have exhausted themselves in the search for an alternative strategy, but still have not found one.

All of this was done to convince the people of the need for England to participate in the nuclear arms race, as this would be the only possible political line under existing circumstances. But in reality this was overtly misinforming the British people.

The **White Paper** did not introduce any provisions specifically about England's nuclear forces that were new in principle. This was explained by the fact that "last year's Statement on Defence Appropriations contained an exhaustive account of our decision to buy the Trident-II

strategic weapons system."⁴¹ It was reported there and then that in due course an official agreement was concluded with the U.S. to acquire the Trident-II system and that "after making the initial decision, we made progress in its implementation across a broad front,"⁴² (i.e., in the matter of implementing this program).

On 19-20 July 1983, debates took place in Parliament on military appropriations. But neither the opposition in the person of the Labourite faction, nor the debates in the House of Commons on the problem of nuclear arms could change anything. After all, the principal decisions had already been made beforehand and their cancellation was not threatened. Therefore, for the orators from all the parties, the debates simply made propagandistic speeches possible; for a historian they give some information about the arguments the main parties use in their propagandistic activities. In this respect, the debates are of some interest to us.

Spokesmen from the rightist party, the Conservatives, were at times fairly frank and spoke about things that help in understanding the government's defense policy. Deputy Emery made an anti-Soviet speech that, at the same time, was aimed against the world national liberation movement. The fact that the Soviet Union is in full agreement with the liberation movements and renders them support put the deputy into a rage. Emery called for a military rebuff of this movement and of the Soviet Union. "We are all agreed," said Emery, "that only the United States can play the leading role in this rebuff." But England can also make a valuable contribution to countering the threat to her interests, as well as to the interests of the European countries, "in the Middle East, South East Asia, and Africa."⁴³ Essentially, England is already making this contribution "by cooperating with the United States in the Diego Garcia archipelago and by using our sovereign bases on Cyprus and our special relations that we still have with Oman and several other nations."⁴⁴ In Emery's words, England is pursuing this objective by sending a detachment of naval ships to the Indian Ocean and also by placing certain military forces at NATO's disposal, including units based on British soil that can also be used if necessary. "Ascension Island is already playing an important role both for the United States and for us; to the same extent, the installation on the Falkland Islands could also prove important to the United States in future years."⁴⁵ England has a great deal of experience in combatting liberation movements: "We need an organization to carry out special operations and political warfare, operating in accordance with foreign policy and military strategy." And all this is in order to "throw back" the liberation movements in various areas of the globe. "Our U.S. allies are already operating in this sphere, actively and entirely openly. The Central Intelligence Agency is a powerful organization; it is well known that its head is a member of the government." Emery called for a "proclamation of our determination to support resistance against tyranny (that's what this colonialist calls socialism--V.T.) and to do everything in our power to restore lost positions."⁴⁶

Having lost a sense of reality, the Conservative frankly stated what England's ruling circles were seeking with their military program, including the nuclear forces. It is natural that the Conservative who spoke supported the government's line on modernizing Polaris and creating a fleet of Trident missile-carrying submarines in the future.

The Labour opposition introduced an amendment to the government's proposal criticizing its military policy. The amendment maintained that the plans for military expenditures for 1983 set forth in the *White Paper* could not ensure England of the necessary protection from aggression and it also expressed regret that the government had not displayed any kind of initiative to halt the nuclear arms race nor did it "support the proposal to freeze nuclear armaments." The amendment called on the government "to stop relying on the Trident and not to deploy cruise missiles on the territory of the United Kingdom."⁴⁷

Speaking as Labour's main orator, Deputy McNamara announced that his party was against the creation of a fleet with Trident missiles. "The Labour Party maintains," declared McNamara, "that the focus on Trident will involve three things: it will disorganize our conventional armed forces and will weaken and disperse them. Therefore, our role in NATO will be weakened."⁴⁸ As we can see, for England the key problem of the arms race and increasing nuclear danger has been outside Labour's field of vision.

In this speech an interesting thought was expressed about the fact that underlying the Conservative Party's focus on an "independent deterrent" is a distrust of Americans and a fear that "when the decisive moment arrives, they will leave us to the mercy of fate."⁴⁹

McNamara phrased the Labour Party's position in the following way: "The Labour Party's policy lies in eliminating Polaris in the next 5 years through international negotiations. When we come to power, we will have to get rid of Polaris. And it goes without saying that a future Labour government will not be connected with Trident."⁵⁰

By the end of 1984, England remained the second most important nuclear power in the imperialist world after the U.S. Her nuclear force represents a very important part of her military might. It consists of a squadron of nuclear submarines with medium-range ballistic missiles on board. According to our estimates, this means that these missiles can reach targets located from 1,000 to 5,500 kilometers away. The British nuclear submarine squadron of nuclear missile-carriers makes up the foundation of the country's submarine fleet. The squadron consists of four nuclear missile submarines: Resolution, Repulse, Renown, and Revenge. Each of them has a displacement of 8,400 tons. In terms of armaments, the submarines have 16 two-stage solid fuel ballistic missiles and the Polaris A-3T system. The range is 4,630 kilometers. The missile's bus carries three warheads.

As is known, England buys her missiles in the U.S. The bus of the missiles and their installation is done by the British themselves. A continuous process of improving the nuclear weapons is taking place and therefore their characteristics are changing. For example, in 1983 one of the submarines was rearmed with Polaris A-3TK missiles, which have a new bus equipped with three individually targetable warheads. This bus also carries the means for overcoming the opponent's antimissile defense.⁵¹ At the end of 1984, England had 64 ballistic missiles with 192 warheads for delivering a first nuclear strike. They are all based on the nuclear submarines.

Even before coming to power, Margaret Thatcher persistently came out with demands to follow the U.S.' example in the arms race. When the Conservative government, which she headed, came into power in 1979, the British leadership immediately began to play a leading role on the European continent to militarize it further. Programs were also quickly developed and established to build up various types of arms. Priority was given to nuclear arms with the aim of creating a powerful nuclear potential. Unbeknownst to the people and to the Parliament, the government adopted a program to build four new-generation, nuclear missile submarines.

It is intended to arm the future submarines with 16 modern three-stage, solid fuel, U.S. Trident-II missiles. Their range is 11,000 kilometers and their accuracy is 90 meters. The missile's bus will carry seven warheads, each with a yield of .6 megatons. The missile can also be outfitted with 14 warheads of .15 megatons, if this proves to be more expedient. The new submarines will be in a position, off England's shores, to deliver strikes against targets in the Soviet Union.

The course taken by the Conservative government to implement this nuclear program is of fundamental importance. It means, first, that England has essentially begun a new twist in the nuclear arms race. Second, she has joined--as much as she can--in the efforts of the U.S., FRG, and a number of other NATO powers to break the military strategic balance that had taken shape and currently exists between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. [They also want to] attain military superiority for the world of imperialism over the world of socialism.

Information appeared in the press that in 1982 British leaders seriously nursed the idea of using their nuclear weapons against Argentina. During the Falklands colonial war, reported the magazine *New Statesman*, the Conservative government had a plan to deliver a nuclear-missile strike against the third largest Argentinean city, Cordoba. Reporters D. Campbell and J. Rentule, relying on information from well-informed political circles, wrote: "Britain planned to use Polaris missiles with nuclear warheads against Argentina. A submarine with Polaris missiles on board was sent to the South Atlantic with an order to be ready 'if needed.'"

The details of this Tory nuclear strategy became known from secret telegrams, which were sent to the British embassy in Washington. In particular, they said: "The most probable target for a threatening or demonstration attack is Cordoba in northern Argentina." As a result, the *New Statesman* pointed out in an editorial: "From this it follows that the government was ready to allow the most horrifying escalation of the conflict, even before the possibilities of diplomatic and political settlements had been exhausted."

According to a Reuters report, the Chancellery of Prime Minister Thatcher and the Ministry of Defence refused to comment on the publication in the *New Statesman*. At the same time, the official spokesman for the Labour Party in charge of foreign affairs, George Foulkes, made an appeal to carry out an independent investigation. The new facts about the probability of the Falklands conflict escalating into a thermonuclear catastrophe revived long-standing fears that there are nuclear weapons on the sunken British destroyer Sheffield. There was also confirmation that the Tories could have been the initiators of "the new Hiroshima."⁵²

Official British doctrine says that England's nuclear force is assigned to NATO. The country's participation in this aggressive military-political bloc fundamentally determines its military-political course. England's membership in NATO has had and continues to have the aim of opposing the USSR and other members of the Warsaw Pact. For all practical purposes, this means constantly building up its military might under the false pretext of the Soviet military threat, strengthening military-political and other ties among the NATO countries, and forming a common policy at disarmament and arms limitation talks.

Roughly since the start of the eighties, England has, together with its allies, used NATO to unfurl a new spiral in the arms race and to attempt to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. These efforts have been accompanied by support for the "crusade" proclaimed by the U.S. against communism, whose organizers proceed from the possibility and need to use military force to abolish the socialist system. Even louder voices are being heard in England advocating the expansion of NATO's zone of operation beyond the area defined by the treaty, that is, beyond Europe. Behind this appears the intention to use NATO in the struggle against the national-liberation movement.

From 1979 to 1984 the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher underscored in word and deed its readiness to display particular firmness and determination to "actively oppose" the USSR. This was substantiated by the supposed need to respond to the "Soviet threat."

The British leadership strives to use to its advantage its role in NATO as the "junior partner" in its bilateral, so-called special relationship with the U.S. The Conservative government, in stressing its

devotion to the "special relationship" with the U.S. and its desire to remain the closest and most reliable ally of the U.S. in Europe, has quite specific and important things in mind. In world affairs, British ruling circles are in the same class positions as U.S. imperialism. It is imprecise to assume that England's negative attitude toward the USSR, the socialist community, and socialism as a whole, as well as toward the national-liberation movement is a result of "American pressure," a product of its "dependence on the U.S.," and "an attachment to the chariot of U.S. policy." [It is also incorrect to] indirectly--though [only] partially--justify the British government which, they say, was forced to do certain things. Such an interpretation of its actions is even advantageous to the British government when it explains its actions to its people and to world public opinion.

In the Anglo-American partnership, the area of nuclear arms is extremely important. This cooperation, like any other phenomenon, has a dialectical character. On the one hand, it gives England a substantial advantage. It receives from America secret information on nuclear matters, special equipment, and nuclear weapons systems, among other things. On the other hand, this cooperation leaves England seriously dependent on the United States. England's focus on the U.S.-produced Trident-II missile system is a convincing example of this dependency. Both now and in the future, the British command will not be able to determine the precise location of its submarines at sea without U.S. assistance. To direct their missiles at the target, data from U.S. satellites will be needed, among other things.

Cooperation between England and the U.S. in the nuclear sphere has other important consequences. It negatively affects relations between England and France. America and England have placed France in an obviously unequal, restricted position in nuclear matters. The French, extremely sensitive about national dignity and their role in international affairs, responded to the Anglo-American nuclear alliance with the adoption and energetic implementation of its own nuclear program. A distinctive Anglo-French competition took shape. England's efforts to modernize her nuclear-missile potential were made, having taken the French factor into consideration.

Anglo-American nuclear cooperation has given the U.S. the potential to play the dominant role in matters connected with the deployment of its nuclear weapons on British soil. U.S. military bases in England are numerous and serve a number of objectives. U.S. interest in this is explained, among other things, by England's strategic situation. Located near the European mainland, England is separated from it by a water barrier, which increases the security of its territory. England is located in direct proximity to sea lines of communication that supply lines to Northern and Western Europe follow. Finally, England is a convenient transfer point for U.S. troops and war materiel being sent to the European continent.

There are various data regarding the specific number of U.S. military bases on British territory. In 1980, in response to persistent demands by a number of parliamentarians and by the public, the Secretary of Defence named 12 bases, among them the base at Holy Loch where U.S. Polaris nuclear submarines are based. Later, he named 53 bases and, finally, 56 bases.⁵³

At the same time, journalist Duncan Campbell began to research this question; he cited convincing facts indicating that there are more than 100 U.S. bases and various military installations in England.⁵⁴ Campbell also published a list of U.S. spy bases on British soil. These bases are airfields where spy planes are based and also listening stations that try to intercept and decode both Soviet radio broadcasts and radio conversations between England and other countries. A large quantity of U.S. nuclear weapons is kept on the bases in England, earmarked for use against the Soviet Union and its allies. There are strategic weapons, medium-range weapons, and weapons for use in the European theater of military action. Nuclear warheads delivered by U.S. F-111 and FB-111 planes based in England can be used against the USSR. "Facts of this sort," writes R. Neild, a professor at Cambridge University, "make it absolutely clear that the Americans enjoy an unlimited right to do anything they see fit in England and, obviously, they are taking advantage of this. They have penetrated England like termites penetrate old furniture." He points out the serious danger in the existence of U.S. military bases on British soil: "England has become a U.S. aircraft carrier loaded with weapons and having a chance to a blow up in any war the United States might enter."⁵⁵

Relations between England and the U.S. in general, and in defense in particular, are complicated and surrounded by the strictest secrecy. Therefore, the information available to the public is scanty. British public opinion has for many years been worrying about the problem of who [will decide] and how the decision will be made to use U.S. bases, in the event of war. There exists the fear--and a very well-founded one--that the Americans will resolve this matter on their own. This means that England could be drawn into a nuclear war not by its own government, but by the U.S. military. And this threatens the extinction of the country. The government's explanation on this matter is: "In accordance with an agreement concluded in the aim of joint defence, the United States uses certain bases in the United Kingdom. We confirm the understanding that the question of using these bases in an emergency situation will be resolved jointly by Her Majesty's government and the U.S. government in light of the circumstances that had taken shape at the time."⁵⁶ The text of this formula puts one on guard: it is not a matter of a firm agreement, but only of an "understanding"; and whether or not this "understanding" will be implemented depends on the circumstances and on how the Americans interpret the circumstances. It should be added that even now the Americans are unwilling to make public statements on the matter. A significant precedent took place in the past: In 1962 the U.S. provoked the Caribbean Crisis [Cuban Missile

Crisis], fraught with nuclear war, without any kind of coordination of its actions with London, which evoked a burst of indignation in England.

There is sufficient substantiation for assuming that, in the event of war, the U.S. will use its British bases according to its own discretion, without taking the British government's opinion into account. Advocating such a conclusion is the well-known British statesman A. Wedgwood Benn in an opinion expressed in 1982. He wrote:

Although as a Secretary I was responsible for the Center for Nuclear Research in Aldermaston and I occupied various posts in four governments, and also was a member of the important Committee on Defence and Foreign Policy and other smaller committees concerned with nuclear policy, I never learned (and still do not know) how the matter is decided of using nuclear weapons stationed in Great Britain.

It is customary to believe that in this case specific principles have been elaborated, prescribed on the basis of the working agreement that regulates the question of the combat use of nuclear weapons and provides, in particular, for a consultation between the U.S. President and Great Britain's Prime Minister, if it is possible. Not one cabinet of which I was a member ever knew how matters really stand with the use of nuclear weapons and I can only assume that the main conditions of the agreement on that score is known only to the U.S. President and Great Britain's Prime Minister.

For the nation and its Parliament, the essence of national sovereignty and independence consists in their ability to independently decide whether to enter a war or conclude peace. I think that our sovereign right was long ago officially replaced by a secret agreement with the U.S. and, in practice, by the fact that the use of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Great Britain cannot be of a limited nature.⁵⁷

One thing is indisputable: that U.S. military bases on British territory represent an enormous danger for the British people and for the cause of peace in Europe. But the irrational policy of the Conservative government ignores this circumstance understood by many British people. Margaret Thatcher responds to the public's demands with statements that she is for the retention of U.S. military bases in England. "We in Great Britain," declared the British Prime Minister in October 1981, "cannot, honorably speaking, take shelter under the American nuclear umbrella and at the same time announce to our American friends: you can protect our homes with your missiles based in America,

but you must not base them near our homes."⁵⁸ Naturally, Thatcher did not explain that the danger to British homes can arise only in the event the imperialists provoke a war. She also did not say that the presence of U.S. weapons on British soil entails the threat of a retaliatory nuclear-missile strike by the victim of NATO aggression--typical British "failure to tell all."

The Thatcher government has played and continues to play the most active role apart from the U.S. in forcing 572 new nuclear missiles (108 Pershing-IIs and 464 Tomahawk cruise) on Western Europe. This step represents a new spiral in the arms race, seriously increases the danger of a nuclear war breaking out, undermines the possibility of successful nuclear arms reduction talks, seriously worsens the situation in Europe, and has other negative consequences. It is aimed at breaking the military-strategic parity, which exists in Europe and which ensures the preservation of peace here, and at changing the parity in favor of the U.S. and NATO, which entails an increase in the danger of a war being provoked by this aggressive group of states. "The U.S. cruise missile program," wrote the newspaper, *The Guardian*, "represents the largest unilateral quantitative and qualitative escalation of the arms race in the history of mankind."⁵⁹

The decision to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles was made in December 1979 in Brussels. Based on it, the Pershings are to be deployed in the FRG and the cruise missiles in England, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, and Holland. In England two bases are to be equipped for them, Greenham Common and Molesworth. The British government was the first to emphatically declare its readiness to take the American missile; it thus attempted by its own example to nudge the other European countries into implementing the Brussels decision. At the end of 1983, the first 16 missiles were already deployed in England.

Imperialist politicians understood that the people would not be silent in the face of this dangerous action threatening their very existence and, so as to neutralize the antiwar protest movement, they made an insidious, deceitful maneuver. The Brussels decision was a "dual" one: first, it provided for stationing 572 missiles and, second, for conducting talks with the USSR on limiting long-range tactical nuclear forces. The scheme consisted of demanding unilateral disarmament from the Soviet Union in this type of weaponry during the talks and, having met with a natural refusal, to lay the responsibility for the failure of the talks on the USSR and to thereby justify the deployment of the new U.S. missiles in Europe.

For many years the British government and mass media have actively sought the realization of this insidious plan that represents an attempt to force the Soviet Union into agreeing to a solution to the problem that would put it in an unequal position and that would not only factually ensure, but also legally secure, a military-strategic advantage for the United States in a legal, international form.

Under the cloak of the Geneva talks to limit nuclear arms in Europe, the U.S., England, and several other countries prepared for and began the deployment of U.S. missiles on European soil. This led to the cessation of the talks in 1983. The responsibility for the deliberate collapse of the talks, for a new spiral in the arms race entailing increased danger for all mankind--most of all for the nations and peoples of Western Europe--is borne not only by the U.S., but also by England. During the Geneva talks, the Soviet Union strove for an agreement to limit nuclear arms in Europe. It introduced a series of constructive proposals and attempted to take into account the wishes of the Western powers as much as possible. The Soviet proposals were aimed at ensuring a real balance in the potentials of the parties' medium-range nuclear means at a substantially lower level. However, the United States was not searching for a just, equitable agreement; it sought the capitulation of the Soviet Union, without taking into account that one cannot conduct talks with the USSR on such a basis. During the talks in Geneva, the U.S. and other NATO countries attempted to scare the USSR and other socialist countries. These were attempts doomed to failure beforehand.

The Soviet Union was forced to respond to the growing threat to its security and the security of its allies by adopting necessary counter-measures. At the same time, the Soviet leadership declared that the USSR was prepared to resume the talks as soon as the U.S. and England and several other NATO countries acting jointly with the U.S. were to take steps to restore the situation existing before the start of the deployment of the new U.S. missiles in Western Europe. However, England's government did not heed this sensible appeal and did not wish to remove its country from an extremely dangerous position. This gave rise to well-founded alarm and indignation among the British people.

This alarm was impressively reflected in the book by the chairman of the British Association for Assistance to the U.N., John Ferguson. He writes that "as long as we remain a nuclear base, it is indisputable that in the event of war, we will receive our portion of nuclear strikes." Furthermore, Ferguson cites data from the book by E.P. Thomson and D. Smith so as to show "what this will mean." Cruise missiles will be stationed in bases at Greenham Common and Molesworth. Missiles targeted at these bases will destroy Newbury and could completely destroy Reading and Huntington with the same strike. The radiation will encompass a significantly large area, depending on the direction of the wind. They say that the launch installations will be dispersed in a circumference with a radius of 50 miles. They claim that Francis Pym even talked about 100 miles. In that case, one should talk about the missiles targeted at these launch installations, which would wipe off the face of the earth all the main cities in Southern England and the Southern Midlands. "Therefore, those who are horrified with such a prospect are not cowards, they are normal people with common sense."⁶⁰

The stationing of new U.S. missiles on British territory was touched upon in the talks between member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and the British Secretary of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Geoffrey Howe, when he was visiting the Soviet Union at the beginning of July 1984. In reviewing the situation on the European continent, A.A. Gromyko told the British secretary that "the deployment of new U.S. nuclear missiles in Western Europe--the responsibility for this is also borne by the government of Great Britain--has led to an increase in the military threat. It is still not too late to rectify the situation. Taking steps leading to the withdrawal of already-deployed missiles while simultaneously taking steps to cancel retaliatory measures will create the foundation for resuming the nuclear arms talks."⁶¹

In response, Howe repeated the well-known, unconstructive position of the NATO countries on the matter, which meant that the British government did not intend to rectify this situation.

That the U.S. and England refused to count British and French nuclear arms in the overall balance of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European zone also contributed to the breakdown of the Geneva talks to limit nuclear arms in Europe.

The perfectly well-founded demand to count British and French nuclear weapons when limiting nuclear arms in Europe was advanced by the Soviet side from the very start of the talks in Geneva in June 1982. This was an absolutely sensible and just demand. After all, the nuclear forces of England and France make up one-fourth of the entire nuclear potential of NATO in Europe.

England's nuclear force is one element of NATO's military machine, which is accorded a quite definite role in the strategic plans of this military bloc. A brochure published in 1983 by the British Ministry of Defence says: "The United Kingdom assisted in the development of the strategy of deterrence being carried out by NATO and is now taking an active part in implementing the nuclear aspects of it on three different levels. First, we fully support it since we believe that it guarantees our security and, at the same time, we are participating in the defence of all members of the alliance, which it envisages. Second, we, like several other members of the bloc, make a direct contribution to U.S. nuclear might--a main component of NATO's defense--by granting bases and certain delivery systems using U.S. warheads. Third, we place various kinds of nuclear forces--both strategic and tactical--at the disposal of the alliance."⁶²

Not to count British and French potential when reviewing the question of limiting nuclear arms in Europe means making it an integral part, an important component of the military superiority over the USSR. The Soviet Union did not demand that England and France participate in reducing [their] nuclear arms. The USSR insisted only that the nuclear means of these countries be counted in the balance of nuclear forces, because they are a part of it and because this is necessary to determine the extent of medium-range nuclear arms reductions by the USSR and the U.S. without damaging the security of the European countries.

The position of the Thatcher government about stationing new U.S. missiles in Europe and counting British and French nuclear forces in the total European nuclear balance convincingly shows that this government has become an accomplice in untwisting a new coil in nuclear weapons and that it did not want the Geneva European nuclear arms limitation talks to be successful.

The traditional position of all postwar British governments on disarmament has consisted of two elements: in word, they have advocated disarmament (this was necessary to deceive world public opinion and its own people), while in deed, they have accelerated their own arms race and have supported in every way, politically and with propaganda, American efforts in this area and have sought more active participation from the other members of NATO in building up [NATO's] military potential. British diplomacy has zealously assisted U.S. diplomacy in blocking disarmament or arms limitation talks that have been carried out in various spheres.

The Soviet Union, together with the other states of the socialist community, advocates a rapid elaboration of practical measures on arms limitations and disarmament. There is not a single question in this area about which the USSR would not make businesslike proposals, would not display concrete initiatives, and would not formulate convincing working documents. In this connection, the Soviet Union has considered and continues to consider the interests of the security of all states, following the principle of equality and identical security. Only on such a foundation can success be achieved in negotiations. Among the proposals introduced by the Soviet Union are documents aimed at restraining the arms race in one of its most dangerous directions--the nuclear one.

The Soviet Union persistently and steadfastly sought to conclude an agreement with the U.S. on SALT II. England's attitude toward this agreement was ambivalent. As the Soviet author G.V. Kolosov pointed out, officially, the Conservative government supposedly reacted positively toward SALT II, but then and there it made two principal qualifications. "This agreement, firstly, must never to any extent interfere with 'raising the effectiveness' of England's nuclear forces or, secondly, even indirectly hinder the scheduled build-up of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe."⁶³

Through U.S. efforts, supported by England, in 1983 the talks on strategic nuclear arms and medium-range nuclear arms in Europe were disrupted. In light of the practical actions by these powers in the nuclear sphere, their position is logical. After all, in reality both Washington and London have chosen a course to achieve military superiority and to create the potential for a first nuclear strike. Therefore, for them the very conduct of talks whose objective would be to limit large-scale military programs now being implemented by them is a burden.

Thatcher's Conservative government does not wish to recognize the need to take urgent and real steps to limit and reduce arms. This government has gone further in this area than its predecessors. Moreover, in essence, it has publicly come out against the very idea of preserving and strengthening peace through disarmament. Speaking at the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on Disarmament in June 1982, Thatcher attempted to prove that peace is not necessary "at any price" and that control over armaments does not always help peace and can even damage the cause of peace. She claimed that the task consists not in banning and destroying nuclear weapons, but in "putting nuclear weapons to work for peace." Thatcher declared that today the main threat comes not from the arms race, but from conflict situations in various areas of the world.⁶⁴

During the years the Conservative government has been in power, British representatives to the U.N. have voted against practically any resolution supporting real disarmament measures. A well-known public figure in England, Lord Fenner Brockway, made a speech in the House of Lords on 16 February 1983 in which he stated that the Conservative government "would have to change its policy, if it wanted the people to believe that it supports multilateral disarmament.... When the government came to power, it initially declared that it supported the decision of the First Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on Disarmament. But actually in its policy it has invariably acted against these decisions." Brockway further reported that the preparatory committee for the Second Special Session had worked out an exhaustive program for strengthening peace by implementing the recommendations of the first special session. But at the second session in New York, "the joint resistance of America and the British government led to the failure to adopt this program. If the government intends to convince the people of its determination to attain worldwide disarmament, it must change its entire policy."

Brockway recounted that he looked through the U.N. documents during December 1983 and he ascertained "an almost unbelievable thing." During just 1 month the British representative in the U.N. "abstained or voted against 25 resolutions that supported the idea of disarmament." The orator cited the most important of these resolutions. Among them were ones that advocated banning nuclear testing, the no-first-use of nuclear weapons, banning the neutron bomb, freezing nuclear arms, concluding an

international convention banning the use of nuclear weapons, banning and eliminating chemical, bacteriological and biological weapons, and preventing an arms race in space.⁶⁵

This was a real reflection of the policy of the British Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher in the area of disarmament.

One should add to this the essentially negative attitude of the British government toward efforts by the USSR to strengthen confidence-building measures that could and must serve as an ever more effective instrument both in restraining negative tendencies in international relations and in creating the necessary atmosphere for mutual understanding and cooperation. As the well-known Soviet international specialist O.N. Bykov notes, "instead of increasing confidence among states, the most militant and reactionary circles of the imperialist states...are delivering blow upon blow against the foundations of normal interrelations and cooperation between East and West and are poisoning the political climate in the world".⁶⁶ Among these imperialist powers England plays a negative role.

The British government is an accomplice of the U.S. in all special actions aimed at undermining the cause of peace. Speaking at the 39th session of the U.N. General Assembly on 27 September 1984, A.A. Gromyko declared that "throughout the postwar years peace has been feverish. When as was the case during detente, cooperation in international relations was worked out between states with different social systems, everything was done so as to undermine the development of positive processes. And it was undermined on the initiative of the NATO military bloc. It is this trend in world politics that serves as the source of the situation, which marks our current international climate. The threat of war has grown and the foundations of peace on earth have become more precarious.

"A broad front of peace-loving forces oppose such a course, which is being clearly manifested as never before in current U.S. policy and [they oppose] *those who place themselves in the position of accomplices with respect to it* (my emphasis--V.T)".⁶⁷

The Conservative government's adoption of programs to unfurl the arms race along all lines, primarily nuclear, intensified the threat of nuclear war and led to lowering the standard of living for the general masses because of the growth in military expenditures. All this brought about a powerful upsurge in the antimilitary movement in England which in its scope, depth, and awareness surpassed the mass antimilitary movement of the second half of the fifties and first half of the sixties that went down in history.

Between the two periods of upsurge lay a time of decline begun in the mid-sixties. Wild speeches during the first upsurge, when even such thoroughly educated and experienced people as Philip Noel-Baker believed

that the masses were capable of immediately compelling the government to begin disarmament, were replaced with disillusionment among participants of the movement. This was a natural result of the ineffectiveness of their efforts that had become obvious in the sense that they did not succeed in forcing the government to change its position about arms.

But then came the start of the eighties and the picture changed radically. At the end of 1979 and beginning of 1980 there began a rapid and powerful upsurge in the peace movement in England. There were several reasons for this. Despite gigantic efforts to improve and refine the machinery of the ruling circles to psychologically cultivate the masses so as to subordinate and manipulate them for imperialistic purposes, the masses, realizing that the government was impotent to withhold or incorrectly interpret--and it was suddenly, over a short period of time--understood the frightening truth that deeply alarmed and outraged them and roused them to action.

This truth was that a real threat of nuclear war had arisen from which England would not escape. It was clear that British ruling circles, in alliance with the U.S. and other NATO countries, were preparing for just such a war. They tried to convince the people that an atomic war was permissible, that it could be won against the Soviet Union, and that it could be localized (all this sounded like recognition that they are objectively leading matters toward such a war) and they unleashed the arms race at a feverish pace which, despite all the propagandistic tricks, speaks for itself. It was impossible, as much as they would have liked to, to conceal from the people that in December 1979, without consulting them, the Conservative government decided to station U.S. cruise missiles in England. It later became clear that the government had decided to create a nuclear force of the future, to replace the four Polaris missile submarines with new submarines armed with U.S. Trident missiles. Then and there military expenditures were raised, the country's already serious economic situation worsened, and expenditures on social needs for the people were cut. To this was added the obvious deterioration in the international situation because of U.S. actions, in which the British government also took part, aimed at undermining the process of detente, and at aggravating the power confrontation of imperialist nations with socialist nations.

The result was that the problems of war and peace and preserving and continuing detente ended up in the center of attention of British public opinion. Since 1979 the movement for peace and against the threat of nuclear war and the Conservative's policies leading to it [war] rose to a very high level and became one of the most important features of British political and public life in the first half of the eighties. This movement was distinguished by the unprecedented enthusiasm of its participants, by the varied and endless diversity of its organizational forms, as well as by the fact that participants come from various social groups and ages, with a whole variety of religious and political convictions and sympathies. An important distinctive feature

is the particularly active participation of women and young people in the movement.

The unwillingness to fight in a nuclear war for the aims of the ruling circles of the U.S., England, and other NATO countries is enveloping British young people more and more. At an International Symposium on Conventional Arms that took place in March 1984 in Copenhagen (Denmark) within the framework of the Pugwash movement of scientists, references were made repeatedly to the fact that in England 25 percent of the young people actively do not wish to serve in the armed forces so as not to participate in a war planned in the bowels of NATO.⁶⁸

Among the numerous organizations in England speaking out against the growing danger of nuclear war, the largest and most active one is the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament [CND]. It emerged in the fifties under the banner "Ban the Bomb!" The activities of this organization enjoy the support of a broad strata of the British people. Between 1980 and 1983, the number of its members paying dues to the central headquarters increased from 3,000 to 54,000. In various cities in England there are about 1,000 local branches and groups operating, in which roughly one quarter of a million people participate.⁶⁹ At the annual conference of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament that took place in December 1983, more than 81,000 members were represented, with a thousand new activists then joining the organization every week.⁷⁰ A demonstration organized by the CND in London in October 1983 assembled 450,000 participants.

The General Secretary of the CND is a Catholic priest, Bruce Kent. The organization has two publications: *War and Peace* and *Sanity*. Participating in the movement are representatives from various social strata; many young people and leftist Labourites and Communists are also active in it.

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament advocates England's withdrawal from NATO. It sets the goal of attaining unilateral nuclear disarmament. At the start of the eighties the movement actively opposed stationing U.S. cruise missiles in England. In July 1983, Bruce Kent declared that at the present time, the decisive link was to fight to prevent stationing cruise missiles in England. This is a dangerous and most insidious type of nuclear weapon. By their very nature, cruise missiles cannot be treated as deterrent weapons. In the event of their deployment, the nuclear arms race on the European continent would enter into a new and even more dangerous stage. This is why the CND favorably appraises Soviet initiatives aimed at not stationing new forms of U.S. nuclear weapons on the European continent. The USSR's demand to include the nuclear-missile potential of England and France in the overall balance of NATO armaments is perfectly just, declared Kent.⁷¹

The unilateral disarmament of England is a persistent demand of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

The chairman of the British Association for Assistance to the U.N., John Ferguson, postulates that those who demand the unilateral disarmament of England are guided by four considerations. First, people connected to one extent or another with religion--Buddhism, Christianity, and several others--treat human life with particular care. [Their belief] finds expression in their devotion to pacifism, sometimes taking the form of a refusal to participate in a war. For Christians, for example, there have existed conditions sanctified by long-standing tradition, when war is permissible. It has now become clear that a future war could be quite different and, as a result, Catholics have been in the front ranks of the religious champions of peace. Thus, at a meeting of the Worldwide Campaign for [Nuclear] Disarmament that was held in London on 22 April 1980, Cardinal Hume declared that "in his understanding of canon law, from the viewpoint of the principles of morality, nuclear weapons are not distinguishable from other types of weapons if they are used to limit military objectives. But inasmuch as he doubts that their use will be thus limited, in principle he is against nuclear weapons." Second, people are becoming aware that "an impasse has taken shape in the field of disarmament." Therefore, they are hoping that if only one power were to truly disarm itself, the others could follow its example.⁷² Third, the motive is a direct personal interest. This pertains above all to nuclear arms. "If England were to renounce nuclear weapons, it would be extremely improbable that she would be a target for nuclear weapons." Fourth, is an elemental judgment that a "unilateral constructive action is obviously more justified than unilateral action of a destructive nature." The truth is that the fiercest critics of unilateral disarmament are those who made a unilateral decision--to put cruise missiles on British soil. Here "we have acted unilaterally."⁷³

The Worldwide Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament enjoys authority both in England and beyond its borders. The prominent British public figures Lord Philip Noel-Baker and Lord Fenner Brockway began this movement in 1979. Its objective was to implement the recommendations of the First Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on Disarmament, the foundation of which the movement considered to be: liquidating nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; eliminating conventional arms over a number of years in stages that should lead to universal and complete disarmament; and transferring military expenditures to development [programs].⁷⁴

The movement was officially proclaimed at a convention that took place in April 1980. Brigadier General Michael Harbottle was named general secretary. The movement was supported by church figures, representatives from parliament opposition, the British congress of trade unions, and a number of philanthropic organizations. The movement organized a petition to support the U.N. recommendations and collected more than two million signatures in England. Thirty-four million people signed similar petitions in Japan, Australia, and Canada. These petitions were presented to the General Secretary of the U.N.⁷⁵

The Campaign for European Nuclear Disarmament, advocating the creation of a nonnuclear Europe, is active in the nation. The members of this organization say that there should be neither medium-range nuclear weapons nor tactical nuclear weapons on the continent.

Besides these organizations, the British Assembly for Peace operates in the country. [It is] affiliated with the Worldwide Council on Peace, which relies on leftist elements in the trade unions. Also active are such organizations as the National Council of Peace, the British Association for Assistance to the U.N., and a number of others. In various areas of the country, hundreds of different organizations are active in the struggle for peace.

Elements of realism and common sense do penetrate even the minds of high-ranking British military men. For example, Lord Mountbatten (having family ties with the Tsarist dynasty) delivered a speech on 11 May 1979 in Strasburg which, in Ferguson's words, the mass media "was scandalously quiet about." He said that "as a military man, having served half a century in military service, I can say with all candor that from the military point of view, the nuclear arms race is pointless. Wars must not be fought with nuclear weapons. The existence of these weapons only increases the danger for us, as they give rise to certain illusions.

"Powerful voices are heard in the world that still believe in the motto of the ancient Romans: If you want peace, prepare for war. This is absolute nuclear nonsense. I repeat--it is a disastrous, mistaken notion to assure that, by increasing universal uncertainty, someone is increasing his own security."⁷⁶

John Ferguson formulated the position of the influential public organization, the British Association for Assistance to the U.N., regarding the arms race thus: "One cannot ensure true security except through disarmament. The Soviet Union has nothing to fear from a disarmed United States. The U.S. has nothing to fear from a disarmed Soviet Union. Western Europe, if it disarms, has nothing to be afraid of from a disarmed USSR and U.S."⁷⁷

Many bodies of local self-government where Labourites predominate have joined in the struggle against nuclear weapons. As a result, a new form of antimilitary action has emerged. In November 1980 the city of Manchester declared itself a nonnuclear zone. By the spring of 1984, 170 British municipal councils had adopted similar resolutions. Among them is the capital of England--London. The municipal council of Greater London adopted a resolution banning the deployment in and transport through its territory of any type of nuclear weapons or radioactive materiel. Entire territories in various areas of England followed the cities' example; they also declared themselves nonnuclear zones. Living in the British territories that have declared themselves nonnuclear

zones are more than 50 million British citizens (i.e., the majority of the country's population).⁷⁸

Many trade union organizations, especially local ones, are taking part in the struggle against the military policies of the Conservative government. At annual trade union conferences, resolutions were made calling for a struggle against the nuclear arms race and for the strengthening of peace and the policy of detente. All of this indicates that an organized mass movement in England has actively joined the struggle against the arms race and the threat of nuclear war. These tendencies have also had an effect on the Labour Party's position. The *Labour Program for Britain*, adopted back in 1976, spoke of the need for arms control and a significant reduction in military expenditures.

In the eighties, as a result of the Labour Party's defeat in the 1979 Parliamentary election and the growing aggressiveness of the Conservative government's foreign and military policies, the Labour Party's position on military matters became considerably more radical. In 1982 *The Labour Program 1982* was adopted, which proclaimed the party's intention to seek a suspension of the arms race and the adoption of real disarmament measures. The program reports that when a Labour government comes into power, it "will adopt a nonnuclear defence policy for England based on collective security, detente, and the removal of all nuclear weapons and nuclear bases from British territory and from Britain's territorial waters."⁷⁹

In July 1984, the executive committee of the Labour Party unanimously approved a new official document defining the party's position on military matters. The executive committee came out in favor of lessening tensions in the world and preventing nuclear war, which would be "suicide" for England. To attain these objectives the nation's leaders must adopt a course of universal and complete nuclear disarmament, obtain a renunciation by NATO of the first use of nuclear weapons, and work toward the creation of a nonnuclear zone in Europe. These measures must be fortified by unilateral measures. The government must renounce the Polaris nuclear missiles, which British submarines are armed with; it must renounce their reequipment with U.S. Trident nuclear missiles; and it must remove U.S. nuclear weapons from the nation's territory, including those located in the nation's territorial waters. England must reexamine her nuclear strategy, which is "dangerous, costly, and senseless," and must cease military involvement in remote areas of the world. Military expenditures must remain at such a level so as to allow the nation's leadership to solve economic and social problems of paramount importance.⁸⁰

This is an important, realistic document. Its appearance signifies that it is in precisely this direction that the aspirations of the country's extensive working masses are moving, whose trust the Labour Party leadership is striving to win.

All of England's political parties, except the Conservatives, came out, in one form or another, against the government's nuclear arms policies at their annual conferences in the fall of 1984.

The Liberal Party's annual conference sharply criticized the Thatcher cabinet's militaristic course and adopted a resolution with a demand to renounce plans to outfit England's submarine fleet with the Trident II nuclear-missile system and to immediately remove U.S. cruise missiles from the country.

The 83rd annual conference of the Labour Party rejected any strategy that would be based on the use or the threat of the use of nuclear arms. The conference came out in favor of liquidating the stockpiles of nuclear weapons accumulated in England and of closing U.S. nuclear bases in the country and of removing already deployed cruise missiles, and it came out against outfitting the British submarine fleet with the Trident II nuclear-missile system.

The Social Democratic Party also demanded the renunciation of the Trident-II program.

The trade unions took the same position. The 116th Congress of the British Congress of Trade Unions in the fall of 1984, by majority vote, approved a resolution that set forth a demand to remove U.S. cruise missiles from the British Isles and to renounce the program to reequip the nation's submarine fleet with the Trident II missile system.

Other voices then spoke out during the 101st annual conference of the Conservative Party. Government spokesmen promoted the deployment of U.S. cruise missiles with nuclear warheads in England as well as preparations to rearm the British submarine fleet with the Trident II nuclear-missile system. Secretary of Defence Heseltine announced that the government had elaborated a new 20-year arms race program that would cost the British people 360 billion pounds sterling. The conference noted that the Thatcher government does not intend to renounce its dangerous course.

The British Communist Party has consistently come out against the arms race. At its congress at the end of 1981, the following demands were formulated: not to deploy cruise missiles in England, to renounce Polaris nuclear missiles and the acceptance of U.S. Trident-II missiles, to close all foreign military and nuclear bases in England, to implement unilateral nuclear disarmament in England, to reduce military expenditures, to withdraw England from NATO, to create a nonnuclear zone in Europe and to simultaneously dissolve NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and for England to actively participate in disarmament talks.⁸²

The antiwar movement is causing great alarm within England's government. The government has led a bitter struggle against the proponents of peace, for in their efforts it rightly saw a real threat

to its aggressive militaristic course. The Secretary of the Scottish district committee of the Communist Party, [?] J. Eshton, said at the end of 1983 that "the Thatcher government is trying to undermine the authority of the antimilitary movement, operating in three directions: first, the Conservatives are striving to convince public opinion that the fighters against the nuclear threat 'naively trust Soviet propaganda'; second, the pro-government press frequently calls them simply the 'reds' and declare them to be 'an instrument of Moscow'; third, the government attempts to prove that 'it is necessary to arm oneself, in order to preserve peace.'"⁸³ The establishment tries to bring down the fever pitch of the antiwar struggle in the country with such unscrupulous methods. Special bodies are being created at the government level for this purpose.

In order to besmirch antiwar organizations by any means and to discredit their objectives, the government has established a special secret "group to coordinate actions," which includes leading spokesmen from the Ministries of Defence, Foreign and Home Affairs, as well as the secretariat of the Prime Minister. The group organized the preparation of a series of articles in which it was argued that a transition to nuclear disarmament could "only bring war nearer" and those who seek this "are playing up to Moscow." Actively joining in this campaign of disinformation was the Central Information Bureau where a department was established on propaganda for the government's military policy, headed by a representative, invited from the U.S., of the well-known advertising firm Walter Thompson.⁸⁴

To intensify the struggle against the antiwar movement, Thatcher in due course named Michael Heseltine to the post of Secretary of Defence, he being an active supporter of the arms race. The new secretary immediately established a subdivision in his ministry of 100 people entitled "Service to Combat the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament," at whose disposal was placed 7.5 million pounds sterling and who initiated the campaign of dirty slander against the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, represented as an "instrument of the Kremlin." The emblem of this organization was portrayed with a hammer and sickle.⁸⁵ During preparation for the 1983 Parliamentary elections, people of ministerial rank openly joined in this campaign.

All these wide-scale actions were undertaken with the aim of deceiving the British people. Unfortunately, the ruling circles attained certain successes on this level. The Conservatives, having launched a noisy election campaign under chauvinistic slogans (the pretext was the war for the Falkland Islands), were victorious in the Parliamentary elections in the spring of 1983. This was a negative factor for the antiwar movement in England.

The struggle the Conservative government is conducting against the antiwar movement bears witness that its policy of confrontation with the

socialist countries and the forces of progress are at the same time a confrontation with its own people.

* * *

The activities of Thatcher's Conservative government in the area of nuclear weapons have for more than 5 years gone in several directions. First, it improved existing nuclear forces, which will be in the country a minimum of another 10 years. Second, it adopted a program to create a new generation of nuclear forces--"deterrent forces for the 21st century"--and set its implementation into motion. Third, the Conservative government not only retained existing U.S. military bases on British soil, but also was the first in Western Europe and the most zealous to take new U.S. missiles with nuclear warheads onto its territory. Fourth, it improved tactical nuclear weapons and their delivery means. Fifth, the Conservative government, in continuing the line of its predecessors and trying to mask its true intentions, actually impeded any arms limitation or reduction talks. Sixth, it assisted the United States most actively in blocking and later disrupting the Geneva talks to limit both strategic nuclear arms and medium-range nuclear arms in Europe. Seventh, when the Conservative government's destructive nuclear arms policy became, despite the disinformation campaign organized on a heretofore unprecedented scale, more and more realistically assimilated by the masses, and when the masses launched a wide-scale struggle against it, the Conservative government and the entire British establishment suppressed and persecuted the participants of the anti-military performances using a powerful system of various refined measures.

Eighth, the British government carried out all these negative actions in closest cooperation with the U.S. government which, by its extremely aggressive policy, strove to undermine the plusses of the detente period, organized a new spiral in the arms race and, to a great extent, increased the threat of a general nuclear war breaking out, fraught with the extinction of human civilization and all living things on earth in general. In all these actions by the U.S. government, the British government served as the principal and most reliable ally of the U.S. from 1979 to 1984.

The result of these actions by the British Conservative government is not extremely comforting for all honorable and sensible-minded people. The threat of world nuclear war has continued to increase; this has been a threat for the people of Great Britain too.

Ninth, in order to disguise these actions, the Conservative government has launched an anti-Soviet campaign, surpassing actions taken during the Cold War. In this connection, the Conservative government sacrificed the possibility of maintaining constructive, mutually beneficial political, economic, and scientific-technical ties with the USSR that are necessary for England.

Throughout the period between 1979 and 1984, the Soviet side has invariably demonstrated its readiness to maintain normal business relations with England. A convincing demonstration of the Soviet Union's will to improve relations with England was a visit to that country by a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet headed by M.S. Gorbachev in December 1984. The delegation conducted useful talks with Prime Minister Thatcher, parliamentary and other British state figures, public spokesmen, and business circles. This confirmed the Soviet Union's aspiration for a serious political dialogue with England, for broader mutual understanding and cooperation based on mutual advantages, which meets the objectives of strengthening peace and security in Europe and throughout the world. The hope was also expressed that the Soviet Union's efforts toward resolving such cardinal problems as preventing an arms race in space, radically reducing and subsequently destroying nuclear arsenals, and eliminating the threat of nuclear war will find realistic understanding and the necessary response on the part of England.

The future will show how British policy will conform to these hopes. There will be no lack of cooperation on the Soviet Union's part.

NOTES

1. *The Guardian*, 1 Jun 1983.
2. *Novoe vremya*, No. 10, 1981, 18.
3. *Pravda*, 19 Sep 1979.
4. *Parliamentary Debates*. House of Commons (hereinafter *PDHC*), vol. 977, col. 681.
5. *Ibid.*
6. L. Freedman, *Britain and Nuclear Weapons* (London, 1980), 49.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1982--1* (London, 1982), cmd. 8529--1, 7.
9. *PDHC*, vol. 988, col. 1244.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1983--1* (London, 1983), cmd. 8951--1.
12. Freedman, *op. cit.*, 63.
13. *Ibid.*, 68.
14. *PDHC*, vol. 988, col. 1245, 1249.
15. *Ibid.*, col. 1245.
16. *The British Strategic Nuclear Force, July 1980* (London, 1980), cmd. 7979, 2.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*, 3.
19. *PDHC*, vol. 988, col. 1235.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*, col. 1236.

22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*, col. 1239.
26. *Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America...* (London, 1980), cmd. 8070, 3-4.
27. *Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1982--1, 2.*
28. *Ibid.*, 11.
29. *Ibid.*, 1.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*, 3.
32. *Ibid.*, 4.
33. *Ibid.*, 5.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*, 6.
36. *Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1983--1, 2.*
37. *Ibid.*, 3.
38. *Krasnaya zvezda*, 27 Sep 1983.
39. *Statement on the Defence Estimates. 1983--1, 5.*
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*, 7.
42. *Ibid.*
43. *PDHC*, 20 Jul 1983, col. 411.
44. *Ibid.*, col. 412.
45. *Ibid.*

46. *Ibid.*, col. 413.
47. *Ibid.*, col. 392.
48. *Ibid.*, col. 404.
49. *Ibid.*, col. 406.
50. *Ibid.*, col. 407.
51. *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 30 Nov 1983.
52. *Izvestiya*, 24 Aug 1984.
53. R. Neild, *How to Make Up Your Mind About the Bomb* (London, 1981), 105.
54. *New Statesman*, 31 Oct 1980, 6-9.
55. Neild, *op. cit.*, 108-109.
56. See *ibid.*, 104.
57. *Za rubezhom*, No. 16, 1982.
58. *The Times*, 17 Oct 1981.
59. *Pravda*, 27 Mar 1984.
60. J. Ferguson, *Disarmament* (London, 1982), 25.
61. *Pravda*, 3 Jul 1984.
62. *Ibid.*, 25 May 1983.
63. G. V. Kolosov, *Voenno-politicheskii kurs Anglii v Evrope* (Moscow, 1984), 88.
64. See *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, No. 6, 1984, 60.
65. Lord Brockway's speech was published in a separate leaflet entitled: *Does Government mean Multilateral Disarmament* (London, 1983).
66. O. N. Bykov, *Mery doveriya* (Moscow, 1983), 5.
67. *Izvestiya*, 29 Sep 1984.
68. The author was a participant at this symposium and became convinced that the citing of this significant fact was not disputed.

69. *Pravda*, 19 Jul 1983; see also, I. I. Zhigalov, "The British Public and Plans To Deploy U.S. Neutron Weapons and Cruise Missiles on its Territory," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 11, 1981.
70. *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, no. 4, 1984, 87.
71. *Pravda*, 19 Jul 1983.
72. Ferguson, *op. cit.*, 24-25.
73. *Ibid.*, 26.
74. Lord Brockway, *The Way to World Disarmament* (London, 1984), 2.
75. *Ibid.*
76. Ferguson, *op. cit.*, 6.
77. *Ibid.*, 20.
78. *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, no. 5, 1984, 143.
79. *The Labour Party 1982* (London, 1982), 284.
80. *Pravda*, 27 Jul 1984.
81. *The Economist*, 29 Sep to 5 Oct 1984, 24.
82. *Comment* (London, 1981), 5 Dec, 1-48.
83. *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, no. 1, 1984, 131.
84. *Pravda*, 19 Jul 1983.
85. *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, no. 4, 1984, 87.

Lt. Col. S. Anzherskii, "Great Britain's Armed Forces," *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* [Foreign Military Review], No. 8, 1984. Part I, 15-18. Excerpts.

The foundation of Great Britain's military policy is active participation in the aggressive NATO bloc and an increase in its military power in every way possible. [This policy is being followed] to attain superiority over the USSR and other Warsaw Pact nations, as well as to closely cooperate with the U.S. and unconditionally follow its military-political course on a global scale, to preserve its influence in various areas of the world, and to retain control over remaining colonial territories.

In terms of military expenditures, Great Britain ranks second within NATO (after the U.S.). The Conservative government has continued to increase military expenditures by 3 percent per year. It has developed "special relations" with the U.S. administration, mainly in the military-political sphere, based on their "nuclear partnership." The Conservative government, following the lead of American imperialism's foreign policy, and with whose help Britain expects to uphold its weight and influence in European affairs, has made the nation's territory available for the deployment of 160 U.S. cruise missiles (including 96 at Greenham Common and 64 at Molesworth). More than 20,000 U.S. servicemen are kept on the British Isles, and the U.S. uses eight air bases and several naval basing stations. Here are located its munitions warehouses, including nuclear munitions and communications centers.

The aggressive essence of the British military-political leadership and its imperial ambitions was manifested most openly in 1982 during the armed invasion in the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, carried out with U.S. support. The British Tories are artificially pumping up the atmosphere of belligerent chauvinism and anti-Soviet hysteria in the country still so that it will be easier to attain allocations of enormous appropriations for militaristic objectives.

The development of Great Britain's armed forces is carried out in accordance with the nation's military doctrine, requiring it to have solid, balanced ground troops, air, and naval forces, which would be capable of achieving political objectives and fulfilling strategic tasks in any probable conflicts, and be in accordance with the program of development for NATO's joint armed forces. Here, particular attention is accorded to expanding the mobilization potential and combat readiness of the troops, to improving the organizational structure of the branches of the armed forces, to raising their strategic and tactical mobility, to increasing the fire and striking might of divisions and units, to improving the quality of the operational and combat training of the staffs and the troops, and to outfitting them with up-to-date types of weapons and military equipment.

The British command divides the armed forces into strategic-nuclear and general-purpose forces.... The former contains four nuclear missile submarines outfitted with Polaris-A3 missiles (with 16 ballistic missile launch tubes). The remaining divisions and units of the branches of the armed forces belong to the general purpose forces, which have the means to deliver nuclear weapons.

The plans for developing the armed forces in the eighties and nineties provide for further increasing the combat potential of the strategic nuclear forces by rearming the SSBNs, as well as by replacing them with new ones. Since 1983 the general purpose forces have been undergoing a reorganization of the ground troops, the "rapid deployment forces" have been being established, the basic types of ships modernized, the aircraft yard qualitatively renovated, and a series of measures carried out aimed at raising the combat and mobilization readiness of the reserve components of the branches of the armed forces.

According to reports in the foreign press, the total number of regular armed forces comes to 321,000 personnel: Ground Troops--159,000, Air Force--90,000, and Navy--72,000. Among the various categories of reserves in the branches of the armed forces are approximately 280,000 personnel....

The **Ground Troops** are the largest branch of Great Britain's armed forces, designed to conduct combat action both independently and within NATO's joint armed forces in Europe.

The ground troops consist of regular and territorial troops. The former are organizationally reduced to two commands: in Great Britain and in the FRG, as well as in small contingents located in other areas of the world....

The units and subunits of ground troops stationed overseas are designed to protect the interests of the British monopolies, to preserve British influence in dependent nations, and to support reactionary regimes struggling against a national-liberation movement. In Gibraltar a reinforced motorized infantry battalion makes up the foundation of the garrison. On British military bases on Cyprus are two motorized infantry battalions and support and service subunits of almost 3,000 men. In Hong Kong there is a separate motorized infantry brigade, whereas Brunei (Southeast Asia) and Belize (Central America) each have one separate motorized infantry battalion.

Currently, the British Command is carrying out the wide-scale militarization of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in order to transform them into a British outpost in the South Atlantic. According to Western press reports, a separate motorized infantry brigade is deployed on the archipelago. A garrison of almost 4,000 British troops is directly subordinate to the head of Great Britain's Defence Headquarters. Here,

the creation of radar stations to control the air space over water areas of the South Atlantic is being carried out at an intense pace.

The territorial troops, whose overall number is about 73,000 men, make up the foundation of the reserve of Great Britain's ground troops. Designed to reinforce the 1st army corps in the FRG and to defend the British Isles, they--together with the regular troops in Great Britain--make up the basis of the mobilization deployment of the ground troops. They have, according to data from the London [International] Institute for Strategic Studies, 35 reserve motorized infantry battalions, 19 reserve regiments (including reconnaissance, artillery, antiaircraft, and engineer), subunits from other troop and services arms, as well as an "Ulster Defence regiment," fulfilling military-police functions in Northern Ireland. In peacetime, reserve units have only staffs manned with cadre personnel....

Lt. Col. S. Anzherskii, "Great Britain's Armed Forces," *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* [Foreign Military Review], No. 9, 1984. Part II, 17-22. Excerpts.

The Air Force. According to Western press reports, the British command assigns the Air Force the tasks of destroying major troop groupings and important targets in the opponent's territory by using both nuclear and conventional weapons; of directly supporting combat action by the nation's ground troops; protecting military bases and sea lines of communication; conducting reconnaissance; and transporting troops and equipment to the TVD and supporting them from the air.

The Air Force currently has two combat commands (in Great Britain and the FRG) and a rear command. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force (the commander) is responsible for their development and for the elaboration of plans for the operational use of aviation in wartime, the organization and conduct of combat training, material-technical support, and also for the training of flight and technical personnel.

Combat aviation commands (the higher operational formation of the Air Force) consist, as a rule, of air groups (wings) that are operational-tactical formations. The group usually includes units and subunits based at the same airfield. The basic tactical unit of the Air Force is an air squadron numbering 8-18 craft, depending on the kind of aviation and the type of planes, and consisting of several detachments.

In mid-1984, the British Air Force had more than 1,500 different kinds of planes and helicopters (including up to 620 combat aircraft, of which roughly 430 are strike aircraft), 64 Bloodhound SAM launchers, and 48 Rapier SAM launchers (figure 1 [not reproduced]). Regular Air Force personnel number 92,000 men; the reserves number approximately 30,000.

The Air Force command in Great Britain (headquarters in High Wycombe), which is placed under the authority of the NATO command, has the forces and means to conduct independent air operations using both conventional and nuclear weapons. It executes tasks both on its own nation's territory and on NATO's ground and naval TVDs, primarily in Central Europe and in the areas of the Eastern Atlantic. In peacetime, a portion of its forces and means are already subordinate to the supreme commander-in-chief of NATO's joint armed forces in Europe....

The British Air Force command in the FRG (headquarters in Reindalen) has 12 combat air squadrons, one squadron of transport helicopters, and five squadrons of Bloodhound and Rapier SAMs. Organizationally, it is included in the 2 ATAF of NATO's joint air forces and makes up its basic strike force on the northern flank of the Central European TVD....

The rear command of the Air Force carries out the task of materially and technically supporting combat and auxiliary units and

divisions, and it also secures communications in the interests of the Air Force and [provides] training for flight and technical cadres....

The naval forces of Great Britain include the fleet, naval aviation, and marines. The personnel number approximately 72,000 men, of whom 7,800 are in the marines.

The fundamental combat tasks of Great Britain's Navy are to deliver nuclear-missile strikes against vitally important targets in the opponent's territory; to destroy ship groupings, surface ships, and submarines; to support ground troops on maritime axes; to conduct naval assault operations; and to protect sea lines of communication.

Naval headquarters (located in Northwood, a London suburb) is the organ for its operational and administrative control, headed by the chief of staff (the First Sea Lord). He is, in fact, the commander of the Navy and advisor to the Secretary of Defence on naval matters.

According to its organizational structure, the naval forces have five commands (the fleet, one command in Great Britain, naval aviation, the marines, and training), and one in the Gibraltar naval region....

Part of Great Britain's Navy is located in the South Atlantic around the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, in the Western Atlantic around Bermuda, in the Indian Ocean around Diego Garcia, and in the Western part of the Pacific Ocean (Hong Kong). The men and equipment in these zones are detailed from the naval fleet command and other commands....

The basic trend in the development of Great Britain's Navy is the qualitative improvement of the ships owing to the construction of various types of new, primarily special-purpose, modern combat ships. Because the period of service for the SSBNs expires in the first half of the nineties, the British government has decided to replace them with new ones, equipped with U.S. Trident-2 missiles. The plans provide for the construction of four or five SSBNs with a water displacement of 10,000-12,000 tons, each armed with 16 ballistic missiles.

To base its ships, Great Britain has established a ramified network of naval bases, principally concentrated on the nation's southern coast and in the Firth of Forth Bay. The largest naval bases are: Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Rosyth; where up to 76 percent of the basic types of combat ships are registered. In the Firth of Forth Bay (Scotland), there is a forward basing station for the U.S. Navy's SSBNs, Holy Loch....

Great Britain's armed forces are an obedient instrument in the hands of the Conservative government, striving--together with its NATO allies--to achieve military superiority over the USSR and other socialist community countries for the purpose of implementing its aggressive plans of action.

Lt. Col. V. Roshchupkin, "Ruled Out: The Nuclear Forces of England and France in NATO's Strategy," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* [Communist of the Armed Forces], No. 5 (Mar), 1985, 82-86.

Every month a convoy of several heavy trucks accompanied by buses with guards and motorcycles, having driven out of the installation's gates in Southern England, stretches out onto the highway and sets a course for the bay of Holy Loch. This is how the British magazine *New Statesman* describes the scene of the secret delivery of nuclear warheads...

We will recall that American nuclear-powered submarines are based in the Holy Loch area. In all, according to evidence from the above-mentioned *New Statesman*, there are more than 100 various Pentagon bases and military installations--including nuclear ones--located in the British Isles. In Bentwaters, Woodbridge, Alconbury, and on other bases on British soil, bombers from the U.S. strategic air command (SAC) with nuclear weapons on board are in constant readiness. With the start of the deployment of U.S. first-strike missiles, nuclear weapons are arriving at the Greenham Common base and soon, according to press reports, they will also appear in Molesworth.

Recently in London, after the passage of 30 years, official documents of the British government for 1954 were made public. From them it follows that even then sober-minded members of the cabinet were extremely alarmed by the aggressive, adventuristic policy of London's senior partner in NATO, Washington, who was trying to push the planet into the abyss of war. On the shores of the Thames serious fears were expressed because "the Americans were driving matters to a confrontation with the Soviet Union and that because of them a nuclear war could break out."

Even Winston Churchill, a fanatical anti-Communist, one of the troubadours and organizers of the anti-Soviet "crusade" against the young Country of Soviets and a proclamaant of the "Cold War" in the postwar period, was alarmed by the possible consequences of the nuclear course of Washington's official ship and by its persistent determination to pull London into its dangerous wake. "England has doomed itself to a position of being a target," certified Churchill as a result of the appearance of American nuclear bases on British soil.

But it is unlikely that at that time even such a patriarch of British politics as Churchill, having stood at her helm for many years, could have assumed that three decades later British authorities would not only unconditionally support U.S. and NATO nuclear strategy, but would themselves--ignoring any expenses--begin to diligently build up their own lethal potential. The convoy of vehicles mentioned at the beginning [of the article] is delivering nuclear warheads to Holy Loch every month, not for American but for British submarines. And these

lethal warheads are not made across the ocean, but by British manufacturers of death in the factories of Southern England....

One of the postulates of NATO doctrine says that the "security" of the bloc's countries can be assured only through the superiority of their combined nuclear might and by the decisive contribution of U.S. nuclear forces and readiness to use nuclear weapons first. England had nuclear weapons in 1952. And when in 1960 France began to acquire them, a kind of nuclear "three-way alliance" took shape within NATO.

In recent years the policies of the ruling circles of the United States and of the North Atlantic bloc as a whole have displayed more and more a determination to wreck the existing military balance between the USSR and the U.S. and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO at any cost. The determination of Washington and its partners to come from a position of strength along all lines and to dictate its will upon others, as was the case more than once, is also clear at the negotiating table. The present U.S. military doctrine openly stipulates that the United States must be the number one power militarily. The idea of military superiority determines the substance of all actions by the U.S. government and Washington's demands on its allies. It is precisely in the name of achieving superiority that programs have been put together to build up strategic offensive forces, nuclear and conventional arms, and to improve the military might of the U.S. and NATO as a whole.

To justify these unprecedented military preparations in the peoples' eyes, the West has often resorted to camouflage and to various kinds of ruses. In particular, they are stirring up the myth about the "Soviet threat" and Soviet military superiority with all their might. Comrade K.U. Chernenko underscored in his recent address to French readers when "Plon" publishers issued the book *The People and the Party are United*: those whose policies are fraught with the threat to universal peace and are attempting to send the public down a false trail, are suggesting that the source of military danger is located in the USSR. But to talk that way means forgetting history and means not seeing the real facts of the present day.

The facts indicate that there exists an approximate military-strategic parity between the USSR and the U.S. and between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This, incidentally, has been and is recognized by prominent political figures in the West and they confirm the appraisals of foreign military experts.

But apologists entrenched on both sides of the Atlantic in the nonsensical idea about Western military superiority do not wish to proceed from the principle of equality and identical security for the two sides. The Atlanticists have their own system for counting men and equipment--computing by elimination, [thereby creating] a militaristic, NATO-weighted system. One of the everyday propagandistic tricks of NATO politicians and strategists, a means of mass information, lies in the

following. In frightening the public in every way possible with Soviet medium-range missiles and with the USSR's military might as a whole, the U.S. and NATO leaders and Western propaganda exclude from their calculations British and French nuclear means; they pretend as though they do not exist at all.

The NATO-ites thereby hope to push into the consciousness of millions of West Europeans the notion of a certain "legitimacy" and "necessity" for the deployment of new U.S. missiles that has begun. One cannot help recalling that Washington's stubborn refusal to count British and French nuclear forces was, in due course, one of the reasons for the breakdown in talks to limit nuclear arms in Europe.

One of the West's propagandistic ruses is the assertion about the supposed "independent," "national" character of the British and French nuclear forces. But admissions by these very same NATO politicians and military men, as well as by reputable western publications say something different. Given a large-scale war, the *New York Times* indicates, British nuclear forces "would be immediately integrated into NATO." Moreover, open threats are heard from the pages of an official British document, the government's *White Paper*. In this "paper" it is written in black and white that the British nuclear forces, being an "indissoluble part" of NATO's nuclear potential, are capable of "inflicting such damage on the Soviet Union that the Soviet leadership must take them into consideration."

As for France's nuclear forces, as indicated by top secret U.S. intelligence documents cited by the *Washington Post*, French missiles are targeted on our country. France's signature is on the NATO treaty and, in accordance with this document, in the event of an armed conflict, France must act jointly with the other states of the North Atlantic bloc. And in this case, note observers, it is no longer so important whether Paris enters the bloc's military organization or not. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of NATO's joint armed forces in Europe, General Bernard Rogers, unequivocally declared that in the event of a war, France will join her forces to NATO's "very quickly." There is the "independent" character of the "national" nuclear forces for you!

Thus, expatiation about the fact that one supposedly must not include British and French missiles in the overall European nuclear balance is demagoguery, pure and simple. Although American weapons make up the foundation of the Atlanticists' nuclear might, the nuclear arsenal of England and France is also sufficiently great. The nuclear means of these two countries is a reality that cannot help but be considered. They exist, they are targeted against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and, as Americans themselves state, are intended to supplement the U.S.' forward-based nuclear means. This is a threat that must be considered and must be responded to. Hundreds of nuclear warheads are capable of reaching their targets; England and

France's missiles are standing in readiness. Let us discuss this in greater detail.

* * *

Military formations capable of using strategic nuclear weapons make up the foundation of Great Britain and France's nuclear forces. In both countries these weapons belong to the arsenal of strategic nuclear forces. We are talking about 162 British and French ballistic missiles. It is they that are earmarked mainly to fight a general nuclear war and, more precisely, to deliver strategic nuclear strikes. It is they, according to the appraisals of military specialists, that are considered to be a most important component of England and France's armed forces, and it is they that are accorded paramount attention. Expenditures on improving existing and on creating new strategic weapons systems are constantly increasing. In the event of a general nuclear war, strategic nuclear forces will operate jointly with general-purpose forces.

The development and organization of strategic nuclear forces in Great Britain, like the armed forces as a whole, is carried out in accordance with London's military-policy course, as well as with NATO's aggressive nuclear strategy. Reliance on nuclear weapons and readiness to set them in motion first is characteristic of this course.

Just what are Great Britain's strategic nuclear forces? They include units and divisions of Vulcan medium-range strategic bombers (56 planes) and nuclear missile submarines. These four boats--Resolution, Repulse, Renown, Revenge--also are members of NATO's joint armed forces and, in turn, carry out combat patrols. Each boat has 16 Polaris-A3 ballistic missiles with a firing range of up to 4,600 kilometers. In the bus of a single missile there are three warheads. In all, according to press data, there are 192 nuclear missile warheads with which the British boats are equipped, aimed at targets located in the USSR's territory.

In speaking about Great Britain's Navy equipped with nuclear weapons, it [the Navy], although inferior to the U.S.' naval armada, is nevertheless not equivalent to the navies of the other capitalist states. According to estimates by military experts, the British fleet is capable of accomplishing a considerable number of combat tasks both in a general nuclear-missile war and in limited wars--with and without the use of weapons of mass destruction. Press reports about the fact that during the Anglo-Argentinean conflict in the South Atlantic there were nuclear weapons on board the destroyer Sheffield and on board other British combat ships can serve as confirmation of this.

Moreover, they could be put into operation at any moment. It was only by sheer luck that there was not an explosion of nuclear warheads on the Sheffield when a missile hit her. Another ship tried to take a

portion of the nuclear weapons from the Sheffield but did not succeed. The British destroyer went to the bottom of the sea, along with its entire arsenal of nuclear means....

Great Britain's ruling circles have paid and continue to pay particular attention to improving and augmenting the offensive nuclear forces. The submarines are taking on modernized Polaris ballistic missiles that no longer have three, but six warheads. This, the leaders of England's military department assume, will significantly raise the might of the sea-based strategic nuclear force. In the nineties it is planned to place Trident-2 missiles on nuclear submarines that have eight warheads and have a greater range and accuracy. The British press reports plans to construct a new base for the submarines carrying Trident missiles on the Clyde River in Faslane (Scotland).

The decision to reoutfit the fleet's nuclear-powered submarines was made in 1979. At that time the cost of purchasing the missiles from the U.S. and of building four nuclear-powered submarines was estimated at 5 billion pounds sterling. The newspaper *The Sunday Telegraph* notes that given inflation, as well as the intention to purchase a more improved type of missile, the cost of the project has now doubled. When the submarine fleet equipped with Tridents is put into service, the nuclear might of the British force will immediately grow many times over. All this graphically testifies to the aggressive nature of British military doctrine, which has already demonstrated its essence in London's military adventure in the Falkland Islands. The position of the British government is thus: the country must possess modern, "independent," nuclear "deterrent weapons."

But the price for this "independence" has already been noted above. It is, as journalists have accurately noticed, the independence of the American "boot" on British soil. After all, in order to launch the Tridents, a guidance system is needed and the British, as the press emphasizes, cannot guide them without American satellites.

It is no accident that the program to rearm the British nuclear force with American Tridents has been criticized even by those in London from whom one would not have expected this at all. The former Chief of the General Staff of the British Army Lord Carver, for example, called the billion-pound expenditures on the American missile system an "erroneous choice of priorities." "Great Britain," wrote the Secretary of Defence in the "shadow" cabinet of the Labourites John Silkin, "no matter how we have examined this problem, does not have an 'independent' nuclear force. We have pretensions of such an independence, but we do not, of course, have it."

But the Tory government does not heed sensible voices. The rather enfeebled British lion is not able to rid itself of long-standing imperial ambitions, [choosing instead to] follow Uncle Sam's militaris-

tic knout constantly pointing at the East, and it is growling threateningly ever more frequently.

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has openly declared that she "would not waver in pushing the nuclear button on the Polaris missiles in the event a military conflict breaks out in Europe, even if this leads to the extinction of Britain." To all appearances, nuclear ambitions and anti-Sovietism have entered the flesh and blood of England's ruling circles so deeply that they are ready, with the recklessness of a card player, to stake the future of their own country.

However, ordinary Englishmen think differently. Despite the toxic fog of militaristic, anti-Soviet hysteria increasingly overtaking an already hazy Britain, many were outraged by the Prime Minister's statement. A veteran of the Queen's Air Force and participant at the landing of allied troops in France in June 1944, John Brown sent a letter to the editor of the newspaper *Moscow News*, published in Moscow in English, sharply condemning the extremely aggressive nuclear ambitions of official London.

This, in part, is what Brown wrote:

First, Mrs. Thatcher forgets that she can speak for [only] about one-third of the nation. Second, those on our small island who remember the battles of Stalingrad, Kursk, Moscow, and Berlin have not forgotten that it was thanks to these victories that the SS boot did not crush us and that we did not have an Auschwitz or a Buchenwald outside of London, Liverpool, or Glasgow. It is namely these Britons, and they are the majority, who know that the Soviet people are our friends, who saved us at a cost of 20 million lives of their own fellow citizens.

The majority of Britons also see that if Mrs. Thatcher pushes the ill-fated button, the response will follow immediately, and after several minutes the British Isles will cease to exist.

The USSR's position, set forth by Comrade K.U. Chernenko at a meeting in the Kremlin with the leader of the Labour Party Neil Kinnock, evoked a great response among the British who think the same way World War II veteran John Brown does. The Soviet Union advocates completely freeing Europe from both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons on the basis, of course, of the principle of equality and identical security for the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO countries. The Soviet Union would be prepared to reduce and physically liquidate the same portion of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR as would correspond to the number of nuclear missiles liquidated by the British side.

Britain's implementation of complete nuclear disarmament with the abolition of corresponding foreign bases would create the conditions whereby the USSR would guarantee that its nuclear weapons would not be targeted on British territory. In the event of an official decision by Great Britain on nuclear disarmament, the entire series of questions arising as the result of this move that are related to Soviet-British relations in the military sphere could become the subject of discussions and a corresponding agreement between the USSR and Great Britain.

This is a clear-cut, constructive position. How will London respond?

Member of the Politburo of the CPSU's Central Committee, first Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, A.A. Gromyko, responding recently to questions from political observers, once again underscored that British and French nuclear means must be taken into account. England and France are participants of the North Atlantic Alliance. It would be highly unwarranted if the North Atlantic Alliance were to receive a sort of addition or bonus, if one can say it thus, in the form of British and French nuclear means. In this matter the Soviet Union has a firm and principled position based on the principle of equality and identical security of both sides.

The Soviet soldiers, together with their comrades in arms--the soldiers of the fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact countries--in fulfilling their patriotic and international duty to defend the security of our country and of our friends and allies, constantly recall the growing military threat from NATO's aggressive circles. The Atlanticists allot a central place in their dangerous preparations to U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles, as well as to the nuclear forces of England and France....

Capt. 2nd Rank Yu. Galkin and Capt. 3rd Rank S. Grechin, "Great Britain's Naval Forces," *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* [Foreign Military Review], No. 2, 1983, 69, 71, 73-75. Excerpts.

Great Britain's ruling circles, following the lead of the U.S.' aggressive policy, is conducting a foreign policy aimed at strengthening its position in Western Europe and the NATO bloc, preserving its influence in various areas of the world, and retaining control over its remaining colonial possessions.

A special place in the achievement of these objectives is accorded to the Navy, traditionally playing the leading role among the country's branches of the armed forces. Serving as confirmation of this are the recent events connected with the Anglo-Argentinean conflict over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, when the Thatcher Conservative government, striving to revive Great Britain's former imperial greatness and to reestablish the colonial status of the islands, sent two-thirds of the British fleet's fighting strength to the South Atlantic.

The British naval forces, the largest in Western Europe, are part of NATO's joint naval forces. They are called on to demonstrate the bloc's might and to put pressure on the other states. As the Western press emphasizes, the basic tasks of Great Britain's naval forces are to deliver nuclear-missile strikes against targets in the opponent's territory; to destroy, with tactical nuclear weapons too, his ship groupings, surface ships, and submarines so as to gain and maintain supremacy in the area of combat action; to support ground troops on maritime axes; to conduct amphibious assault operations; to protect sea lines of communication; and to ensure the guarding of the 200-mile fishing zone and oil fields in the North Sea both in peacetime and wartime....

Fighting strength. According to data in the foreign press, at the start of 1983 the naval forces consisted of 32 submarines (four SSBNs, 12 nuclear, and 16 diesel), more than 180 combat ships and launches (3 antisubmarine aircraft carriers, 4 light cruisers, 8 guided missile destroyers, 18 guided missile frigates, 25 frigates, 8 patrol ships, 41 mine sweepers, 8 assault landing ships, 58 assault landing launchers, and 9 patrol boats), as well as more than 200 auxiliary missiles. In the reserve there is the Bulwark assault landing helicopter carrier, two *Tiger*-class cruiser-helicopter carriers, and up to 15 frigates.

Naval aviation has about 30 Sea Harrier aircraft with vertical or shortened take-off and landing, more than 120 antisubmarine and transport-assault landing helicopter and, apart from that, about 180 aircraft and helicopters of auxiliary aviation.

The Marines' armaments are: 105-mm guns, 82-mm mortars, Milan antitank guided missiles, Blowpipe antiaircraft guided missiles, and Giséle and Scout helicopters.

The Navy's personnel numbers 74,200 men (10,000 officers), including 7,000 marines....

Basing. Great Britain has created a ramified network of naval bases mainly concentrated on its southern coast and in the Firth of Forth Bay (Portsmouth is the main one, Gosport, Dartmouth, Londonderry, Portland, Rosyth, Plymouth, Rothesay, Chatham, and Faslane). In the Firth of Forth Bay (Scotland) there is the forward basing station for the U.S. Navy's SSBNs, Holy Loch. Plymouth, Portsmouth and Rosyth are considered the largest naval bases; up to 76 percent of the basic types of ships are assigned to them. The Faslane, Gosport, and Rothesay naval bases have special equipment in order to provide basing and material-technical facilities for nuclear-powered submarines....

Prospects for development. Judging from foreign press reports, the main direction in the development of Great Britain's naval forces is the qualitative improvement of the ship strength by commissioning various types of new, modern ships and submarines, primarily special-purpose ones (antisubmarine, air defense, and for combating a surface opponent).

Because the service time of the nuclear missile submarines now in operation expires in the first half of the nineties, the Thatcher government has decided to replace them with new ones which will be armed with U.S. Trident II missiles. It is planned to construct four or five SSBNs with a displacement of 10,000-12,000 tons.*

Three Trafalgar-class SSNs are in various stages of construction. The last of them is planned to be put into operation in 1985. It is proposed, moreover, to lay down another two boats of this class. New diesel submarines of the 2400-project are being developed to replace the Oberon and Porpoise-class submarines.

The Western press has also noted that by the end of 1985, in accordance with the Chevaline program, the rearmament of three SSBNs with Polaris-A3TK missiles instead of the Polaris-A3 should be completed. In addition, nuclear submarines are expected to be armed with Harpoon antiship missiles.

Construction is continuing on the Invincible-class antisubmarine aircraft carrier R09, the Ark Royal (its commissioning is planned for 1985), four Sheffield-class guided missile destroyers, four Broadsword guided missile frigates (in all, it is planned to have 26), a second Leeds Castle-class patrol ship and five Brecon mine sweepers. The development of a type-23 frigate is being carried out to replace the Leander-class ships.

* For greater detail about the prospects for the development of British SSBNs, see *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie*, No. 6, 1981, 65-63.--Ed.

Along with the construction of new ships, a lot of attention is being paid to the modernization of existing ones. For example, the Leander-class frigates are being reequipped, turning into guided missile ships. It is also proposed to reequip several fishing trawlers, turning them into mine sweepers designed to trawl for mines at great depths.

Great Britain's naval command attaches particular importance to raising the potential of naval aviation. To this aim, new classes of aircraft and helicopters are entering the inventory of the naval forces. In particular, certain classes of helicopters are being replaced: antisubmarine Wasps for Lynx and transport-assault landing Wessex for Sea Kings. A new antisubmarine helicopter, the WG34, is being developed (it will replace the Sea King).

According to evidence in the foreign press, events in the Anglo-Argentinean conflict over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands (during which Great Britain lost 5 ships--two guided missile destroyers, two guided missile frigates, and one assault landing ship--1 auxiliary vessel, up to 15 Sea Harrier aircraft, more than 20 helicopters, and 250 men) have revealed a number of vulnerable spots in the concept of surface ship construction and the inadequacies in their construction. At the present time the experience from this combat action is being carefully studied and, in the opinion of foreign specialists, in the future it could substantially affect the nation's shipbuilding program. At the same time, it is emphasized that significant changes in the organizational structure and outfitting of marine units and subunits is not anticipated.

Operational and Combat Training. Training is being carried out according to the plans of the national command and NATO's joint armed forces and has as its main objective raising the combat and mobilization readiness of divisions and units: improving the degree of staff training, mastering cooperation between various arms of the naval forces, naval air, and the marines; and using them within the structure of NATO's joint naval forces and jointly with other nations' naval forces. In the opinion of the bloc's military specialists, in order to achieve this objective the Navy's activities must not be limited to coastal areas, but the ships must be capable of carrying out any action under various weather conditions on the open sea and not yield to the opponent in anything.

British naval forces participate in practically all NATO exercises conducted in the Eastern Atlantic and Iberian Basin, as well as in the Mediterranean Sea. In this connection, particular attention is paid to the problems of ensuring the deployment of NATO's antisubmarine forces and strike fleet in the North Atlantic, of gaining and retaining supremacy in certain areas of the Norwegian and Greenland Seas, and of ensuring the transport of troops and cargo by sea in order to reinforce NATO joint armed forces' groupings in Europe.

According to data in the foreign press, as a member of NATO, Great Britain has committed itself to earmark up to 85 percent of the basic types of its ships, considerable naval aviation forces, and marines to the bloc's joint naval forces. For example, it has earmarked an anti-submarine carrier group (and antisubmarine aircraft carrier and escort ships) for NATO's strike fleet in the Atlantic. In addition, another aircraft carrier and eight escort ships are being given to NATO to protect ocean lines of communication. The British Marines are meant to conduct combat action in the North European TVD.

Great Britain's naval forces played a fundamental role in the conduct of the operation to seize the Falkland Islands. The western press has noted that the marines and naval aviation pilots were sufficiently well trained. At the same time, substantial inadequacies were revealed in the organization of air defense for ships and assault landing forces, especially in combat with low-flying targets. Several ships were lost because of the ineffectiveness of the long-range radar detection system of an air opponent. In this conflict, the British naval forces demonstrated the fleet's potential to transfer significant quantities of personnel and armaments over great distances.

The foreign press emphasizes that the naval commands of the bloc's nations are being studied and analyzed in depth and the experience of the British Navy's combat action in the South Atlantic is being used in conducting various exercises. Simultaneously, a number of tenets in the tactics of ship combat action are being reexamined, and new trends in the development of naval forces are being elaborated. The conflict, in the view of the British command, will have a substantial influence on Great Britain's naval strategy and its shipbuilding program. In particular, changes will be introduced into several tenets about concepts for constructing guided missile frigates and destroyers in order to raise the effectiveness of the air defense and to strengthen constructive defense.

All the above-cited information about the status and prospects for developing the British naval forces vividly testifies to the fact that the British fleet remains a main instrument of the aggressive policies of the nation's ruling circles.

Col. P. Shiryaev, "The British Air Force Command in the FRG," *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* [Foreign Military Review], No. 3, 1985, 37-41.

Great Britain's ruling circles, following the lead of Washington's aggressive policy, are constantly stirring up the arms race and are implementing a wide-scale program for modernizing and building up their armed forces' might. In recent years, they have unqualifiedly supported all the United States' militaristic aspirations and have justified U.S. actions to increase the American military presence in Western Europe and other regions of the world. Thus, the former Chief of Great Britain's Air Staff, Air Marshal Bitham, appearing before [a group of] college students, declared that the West European nations--and especially Great Britain--could and must do everything necessary to render "assistance to the Americans in protecting our common, expanding interests." Within this support, the main role belongs to the British military department which, by capitalizing on the alleged tendencies manifested during the Anglo-Argentine military conflict of a lag in the development of the nation's armed forces, obtained from Parliament additional appropriations to expedite outfitting the army, air force, and navy with new weapons systems and combat equipment. The foreign press reports that, as a result of the execution of the modernization program, impressive changes will take place in the Air Force, primarily in a more combat-ready British air grouping stationed in West Germany, known as the Royal Air Force Command, Germany (its headquarters are at the Reindalen air base). The organization, composition, and prospects for development of this command are listed below, based on information from the Western press.

Organization and combat composition. The Royal Air Force command in the FRG is currently unifying fighter-bomber, fighter (Air Defense), and auxiliary aviation, as well as individual units and subunits that protect and defend air bases, material-technical supply, and communications.

Judging by foreign press reports, the command consists of 14 air and four antiaircraft missile squadrons that are, organizationally, incorporated into five wings, four of them being air (the 134th, 121st, 135th, and 137th) and one missile (the 4th)....

As *Armed Forces Journal* notes, the command's air units and subunits are well trained and are maintained at a high level of combat readiness. To this aim, round-the-clock duty for the crews of combat aviation and teams of antiaircraft missile sites is organized. Thus, of those fighter squadrons permanently on combat alert, two teams are singled out who are on 5-minute take-off readiness. They are relieved every 8 1/2 hours. During the alert, surprise tests are conducted with take-offs and flights to intercept the "opponent." As the Western press notes, experience from such tests has demonstrated that a majority of the pilots from the 19th and 92nd fighter aviation squadrons are capable

of taking off from an alert status at the airfield 3 or 4 minutes after receiving the order.

In addition, on-duty carrier aircraft are singled out from the attack squadrons having nuclear bombs on board and are in constant readiness to take off in order to destroy targets located in the socialist community countries.

Development. Despite the sufficiently powerful contingent of its air force established in the FRG, the British military leadership is taking steps to significantly improve its strike power. To this aim, a program is being implemented to rearm its subunits with new Tornado multipurpose tactical fighters. As has already been reported, Great Britain's Ministry of Defence plans to acquire 385 of these planes for its Air Force, of them--220 Tornado-GR.1 fighter-bombers (figure 2 [not reproduced]) and 165 Tornado-F.2 Air Defense fighters. In 1983, 44 Tornado-GR.1 aircraft were delivered to the Air Force. Hereafter, it is planned to maintain this delivery rate until the end of 1989. According to data in the foreign press, since 1979 the British Air Force has already obtained more than 150 Tornado aircraft, which has allowed the command to establish the necessary material base for a smooth transition of the combat squadrons to the new aviation equipment.

The program to outfit the British Air Force in the FRG with Tornado aircraft is designed for 5 years (1983 through 1987). The first vehicles joined the 15th squadron of the 134th air wing back in September 1983. By the beginning of October, the squadron was at full strength, and the aircrew started to master flights in the new aircraft in the Central European TVD [theater of military action]. It was brought up to fighting strength in January 1984. During this squadron's transition to the new air equipment, its tasks were entrusted to the 16th light combat air squadron, that is, the combat readiness and striking power of the air group did not diminish. By now the rearming of the 16th light bomber air squadron has been completed.

It is planned to move the Buccaneer-S.2 light bombers taken from these subunits to Great Britain and to bring the 1st bomber air group (headquarters in Uphaven) up to full strength with them. It is reported that they are being worked on to make them compatible with the air-to-ship Sea Eagle missile. In the future they could be used to deliver strikes against naval targets, that is, to execute tasks in the interests of the navy.

After rearming the 16th and 15th squadrons, British military specialists have generalized the experience of switching to the Tornado aircraft and have elaborated measures to accelerate the process. Subsequent plans during 1984-1985 provide for reoutfitting the 20th, 31st, 17th, and 14th tactical fighter squadrons of the 135th Air Wing with new aircraft (the first of them has already been rearmed). From

the moment the first aircraft arrives in the squadron to the time it is brought up to fighting strength should take a total of 4 months.

Along with improving the qualitative state of the fighter-bomber squadrons, it is also planned to increase their quantity. Thus, in 1986 the Royal Air Force Command, Germany, will be strengthened by one more squadron of Tornado aircraft by resubordinating the 9th tactical fighter squadron (air station in Huntingdon, Great Britain) to the 135th air wing (airbase in Bruggen, West Germany).

By the start of 1986, when the necessary quantity of the aircraft reconnaissance variant of the Tornado tactical fighters has been produced, they will arm the 2nd reconnaissance air squadron of the 134th Air Wing. The foreign press reports that time tests of reconnaissance apparatus for these aircraft are now being completed. It is planned to install it in the nose of the fuselage and in special suspended containers. It is believed that this apparatus will ensure the conduct of air reconnaissance at low and extremely low altitudes and at the aircrafts' maximum flight speed. The sector of coverage of targets that have undergone reconnaissance will reach 180° in the front semisphere. Within the set, devices and sensors of various operating principles make it possible to record various characteristics of the objects that have been surveyed in order to reveal them day or night in simple or complicated meteorological conditions.

On the whole, so foreign military specialists believe, with the completion of the transition of the main units and subunits of the British air group in the FRG to the Tornado aircraft, its combat potential will grow several times over, particularly in delivering strikes against the opponent's second echelons and reserves. They draw such a conclusion on the basis of the high tactical-technical characteristics of the aircraft and the effectiveness of its weapons. The foreign press notes that the Tornado tactical fighter is the first West European combat aircraft capable of operating in simple and complicated meteorological conditions at extremely low altitudes (60 meters) and great speed (up to M=1.2), thanks to a system that provides automatic pilot during the practice of following the ground's configuration and out-flanking obstacles. In terms of its characteristics, it surpasses the analogous apparatus of the U.S. F-111 aircraft. The fighter's capability to function on a prolonged automatic pilot at extremely low altitudes in conjunction with the presence of onboard systems for active and passive jamming will, in the opinion of Western military experts, allow the crew to successfully break through the opponent's existing air defense system. They especially note the might of the aircraft's armaments and, consequently, its potential to destroy various targets. In particular, depending on the nature of the target and the tasks to be accomplished, it can carry two Mauser guns with an ammunition load of 360 rounds, conventional air bombs (Mk 13, Mk 15, Mk 82, and Mk 83), the OR.1177 nuclear airbomb, BL.755 bomb clusters, air-to-air guided missiles (Sidewinder), air-to-ship (Kormoran), air-to-surface (Maverick),

and guided bombs with laser and television guidance systems. In addition, flight tests of the new JP233 bomb cluster, specially developed for this aircraft, are being conducted; it is a container filled with 30 small-calibre, concrete-piercing bombs and 215 antivehicle mines. It is designed to take out runways, taxiways, concrete aircraft shelters, and other area targets. They expect the clusters to enter the inventory in 1985-1986.

After completing the transition of the above-mentioned units and subunits to Tornado aircraft, it is planned in 1987-1988 to replace the Harrier-GR.3 aircraft, which has verticle or shortened take-off and landing, with the improved Harrier-GR.5. Great Britain's Ministry of Defence has already ordered 60 such aircraft that, in the opinion of the experts, will make it possible not only to rearm the 3rd and 4th tactical fighter squadrons, but also to organize one more squadron (it is planned to have 18 vehicles in each of them), as well as to establish a reserve of six Harrier-GR.5 to make up for losses.

Based on the special features of the theater of military action, the British command has, so the foreign press reports, decided to leave the Phantom-FGR.2 air defense fighters (figure 3 [not reproduced]) in the 19th and 92nd fighter air squadron until the mid-nineties, until they are replaced by the new air defense fighter developed in the FEFA (Future European Fighter Aircraft) program by the FRG, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain jointly. In all, it is planned to build 800 of this type aircraft; of them, 250 for the FRG; 200 for France; 150 for Great Britain; and 100 each for Italy and Spain. The first test flight of the new fighter is planned for 1991 and the start of their arrival to the troops for 1994-1995.

Western military experts emphasize that as a result of the implementation of this program, the British Air Force command in the FRG is undergoing substantial quantitative and, especially, qualitative changes owing to its rearmament with the new aviation equipment. By the end of the eighties, this grouping will number 16 squadrons, including seven attack (105 Tornado tactical fighters), three equipped with Harrier-GR.5 aircraft (54), one reconnaissance (15 Tornados), two air defense Phantom-FGR.2 fighters (24), one communications, and two helicopter squadrons.

In addition, within the framework of the program to reinforce the British Air Force command in the FRG, it is planned to do some reconstruction of airfields for basing its units and subunits. For example, at Laarbruch, construction has already begun for additional stopping areas, missile service areas for servicing and repairing aviation equipment, and new taxiways and access roads are being built. During the next 2 years, new reinforced shelters will be constructed at the Laarbruch and Bruggen airbases, each of which will provide for the simultaneous stationing and full servicing of two Tornado aircraft. After reconstruction, four squadrons of this type of aircraft will be based at each of these airbases.

Col. V. Leskov, "Great Britain: Geographical Conditions, State System, Economy, and Elements of its Infrastructure," *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* [Foreign Military Review], No. 5, 1980, 21-26. Excerpts.

[Translators note: Because only a fraction of this article is of direct interest to this study and most of the information provided is, in fact, quite general (as the title suggests), the excerpts I have translated provide a feel for the flavor of the article rather than any profound insights, with the exception of the section on infrastructure. Clearly, however, this latter section and the map accompanying it is of considerable importance. As noted by British author Duncan Campbell (*New Statesman*, 31 October 1980) soon after the article appeared, Col. Leskov has "identified in a scarcely disguised fashion the targets of Soviet interest." Specifically, Leskov "provided an astonishing map of Britain with dozens of key locations and airbases marked or mentioned." Once again the Soviets have shown what value their open press materials can be to Western analysts.]

* * *

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the official name) is a very old capitalist nation, one of the initiators of the establishment of aggressive imperialist blocs, an active participant in NATO (total military appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979-80 came to about 9 billion pounds sterling), and is the second nuclear power, after the U.S., in the capitalist world.

The enormous colonial British empire fell apart in the postwar period as a result of the power of the national-liberation movement. In terms of the overall volume of industrial production, in recent years she has been forced back, by the U.S., Japan, the FRG, and France, to fifth place in the capitalist world.

However, Great Britain continues to play an important role in world politics and the capitalist economy.

...British ruling circles conduct a policy of collusion with the American imperialists and advocate intensifying the arms race. British imperialism is carrying out an aggressive policy in many regions of the globe and is obediently following the lead of the Carter Administration's policy in the Near and Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and other places....

The economy. Great Britain is a highly industrialized nation and one of NATO's arsenals. It supplies many states with weapons, first and foremost, the partners in its aggressive blocs and alliances. Foreign trade and the export of capital play a major role in its economy.

Occupying the dominant position in industry, trade, and finance are the nation's capitalist monopolies, in whose hands is concentrated military production. They are closely connected with monopolies in the U.S., FRG, France, and other states. In the postwar years U.S. monopolies have penetrated the British economy and have assumed strong positions in the economy....

Infrastructure. Great Britain is located at the intersection of important maritime and air ways and occupies an advantageous military-geographic position in Western Europe. The NATO command, taking these particular features into account, has assigned it to a special zone within the system of the European theaters of military action. The development and improvement of Great Britain's infrastructure is being implemented both according to national plans and according to the programs of the U.S. Armed Forces and the NATO bloc command.

There is established in the country a dense network of railroads and automobile roads, hundreds of civilian and military airfields, numerous ports and naval bases, warehouses for weapons and warheads (including nuclear ones), POL and various material-technical troop supplies, and pipeline systems (figure 1).


According to information in the foreign press, the U.S. Armed Forces and the NATO bloc command has, having taken Great Britain's advantageous strategic situation into account, established a considerable quantity of various installations on its territory.

Communication routes. The nation's main railroad hub is London (11 tracks meet there). Major hubs are Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow, Carlisle, Liverpool, Leeds, and Sheffield. The route from London to Western Midland and Lancashire is distinguished as having the heaviest traffic. In the opinion of foreign observers, the British railroads need to be modernized.... Air transport is developed.... Naval transport is of great importance;...the merchant fleet's tonnage exceeds 50 million tons....

Airfield network. According to foreign press data, there are 336 airfields and take-off and landing strips in the country, including more than 180 airfields with major runways. A large portion of them are concentrated in the South-East. According to foreign press reports, the airfield networks in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland are less developed. The largest civilian airfields (airports) are in London (Heathrow and Gatwick; construction of a third is planned), Bedford, Manchester, Bristol, Glasgow, and Stansted. The length of some of the runways at these airfields exceeds 3,900 meters, the width, 90 meters.

About 70 airfields belong to the British armed forces. The length of their runways [varies] from 2400 to 3200 meters. The largest of them are Boscombe Down, Gaydon, Coningsby, Marham, Manston, Scampton, Watton, Wittering, Waddington, Finningley, Fairford, Huntingdon, and

THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN'S INFRASTRUCTURE



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Source: *Zarubezhnoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, No. 5, 1980, p. 24.

[?] Elvington. Several airfields used by the British and U.S. Air Forces during World War II have, at the present time, been temporarily closed down. In the opinion of Western specialists, if necessary they could be used by modern combat aviation.

The operating civilian and military airfields are considered quite suitable for basing all types of airplanes. Modern equipment makes it possible to operate them in unfavorable weather conditions, day and night. Many of the nation's airfields (both civilian and military) are currently undergoing reconstruction: runways are being lengthened, their surfaces are being replaced with more durable ones, modern radar equipment is being installed, new taxiways and parking places are being constructed, and modern air terminals and storage facilities are being built.

Foreign specialists underscore the fact that the airfield network exceeds the nation's requirements and NATO plans stipulate using it to base aviation from other bloc nations.

Naval bases and ports. Great Britain's island status has fundamentally influenced the development of a wide-scale network of naval bases and ports. A large portion of the naval bases are located on the southern coast and in the Firth of Clyde Bay (Scotland).

The most important naval bases on the southern coast are Plymouth, Dartmouth, Portsmouth, Portland, and Gosport. In the Firth of Clyde Bay there are the Rothesay and Faslane naval bases, as well as the British naval basing station Fairlie. Also among the major bases are Chatham (southeast of London); Rosyth (on the coast of the Firth of Forth Bay in Scotland); and Londonderry (Northern Ireland). On Kintyre Island in Scotland there is a major basing station, Campbeltown.

Portsmouth is the main naval base where the main personnel training schools for the British Navy are concentrated: the torpedo-mine, artillery, communications, navigation, electronics, mechanics, and medical schools. Here all types of ships can be repaired.

In wartime it is intended to use a number of the nation's ports for basing the British navy and ships from other NATO countries. Great Britain has about 300 ports; the freight traffic of 30 of them exceeds 1 million tons (each). The largest ones include London (freight traffic of 60 million tons); Liverpool (30 million tons); Manchester; Glasgow; Hull; Bristol; and Newcastle (from 7 to 20 million tons each). Many ports are gradually being modernized: new loading and unloading equipment is being installed, the depth of their quays is being enlarged, and container berths are being built. A narrow field of specialization is characteristic for a large portion of British ports. For example, Felixstowe mainly works on container freight, while Milford, [?] Haven, and Southampton (figure 2 [not reproduced]) are important oil tanker ports.

Military warehouses. In various sections of the country a wide-scale network of warehouses for keeping weapons, munitions, and various military equipment has been established. According to foreign press information, there are nuclear munitions in warehouses constructed in the area of Upper Heyford, Bentwaters, Brize Norton, Wethersfield, Woodbridge, Greenham Common, Lakenheath, Marham, Sculthorpe, and Fairford. Near the Faslane naval base a warehouse has been built to keep the missiles for the nuclear missile submarines.

Warehouses for conventional armaments and munitions are distributed throughout the country, where ground troops are deployed and near air and naval bases.

Communication systems and means. Domestic and international communication systems have been widely developed in Great Britain. International telephone and telegraph communication is carried along underwater cables, radio and radio relay lines, and troposphere communication lines. Great Britain is connected with the U.S. and Canada by transatlantic telephone cables. Very important American lines also go through Great Britain, providing the Pentagon communication with U.S. troops in the European theater of war.

Great Britain's armed forces operate the Skynet communication system, using an artificial earth satellite, including the tracking and control station in Oakhanger (Hampshire County), ground stations at Cyprus, Bahrain, and Singapore, as well as two stations on British naval ships.

American bases and installations in Great Britain. According to foreign press reports, the contingent of U.S. troops in Great Britain numbers more than 20,000 personnel, stationed on more than 20 bases. Given the importance of Great Britain's strategic location, the Pentagon supports a ramified network of bases, nuclear and conventional weapons warehouses, various staffs, communication hubs, reconnaissance centers, and other installations.

Eight U.S. air bases are currently in the country: Upper Heyford (a runway 2,900 meters long); Bentwaters (2,700 meters); Brize Norton (3,000 meters); Wethersfield (2,700 meters); Woodbridge (2,700 meters); Lakenheath (2,700 meters); Mildenhall (2,800 meters); and Alconbury (2,700 meters). All of them are located in southeast England, on the shortest paths to Europe.

Recently, reports have surfaced in the press that the Pentagon is once again intending to restore the Greenham Common airbase that was closed down at the end of the fifties (Berkshire county, west of London). There it is planned to station reconnaissance aircraft, which will be used for reconnaissance of the Warsaw Pact nations. The most important strategic U.S. naval base is considered to be Holy Loch (Scotland), where the nuclear missile submarines of the U.S. Atlantic

Fleet are based. And here, in the Firth of Clyde Bay (at Glen Douglas) there is a nuclear weapons warehouse that, according to information in the foreign press, is designed to supply U.S. SSBNs with nuclear munitions. It has also been reported that military warehouses for U.S. troops have been built in West Ruislip, Welford, Chicksands, and elsewhere.

Various kinds of U.S. communication hubs have been built and are in operation in Great Britain. Among the largest are Croughton (part of the unified communication system of the U.S. armed forces); Edzell (in Scotland, for communication with the nuclear missile submarines); Thurso (Scotland); Londonderry; South Ruislip (Air Force communication hub); and Martlesham Heath and Hillingdon (scatter communication hubs). According to foreign press reports, a signals intelligence center has been built at Brawdy, whose activities are directed against the USSR and other Warsaw Pact nations.

Various U.S. troop and NATO armed forces' staffs are also located on the British Isles. Headquarters for U.S. Naval Forces in Europe are in London; at the airbase in Mildenhall, headquarters for the 3rd air army; and at Holy Loch, headquarters for the 14th squadron of nuclear missile submarines. Located at High Wycombe is the headquarters of the British Air Force command in the home country, which is simultaneously the regional NATO air command. The headquarters for NATO joint armed forces in the East Atlantic is located in Northwood (and is simultaneously the headquarters for NATO joint armed forces for the English Channel).

Great Britain's government is constantly increasing its military appropriations and is taking an active part in the arms race. It has set aside considerable sums of money for developing and improving its infrastructure. According to foreign press reports, recently the British Conservative government readily agreed to station 160 U.S. cruise missiles on its territory. It is planned to deploy the bases for them in eastern England. All of this once again testifies to the aggressive course of British militarists, actively supporting the U.S. and NATO militarists.

M. Belyaev, "Who Benefits From the Arms Race?" *Krasnaya zvezda*
[Red Star], 24 Jan 1985, 3.

It is difficult to name a large or a small armed conflict in virtually any corner of the world where, if British soldiers did not take part, British weapons were not used. But never has the flywheel of the arms race in Great Britain untwisted with such rapidity as now.

In only a few years, from fiscal years 1978-79 to 1984-85, military appropriations have increased by 27 percent and the military budget has reached an unprecedented sum--17,033 million pounds sterling. England is not only fulfilling, but is overfulfilling U.S. and NATO requirements for an annual 3-percent increase in their military budgets. But even such growth rates for military expenditures are considered insufficient by certain British circles.

For example, Great Britain's Secretary of Defence Michael Heseltine recently announced a new 20-year military program that will "cost" 360 billion pounds sterling. Central to this program is the outfitting of British naval forces with the U.S. Trident nuclear-missile system, for which 11 billion pounds sterling have been allocated, as well as the mass production of Harrier airplanes, the modernization of tanks, and the creation of new types of conventional arms.

The question involuntarily arises as to why a country, suffering from economic disorders, allows itself to divert such large sums of money to the arms race? No small role in the build-up of Great Britain's military might is played by the ambitious plans of the Conservatives, dreaming about the former greatness of the British empire and aspiring to play a leading role in the Western world. Washington's instigative actions also contribute to the expansion of Great Britain's militaristic preparations. However, to a significant extent, the arms race depends on the egotistical activities of the British military-industrial monopolies.

For those who make their business in blood, government orders for arms deliveries are truly a "gold mine." After all, work on military arsenals means not only increased revenues, but also a guaranteed market for sales, regardless of the oscillations in the economic state of affairs. The British journal *Labour Research* noted that during an economic recession profits fall in most fields and within most companies; only firms concerned with military production "experience a boom." Among the weapons smithies who receive the largest orders for arms deliveries and who, correspondingly, have the greatest profits are Ferranti, Racal Electronics, Plessey, and Marconi-Elliott. No small amount also falls to aircraft construction corporations.

The largest supplier of aerospace armaments is the British Aerospace company. It was created by the state in 1977 and soon was one

of the leaders in military production. Its profits from sales of aviation equipment and, to an even greater extent, from sales of missiles and space equipment depend completely on orders from the Ministry of Defence. About one-eighth of all state military expenditures goes directly to this company.

The enumerated companies are basically engaged in military business. But there are also industrial giants participating in it for whom arms production makes up only a portion of their basic activities. Take, for example, British Leyland, IKI, and British Petroleum. They, like the others, do not let a chance go by to receive their share of the profits from the production of instruments of death. Thus, without the participation of the electronics company General Electric, which does not formally number among the military-industrial corporations, virtually not a single major militaristic project would get out.

Several dozen major monopolies snatch up the main mass of orders from the Ministry of Defence and, correspondingly, the fattest pieces. However, through the system of subcontracting, approximately 5,000 small and mid-sized firms are drawn into arms production. As a whole, a significant portion of British industry works for the Ministry of Defence: 45 percent of aerospace production, 30 percent of ship construction, and 20 percent of the electronics industry go to military purposes.

By holding powerful positions, military corporations are stimulating in every way possible the state's actions directed at the arms race and are decisively influencing the formation of state policy in the military sphere. In this connection, industry's close connections with the military circles and state apparatus are used on a broad scale. Essentially, we are talking about the activities of a far-flung military industrial complex in Great Britain.

The monograph that has come out in England, *The Elite and Power in British Society*, discusses the close interaction between the monopolies and the ruling elite. It notes the fact that "the directors of industrial companies are the elite of the elite." The authors of the monograph stress that the offices of the monopolies are directly connected to the corridors of power.

To fully guarantee that military orders are pushed through, many weapons concerns include on their board of directors former officials from military departments and retired generals and admirals who have not lost the "necessary" connections. Rolls Royce, Racal Electronics, Ferranti, and other companies regularly resort to the services of retired military men. For example, in 1982 the highest paid director of Racal was R. Brown, who had earlier occupied a prominent post in the Ministry of Defence. The company estimated his services at 127,500 pounds sterling.

But British military companies probably resort to hiring such "specialists" only for extra insurance. After all, the majority of Parliament is made up of "their own" people who themselves know what to do. Of 315 Conservative deputies who do not have ministry posts, 157 people hold 355 director chairs in various firms and 105 act as "consultants" in 219 companies. Former Prime Minister Callaghan, so *Labour Research* writes, in looking at several Members of Parliament, was at a loss: "Just whose interests do they represent? Are they acting in accordance with their posts or are they defending their own interests and the interests of their friends?"

With the advent to power of the Conservatives several years ago, who traditionally protect the interests of big capital and the British aristocracy, the role of the military-industrial complex in militarizing the country has grown even more. The profits of military corporations have also grown. In 1982-1983 the Ministry of Defence paid out 6.8 billion pounds sterling on its contracts, 60 percent of the payment being made at rates, which assured extraordinarily high revenues. The military-industrial complex was one of the initiators in unleashing the Anglo-Argentinean war for the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. During this adventure, the military corporations wanted to demonstrate the potentials of the products they had produced. However, the main incentive was leaked information about the existence of large oil reserves in this region and the desire to be in charge of them.

In trying to please big business, the Tory government has transferred previously nationalized corporations into private hands. Controlling shares of the Ferranti firm were auctioned, as well as a considerable portion of British Aerospace, and British Shipbuilders is next in line to be sold. It is significant that this process primarily affects the most profitable corporations. In commenting on the intention to sell Royal Ordnance Factories--a producer of small arms--back into private hands, *Labour Research* noted that its previous year's profits of 68.2 million pounds sterling will be good bait for buyers.

The irrepressible appetite of the military-industrial complex is satisfied primarily at the expense of already "overburdened" expenditures on social needs. And today Great Britain's cannon kings insist on reducing so-called "state services," excluding, of course, military expenditures.

However, the arms race is not the path that can ensure the growth of international authority, the development of stable business relations with other countries, or the strengthening of the peoples' security. Recent events show that, within official British circles, there is a growing understanding that the new spiral in the arms race mapped out across the ocean, especially spreading it to space, threatens to turn Great Britain into a mere appendage of Washington's military-political machine. Under these circumstances, it is becoming more and more difficult for the military-industrial complex to impose a policy on the country that is favorable to it.

A. Volkov, "The British Military Aid Program," *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* [Foreign Military Review], No. 3, 1984, 37-38.

As was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, the imperialist forces are trying to win over Third World states so as to manage their natural resources more freely and to use their territory to execute aggressive schemes. To these ends, Great Britain's ruling circles are making wide-scale use of military-economic ties in their relations with the developing countries. At the turn of the eighties, increased attention was paid to the so-called military aid program, whose principal objective was to train and educate military and technical personnel for the armed forces of the developing states.

Great Britain's military-political leadership has traditionally viewed the training of foreign servicemen as an instrument of foreign and military policy. A report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the British Parliament points out, in particular, that military aid is one of the components of the West's strategy and it especially singled out the fact that the military aid program contributes to the formation of pro-Western political views among the officer corps of the developing countries' armed forces.

Official inquiries about assisting in the training of military and technical personnel are usually directed through military attaches. They are reviewed by the Secretary of the Ministry of Defence together with the military department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The form of this assistance is determined during visits of working groups of experts from the appropriate sections located within departments of the armed forces' branches. The training of foreign servicemen is carried out in Great Britain or in the country itself with the assistance of British military advisors.

During the period 1974 to 1981 representatives of 114 states, including 92 developing countries, were educated in military institutions of learning and training centers in Great Britain. Foreign specialists note that despite an increase of almost two and a half times in the overall cost for education from 1974 to 1978, the number of servicemen being trained did not go down and, at the present time, is between 7,000 and 8,000 men per year on the average. The portion of foreign servicemen in the overall number of students at military institutions of learning and training centers comes to 6.5 percent in a given year; in some of them (the Air Force technical training center in Hellton, the Air Force staff college in Bracknell and the Navy training centers in [?] Manadon and Excellent) it reaches 25 percent. A special directory is published annually and distributed among the military attaches indicating vacancies in military institutions of learning and the areas of specialization. Usually up to 500 various courses and other types of special training are offered.

Yet another form of assistance in training foreign personnel is the dispatch to other countries of military advisors who are servicemen in the British armed forces. At the start of the eighties about 750 British military advisors were in 27 states of the world. The largest groups were located in Oman (132 men); Kuwait (129); Brunei (125); Nigeria (58); and Saudi Arabia (more than 50).

Candidates wanting to serve as advisors in foreign armies are selected from among volunteers after consultation with the personnel bureau of the Ministry of Defence. As a rule, there is no shortage of candidates. Advisors sign a contract for 1-1/2 to 2 years. Their principal task is to teach staff officers and instructors in order to train the ranks. The poor organization of the rear service, as the foreign press notes, remains a weak point in the armed forces of many developing countries. In this area, too, Great Britain provides help through advisors. According to foreign press reports, in certain countries officers of the British Air Force's special purpose troops have rendered their "services" on how to conduct antiguerrilla warfare.

The activities of a group of British military advisors in Nigeria serves as a characteristic example. Roughly 60 percent of them are occupied with training staff officers of the ground troops in the military educational center in Kaduna, while the rest are equally divided between the Air Force and Navy. In connection with the 1981 purchase of British Vickers Mk 3 tanks, advisors are awaited so they can help reorganize Nigerian tank and mechanized units and [help teach how to] master the new equipment.

In addition, Great Britain sends (for up to 3 months) individual servicemen and entire subunits, mainly engineer troops, to Third World countries in order to execute specific tasks. Such subunits, for example, are sent annually to Kenya to build and repair bridges, roads, and other elements of the military infrastructure. In contrast to advisors, who wear the military uniform of the armed forces of the country they are in, these servicemen remain in British uniform.

Along with the military advisors, former servicemen for Great Britain fulfill the same tasks, now working under contract in the armies of the developing countries. In the armed forces of the African countries alone they number some 500 men, more than double the number of British military advisors.

The financing of a training program of foreign military personnel comes from two sources. First, from Great Britain's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' budget (in the form of gratis subsidies) and second, from the countries receiving the military aid. The terms for paying for the services within a given program depend on several factors. Usually the recipient countries pay up to 90 percent of the expenses connected with British military advisors' stay in their country. But if it is located in a strategically important region or if there are favorable prospects

for exporting British weapons and combat equipment there, then Great Britain's government takes it upon itself to pay 90 percent of the services granted. The education of foreign servicemen in Great Britain is paid for based on virtually the very same terms, but with the sole difference that Britain requires a certain portion of the payment in advance.

Payment for education includes upkeep expenses for teachers, the cost of munitions and other military things used during teaching, current expenses for and depreciation of training equipment and other types of special teaching equipment, buildings, and installations. The overall cost of these elements is calculated for each course and is divided by the number of students. Quartering and food expenses are considered separately.

On the whole, the British government subsidizes the education of 20 percent of the total number of foreign servicemen undergoing training in Great Britain. Whereas the volume of budgetary expenses for implementing the military aid program in fiscal year 1978-1979 came to 6 million pounds sterling, 1 year later it had reached 7 million. In 1980-81 and in 1981-82 already 10 million pounds sterling were spent for these purposes, and in 1982-83 and in the current fiscal year, 13 million.

Along with training foreign servicemen, budgetary monies allocated to this program are sometimes directed at financing gratis deliveries of weapons and military equipment. For example, in 1982 two naval patrol planes, BN-2B Defenders, were purchased for the armed forces of the former British colony of Belize; their delivery was paid for out of funds from the military aid program.

Great Britain is also trying to exploit connections with the developing states in order to train the servicemen of its own armed forces. Beginning in 1971, according to an agreement with the government of Kenya, about 1,000 British soldiers take part annually in 6-week exercises in East Africa. Basically, these are marine subunits with limited engineering support that are stationed at the air force base in Nanyuki (150 kilometers to the north of Nairobi). In [?] Kahava (the Nairobi area), a liaison group of British ground troops (umpires) is carrying out the control and rear support for the exercises. In the opinion of Great Britain's military-political leadership, Kenya's territory, with its diverse relief of terrain and climate, is quite suitable for training British troops; they acquire experience in conducting combat action in a tropical area, which could be useful in the event of armed intervention in this region in the future. Joint maneuvers are also carried out with units from the Kenyan army, which provides liaison officers for the duration of the exercises.

In recent years, commercial factors have played an important role in the expansion of the military aid program inasmuch as the developing

states, as foreign specialists note, are trying to acquire military equipment in those countries where their servicemen are being trained. This is because their education is conducted according to British study programs and manuals, and the servicemen study British-made weapons systems and become acquainted with the purchasing procedure. Great Britain's military-industrial firms exploit this fact and put pressure on its country's government to connect military aid programs more closely with arms trade. It is precisely for this reason that the Western press calls the training of foreign military and technical personnel "the invisible export of weapons."

For example, Oman's armed forces--one of the largest purchasers of produce from Great Britain's military-industrial firms--is equipped virtually in full with British weapons. This is no accident, as all of Oman's senior naval officers, more than two-thirds the Air Force's officers, and more than half the ground troops officers, including the commanding officers, are either British military advisors or former British servicemen. In addition, the overwhelming majority of Oman officers and even the head of state himself, Sultan Qaboos, went through training in British military institutions of learning.

N. Nikolaev, "Great Britain: Following the Lead of the U.S.' Aggressive Course," *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* [Foreign Military Review], No. 7, 1984, 9-13.

The international situation today is not only tense, but also fairly dangerous. "Unfortunately, there are forces in the world that have linked their interests with the arms race and are openly counting on undermining the existing military-strategic balance. The stationing of first strike nuclear weapons in several West European countries aimed at our country and its allies is one manifestation of this policy that is dangerous for the cause of peace," announced the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade K.U. Chernenko. The responsibility for the situation that has been created lies primarily on the United States of America. At the same time, the United States has received comprehensive assistance and support from its NATO allies, primarily Great Britain, in implementing the course aimed at attaining military superiority over the USSR.

Britain's ruling circles have, together with the U.S., severed the alliance with the USSR that existed during World War II and have initiated an arms race and a "Cold War" against our country and the other socialist states. In 1949 Great Britain actively aided the U.S. in putting together the aggressive NATO bloc. It has always participated in or supported all the aggressive actions American imperialism has repeatedly conducted in various areas of the world. Great Britain provoked such actions in Africa, the Middle East, and in other regions. New proof of British imperialism's constant readiness to resort to any forcible means, including military force, to achieve its expansionist objectives was the neocolonialist adventure to capture the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in April and May 1982.

At the present time, this nation's government is diligently strengthening its colonial domination over the above-mentioned islands. In the estimates of foreign specialists who were there, they "are being turned into England's military outpost in the South Atlantic": a large military base is being established with underground weapons depots (including missile and nuclear weapons), new barracks are being erected for 15,000 men, a modern repair base is being organized, and takeoff and landing strips for any kind of aircraft are being constructed. Western specialists assume that NATO will necessarily take upon itself a share of the expenses to create the Falklands' military infrastructure where the best types of modern U.S. armaments will be delivered. In addition, it is planned to have satellite communication stations and control centers on the islands.

As in the U.S., in peacetime a large segment of the fighting strength of Great Britain's armed forces is located outside the home country. The largest group of ground troops and the one most prepared

to conduct combat action--the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR)--is located in the FRG and is a member of NATO's joint armed forces in Europe. British ships, along with U.S. naval forces, make up NATO's strike force in the Atlantic. Significant contingents of Great Britain's armed forces are deployed at its military bases in Gibraltar, on Cyprus and the Maldives, in Hong Kong and Singapore, and on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands.

Great Britain occupies a special place within the military structure of the North Atlantic bloc. The country has a developed infrastructure network for its own armed forces. American troops are also deployed here, possessing several dozen military bases: airfields where strategic bombers with nuclear weapons and reconnaissance aircraft are based; a naval base for nuclear-powered submarines with nuclear missiles (at Holy Loch); control and communication stations, and various kinds of warehouses.

Great Britain, being the only West European country belonging to NATO's military organization that possesses and produces nuclear weapons, has always supported all the plans of the U.S. military-political leadership with respect to the further buildup of their nuclear might. It was an active supporter of the adoption by the bloc's leadership in December 1979 of the decision to deploy 572 new medium-range U.S. missiles in a number of West European states starting in 1983. It is planned to station the largest number of them, with the exception of the FRG, on British territory--160. At the same time, a program to modernize the British strategic force is being carried out, as a result of which the nuclear submarines with Polaris-A3 ballistic missiles will be replaced with new nuclear submarines armed with the latest U.S. Trident-2 ballistic missiles.

From the very start, the West has stated that only "U.S. and Soviet improved-range theater nuclear-missile systems" will be examined at the Geneva talks. This is an absolutely unacceptable prerequisite for the Soviet Union, which it cannot under any circumstances agree to, inasmuch as it stipulates the arbitrary exclusion of one component from the complex system of the balance of this range of nuclear arms in Europe, and at this stage it responds to the interests of the U.S. and NATO.

In accordance with the West's position, it is planned to keep outside the talks' framework British and French ballistic missiles on submarines, French land-based medium-range ballistic missiles, U.S., British and French medium-range aircraft, as well as U.S. deck aircraft. In 1980, Francis Pym, then Great Britain's Secretary of Defence, made an official statement in Parliament and acknowledged the existence of only 226 land-based long-range nuclear systems in the European theater of war for NATO, including 170 U.S. F-111 fighter-bombers and 56 British Vulcan bombers (all of them based in Great Britain). However, in the opinion of the bloc's leadership, even these arms will not be subject to examination at the talks inasmuch as they do not fall

under the definition of "U.S. nuclear-missile systems." In reality, they are demanding that the Soviet Union not make note of the existence of 857 medium-range nuclear weapons carriers that NATO has in Europe.

Such a position reflects the fundamental principles of the NATO ringleaders to acquire a significant strategic advantage.

At a press conference in 1979, Luns--then Secretary General of NATO--reported that all the Pershing-2 missiles would be deployed in the FRG, while the cruise missiles would be distributed in the following manner: 160 in Great Britain, 96 in the FRG, 112 in Italy, and 48 each in Belgium and the Netherlands. Among the U.S.' European allies, it was first and foremost Great Britain and the FRG that played an active role in deciding to deploy these missiles.

As appears from the statement by the Soviet leadership on 24 November 1983, the decisions by the FRG, Great Britain, and Italian governments, unequivocally indicate that they were adopted contrary to the will of their own peoples and the interests of security of their own countries, as well as of European and universal peace.

In 1980 Pym made an official announcement in Parliament about the deployment of U.S. cruise missiles on two existing British military bases. They are the reserve airbase of the United States Air Force located on the Royal Air Force's Greenham Common base in Berkshire county and the Royal Air Force's Molesworth base (Cambridgeshire county) which at the present time is being used as a warehouse by the United States Air Force. There will be six units of cruise missiles at Greenham Common and four in Molesworth.

In June 1980 (more than 3 years before the planned deployment of the missiles and considerably earlier than the start of the Soviet-American INF talks) it was officially stated that there was a need to place the first missiles into service as quickly as possible. [This] indicates the intention of both Great Britain's Conservative government and the U.S. administration to view the proposal about the talks as a propagandistic action and to speed up in every way possible preparations to deploy the new missiles so as to definitively deprive the talks of any chance for success. It is no accident that it was Great Britain that became the first NATO country in which the actual deployment of U.S. missiles began. On 14 November 1983 the first batch of the cruise missiles were delivered to the Greenham Common base.

The fact that, in planning to deploy the missiles the U.S. and NATO were setting quite definite strategic objectives is indicated by the selection of the formula which states how the decision to use them is to be made. According to the existing practice of using the missiles, like the other U.S. nuclear arms deployed in Great Britain, consultations must be carried out between the British and American governments. This procedure is known as the "joint adoption of a decision" and is set

forth in a special Anglo-American agreement. It grants the United States the right to decide whether to launch the missiles. This has created well-founded alarm within Great Britain's progressive public. Demands are resounding throughout the country to resort to a so-called "dual key system," which has already been adopted for the British Army on the Rhine's Lance missiles, the M-110 (203.2 mm caliber), and M-109 (155 mm) howitzers, and was used in the past for the Thor missiles. Its essence lies in the presence of two chains of command duplicating each other that are locked to the governments of the U.S. and Great Britain.

Under such an organization it is practically impossible to use the weapons without a decision by both countries. Francis Pym answered the question of why this system is not being used for U.S. cruise missiles in the following way: "We could have a dual key if we had taken part in paying for this weapon system and in owning it, but we have not; this system belongs to the United States." However, the real reason is different. By deploying the missiles, the U.S. is trying to acquire a first-strike potential that could be implemented only through rapidity and surprise. The "dual key" procedure is extremely unwieldy and therefore many military figures treat tactical systems that use it with distrust. The U.S. has concentrated the whole process of making the decision in its own hands so as to ensure for itself the possibility of carrying out a surprise, concentrated launch of missiles against the Soviet Union's territory at the necessary moment. This fully conforms to the adventuristic intentions of the present U.S. administration which is attempting to limit a nuclear war to Europe and to thereby deflect retribution from the U.S., leaving its European partners in the NATO bloc vulnerable to a retaliatory nuclear strike.

The tactical-technical characteristics of the land-based cruise missiles point out that they are a first-strike weapon. However, the Western press has repeatedly maintained that cruise missiles fly relatively slowly and therefore cannot be a first-strike weapon. In one of his speeches, Great Britain's former Deputy Secretary of Defence Peter Blaker stated: "They fly at approximately the same speed as a British Airways jet airplane. They would need 3 hours to reach Moscow." Stating the issue this way is a deliberate and flagrant distortion of reality. For example, doctor of physics [?] D. Penman has written: "For any kind of astute specialist, it is obvious that the low speed of cruise missiles must necessarily reflect some kind of extremely important military advantages. These are, of course, the guidance system and the difficulty of detecting [the missiles] with radar, which is connected with the extremely low flight and, consequently, with low speed. Detecting cruise missiles is difficult, because weak radar signals reflected off them must be separated from so-called local ground interference. These missiles are highly accurate and are capable of hitting protected launch installations, which makes sense only if the missiles are located in the silos. Thus, one can say that cruise missiles are a first-strike weapon."

USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, characterized the purpose of the new weapon in the following manner: "U.S. missiles, having a range of 2,500 kilometers, are a first-strike weapon and intended for fighting a nuclear war in Europe." The most dangerous, destabilizing characteristic of the new missiles lies in their ability to hit strategic targets in the European part of the USSR. The United States assumes that, having used them first, it will be able to deprive the Soviet Union of the potential to cause the West unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike.

British imperialism's plans connected with the stationing of new U.S. missiles in Europe are reflected in the British government's attitude toward the Soviet-American talks to limit strategic arms and medium-range nuclear arms in Europe. Great Britain's position on this matter is important not only because it is an imperialist power in the political and military sense, having its own nuclear armaments and being one of the U.S.' principal allies, but also because the Soviet Union is proposing to limit the number of Soviet missiles and warheads in the European part of the USSR to the very number of British and French ballistic missiles and the warheads on them.¹

The British strategic force is made up of four nuclear submarines built in Britain from 1967 to 1969 and having 16 Polaris-A3 U.S.-produced ballistic missiles. Each missile is equipped with multiple re-entry vehicles (three warheads of 200 kilotons each) manufactured in Great Britain. Since 1983, under the Chevaline program, the missiles have been equipped with MIRVs, containing six warheads of a 40 kilotons yield each.

British ruling circles see the objective of the Chevaline program in ensuring the effectiveness of the British SLBMs until a new system is put into service. In 1980, Francis Pym announced in Parliament the British government's decision to acquire the U.S. Trident-1 SLBM; however, following the U.S. announcement of its strategic program for the eighties, the Conservative government decided to acquire the new, significantly more effective Trident II ballistic missile.

The program to put Trident II missiles into service will mean significant qualitative changes in the British strategic force: giving it the potential to deliver a first strike from far away, increasing the quantity of warheads, and significantly raising the yield of the missiles and the performance characteristics of the submarines. Deputy leader of the Labour Party Denis Healy, former Secretary of Defence from 1964 to 1970, wrote in an article published in the newspaper *Observer*: "The British force, after being outfitted with Trident missiles, would

1. Great Britain has 64 Polaris-A3 SLBMs, France has 80 M-20 SLBMs and 18 land-based S-3 medium-range ballistic missiles (in all, 162 ballistic missiles).

have a greater striking yield than all the Soviet SS-20 missiles put together."

Great Britain's ruling circles view the British strategic nuclear force as the most reliable guarantee for protecting the interests of British imperialism. Proceeding from such a guideline, they are trying to avoid situations that could complicate maintaining this force in constant combat readiness or that could make its modernization more difficult. This fact, along with the Conservative government's following "in spirit and letter" the NATO decision to deploy the missiles, has been the reason Great Britain is against counting Britain SLBMs at any talks.

From the very beginning, Great Britain has been one of the most active accomplices of the U.S. in implementing the U.S. line to thwart the talks and to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in Europe. The British government supports the strategic course of the ruling circles of the U.S. and NATO aimed at achieving military superiority over the USSR and, in the final analysis, abolishing socialism as a social system, not only under pressure from the United States but also on its own initiative. Therefore, it must bear the same degree of responsibility before the entire world as do the U.S. militarists.